

FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FETISHISM

From normal to pathological sexuality

Ednei Soares de Oliveira Junior

Research Institute of the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology, and Religious Studies

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Freudian Psychoanalysis and Fetishism

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Ednei Soares de Oliveira Junior

Center for Contemporary European Philosophy
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Promotoren:
prof. dr. H. Westerink
prof. dr. P.I.M.M. van Haute †
prof. dr. G. Massara Rocha (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazilië)

Manuscriptcommissie:
prof. dr. G.J. van der Heiden
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prof. dr. V. Safatle (Universidade de Saõ Paulo, Brazilië)

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by

Ednei Soares De Oliveira Junior
born on July 14, 1982
in Governador Valadares (Brazil)

PhD supervisors:
prof. dr. H. Westerink
prof. dr. P.I.M.M. van Haute †
prof. dr. G. Massara Rocha (Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil)

Manuscript Committee:
prof. dr. G.J. van ver Heiden
prof. dr. U. Kistner (University of Pretoria, South Africa)
dr. V. Blüml (Medical University of Vienna, Austria)
dr. J. Sumic Riha (The Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Slovenia)
prof. dr. V. Safatle (University São Paulo, Brazil)

Summary

This dissertation investigates Sigmund Freud's theory of fetishism by discussing two major philosophical problematics. These problematisations are discussed in terms of 1) how Freud's theory of fetishism challenges the status of perversions as pathological, and 2) how Freud's thoughts on fetishism can explain whether human sexuality is dependent of a sexual object. The main argument of the structure in which this dissertation is organized is the influence of the ideas of the French psychologist, Alfred Binet, on Freud's psychoanalytic thinking on fetishism. It is argued that in his work, Freud evolves Binet's ideas and conceptualizations with a view to solve problems caused by fetishism in Freud's psychoanalytic theory of the topic. This dissertation also claims that the influence of Binet's ideas on fetishism in Freud's psychoanalytic thinking can be likewise seen in Freud's theory of perversion and in his overall theory of psychopathology. Lastly, this dissertation discusses the ideas of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, on fetishism. It is discussed that Lacan's ideas on the topic are linked to a theorization on subjectivity and on the object of human desire. Here, this dissertation discusses the difference between Freud's and Lacan's theory on fetishism as well as the fact that Lacan's psychoanalytic thinking on fetishism and other topics is also engaged with evolving Binet's ideas.

Samenvatting

Deze dissertatie onderzoekt Sigmund Freuds theorie over fetisjisme door twee belangrijke filosofische problemen te ontwikkelen. Deze problematiseringen worden besproken in termen van 1) hoe Freuds theorie van fetisjisme de status van perversies als pathologisch uitdaagt, en 2) hoe Freuds gedachten over fetisjisme kunnen verklaren of de menselijke seksualiteit afhankelijk is van een seksueel object. Het belangrijkste argument van de structuur waarin deze dissertatie is georganiseerd, is de invloed van de ideeën van de Franse psycholoog Alfred Binet op Freuds psychoanalytische denken over fetisjisme. Gesteld wordt dat Freud in zijn werk de ideeën en conceptualiseringen van Binet ontwikkelt met het oog op het oplossen van problemen die het fetisjisme veroorzaakt in Freuds psychoanalytische theorie over dit onderwerp. Deze dissertatie beweert ook dat de invloed van Binet's ideeën over fetisjisme in Freud's psychoanalytische denken eveneens te zien is in Freud's theorie over perversie en in zijn algemene theorie over psychopathologie. Tenslotte worden in deze dissertatie de ideeën van de Franse psychoanalyticus Jacques Lacan over fetisjisme besproken. Er wordt besproken dat Lacans ideeën over het onderwerp verbonden zijn met een theorie over subjectiviteit en over het object van menselijk verlangen. Deze dissertatie bespreekt het verschil tussen Freuds en Lacans theorie over fetisjisme en het feit dat Lacans psychoanalytische denken over fetisjisme en andere onderwerpen ook betrokken is bij de ontwikkeling van Binet's ideeën.

To my family, friends and Marianne

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Introduction

Freud's legacy to the field of psychoanalysis encompasses pioneering research on human sexuality. Many scholars in the field of philosophy view psychoanalytic theory as a crucial contribution to our understanding of human nature. Accordingly, philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have mined Freud's ideas on sexuality as a rich source of contemporary thinking; scholars have also treated Freud's foundational work on sexuality as a target of criticism (De Vleminck 2010, 9).

In 1893, Freud began to theorize, in a lecture, that sexuality is a potential cause of neurosis (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12). Over the next twelve years, Freud (1905a) evolved his theory of sexuality, eventually formalizing this thinking in his 1905 book, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Indeed, this volume represents the first systematic theory of human sexuality in psychoanalysis. To achieve this systematization, Freud based his theory on a concept of sexual perversions that circulated widely among nineteenth-century scientists who focused at all on sexuality.

Compared to his previous work on the subject, Freud's 1905 formulation of sexual perversions introduced a different clinical and conceptual framework. In addition to the sexual perversions such as sadomasochism and inversion, described in *Three Essays*, Freud in 1905 posited the "fetishist" perversion as the focus of his new approach to his theory of sexuality.

Freud first presented the concept of fetishism as a phenomenon as such in Three Essays; his use of the term fetishism (*Fetischismus*) conforms to the conventions of the psychiatric and sexological literature of the late-nineteenth century (Krafft-Ebing, 1893a). As such, Freud used the concept of fetishism as a means for developing the notion of perversion in the context of psychoanalytical theory. In *Three Essays*, Freud identifies fetishism as a deviation from the "sexual aim" of reproduction—and considers fetishism to be an unsuitable object of the sexual drive. Freud suggests that, in its pathological form, fetishism occurs when an individual's sexual interest is focused entirely on a specific body part or an artificial object, thereby causing all other sexual stimuli to recede into the background. Freud writes, "The situation becomes pathological only when the striving for the fetish, going beyond such a condition, becomes fixated and takes the place of the normal sexual aim and, furthermore, when the fetish is detached from a particular person and becomes the sole sexual object. These are the general conditions under which mere variations of the genital drive pass over into pathological aberrations" (Freud 1905a, 17). This

definition indicates that Freud followed the criteria for explaining fetishist pathology as established by the late-nineteenth century literature that preceded him (Binet 1888a, 65; Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 153).

Based on the literature on fetishism that Freud "inherited," he agreed with his predecessors: fetishism—with its attendant outsized erotic interest in (parts of) the female body and women's clothing—was a phenomenon that reflected the cultural landscape of the turn of the (nineteenth) century. The concept of fetishism—whether pathological or not—provided the lens through which sexuality could be most usefully studied. For example, Freud (1909a, 156) and his predecessors (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 167) were aware of how the concept of fetishism was evident in modern culture; we see this in their discussions of the increasing erotization of female bodies and women's clothing, particularly the fashion trends that accentuated certain body parts, like the woman's breasts and hips. Freud's ongoing engagement with the topic of fetishism preoccupied him; this preoccupation even carries through to his final writings. Indeed, Freud, just before relinquishing his writing, due to cancer (Gay 1988, 634-5), wrote drafts of two works—a book and an article—in which he redefined his theory on mental illnesses based on fetishism (Freud 1940a, 275; 1940b, 202).

Even now, more than a century after advent of his writing on the subject, Freud's contributions to the thinking on fetishism has given rise to non-pathologizing perspectives on perversion. In their discussions about sexuality, twenty-first century scholars frequently refer to Freud's ideas on fetishism. For example, some thinkers, adopting a feminist approach, assert that Freud's theory of fetishism provides the basis for challenging the pathological status of perversions; these thinkers also argue that fetishism represents new forms of sexual practice as well as a more diverse interpretation of sexual desire (Adams 2002, 258). Similarly, in the field of queer theory, Freud's account of fetishism is sometimes used as a basis for challenging heteronormativity as well as for theorizing about lesbian sexuality and desire (Campbell 2000, 145). Moreover, Freud's thinking on fetishism is harnessed to problematize contemporary sexual and gender identity, including transgender sexuality. In this case, Freud's theories on fetishism support the argument that sexuality is not determined by anatomy but on how sexual difference is fantasized (Dean 2009, 150; Parfitt 2007, 72).

Clearly, Freud's account of fetishism continues to mobilize current arguments in favour of a range of sexualities. This raises the following questions: How, exactly, is Freud's thinking on perversions contributing to scholars' reconsideration of whether human sexuality can be understood independently of a sexual object? (Van Haute

and Westerink 2017, 3-4). Does Freud's theory of sexuality—and his psychoanalytic practice at large—comprise a fundamental part of the movement to normalize human sexuality (Foucault 1979)? To answer this question in the affirmative is to position Freud's theory of sexuality as taking part in forms of control and power that are regulated by family structure, as well as constituting medical theories and their classifications (Foucault 1979, 2003).

This dissertation problematizes Freud's exploration of fetishism. I argue that the moment Freud begins exploring fetishism—and now using the actual term for the first time—in *Three Essays*, the phenomenon of fetishism becomes a problem for his theory of sexuality. Freud's initial concern with fetishism was to demonstrate how the sexual drive attaches itself to various objects; Freud challenged his predecessors' idea of an internal, biological norm that links the sexual drive exclusively to the specific objective of biological reproduction. This can be read as a critique of the conceptual structure of nineteenth-century theories of sexual psychopathology. However, upon conceiving of the object as *not* innate to the sexual drive, Freud's theory of fetishism destabilized his theory of sexuality, specifically, his theory of perversion and infantile sexuality: the problem arises because fetishism, as a phenomenon, requires an object.

As fetishism clearly became a problem for Freud in his effort to align this concept with his other theories, Freud stipulated an aetiology of fetishism. He then began to reformulate gradually his theory of fetishism; by relating this phenomenon to his previous theory of neurosis, Freud adopted a developmental approach that was more normative. Freud's reformulation of fetishism can be read as an evolution of the same concepts he first appropriated from the literature on perversions—in particular the works of French psychologist Alfred Binet, and to a lesser extent, the works of the German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing. In this dissertation, I argue that Freud's solution to his years-long problem of fetishism can be traced to the works of Alfred Binet: Freud's continuous reformulation of Binet's ideas on fetishism culminates in Freud turning fetishism into the central argument for his theory of psychopathology. This introduction will present the context of Freud's approach to fetishism; provide a brief review of the notion of fetishism in other contexts; and outline the overall structure of the dissertation.

The concept of fetishism entered Western thought long before it garnered Freud's attention (De Brosses 1760, 10). After fetishism was introduced in the eighteenth century, various modern disciplines—including anthropology, sociology, and philosophy—have come to assign different meanings to the word. It is difficult, if not

impossible, to find conceptual consistency across disciplines for the current usage of "fetishism". Many scholars argue that, in addition to becoming problematic for the field of psychoanalysis, the subject of fetishism also became contested in other disciplines (Assoun 1994, 3-8). The notion of fetishism was first applied in the field of religious studies, where it was used as a criterion to distinguish between enlightened and primitive societies (Iacono 2016). According to scholars (Müller 1878, 195; Iacono 2016, 8), Charles de Brosses' (1760) work, *Du culte des dieux fétiches*, is considered to be the text that introduces fetishism as it first appeared in the French language during the eighteenth century (Iacono 2016, 2).

In De Brosses' view of "fetishist" practices, "primitive" societies were characterized as superstitious and devoted to religious worship. Accordingly, Freud, in his first mention of fetishism in 1905, acknowledges it as a form of worship. His approach to fetishism, then, follows a tradition that employs terminology from religious studies to describe the relationship of the pervert / fetishist to the object of the fetish in cases such as worship and veneration, as can occur in a cult-like environment (Binet 1888a, 1; Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 12). Some twenty-first-century scholars assert that Freud's psychoanalytic theory of fetishism was motivated by his personal vulnerability as a Jewish man facing European discrimination (Matory 2018, 98, 103, 137, 160). According to this claim, Freud, in addressing the phenomenon of fetishism, was trying to escape European anti-Semitist oppression—by distinguishing the Jewish race from that of inferior "savages" (Africans). Freud's theorization of fetishism is understood by these scholars as his effort to "prove" his whiteness—and acceptability to the European bourgeoisie.

In this dissertation I argue for an alternative explanation of Freud's ongoing re-examination of fetishism. My argument holds that Freud's work on fetishism represents an attempt to solve an intriguing—yet perplexing—problem in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Neuropathology: How to understand the conditions that give rise to fetishism. Freud advanced his thinking by means of an ongoing internal "dialog" with the ideas on fetishism first developed by Binet. Freud did so in 1905, in trying to solve the problems presented by the concept of fetishism. Rather than hewing to the concept of fetishism that derived from religious studies, Freud introduced a more complex, more nuanced, and more broadly applicable definition of fetishism, which included concepts such as overvaluation, idealization, and sublimation. In line with this thinking, Freud associated religious cults with a cultural and historical view of perversion that differs fundamentally from a pathological perspective: Freud sought to recognize common patterns of both perverse and non-pathological sexualities without reducing cultural phenomena to pathologies.

Existing research on Freud's thinking on fetishism differs from the problematic I develop in this introduction. Scholars who have systematically explored Freud's theory of fetishism (Rey-Flaud 1994, 18; Assoun 1994, 64) acknowledge that Freud introduced this theory in 1905, by adopting Binet's (and Krafft-Ebing's) ideas. However, rather than examining Freud's problems with fetishism as of 1905—or framing the subsequent debate with the ideas of Binet as part of Freud's quest to resolve such problems—these scholars argue that after 1905, Freud somehow redefined or even *invented* the concept of the fetish (Rey-Flaud 1994, 7, Assoun 1994, 3). These works are guided by the discussions on Freud's theory of fetishism led by the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan. Considering these claims, I believe that there are pertinent reasons to reinvestigate Freud's work on fetishism, and the role of fetishism in Lacan's interpretation of Freud's work.

Lacan adapted Freud's theory of fetishism, gaining prominence in the field of philosophy. For example, in the 1950s, Lacan employed Freud's theory of fetishism as a model for his own theory of human subjectivity (1958-9, 370). Lacan also argues that fetishism is a paradigmatic perversion (Lacan 1956-7, 198) and that fetishism conforms to a specific structure (Lacan 1956-7, 198). Lacan's claims also represent concrete grounds for reinvestigating Freud's work on fetishism; Lacan's approach to Freud's theory expresses continuities and discontinuities with Freud's theories. I argue that Freud's early interpretation of fetishism departs sharply from the prevailing thinking, which pathologized perversion. My research indicates that Freud's original thinking on the subject of fetishism represents part of a larger theoretical engagement with sexual perversions. In taking this initial approach, Freud challenged the criteria that differentiated normal and pathological sexualities—criteria established by the sexological and psychiatric literature of the late-nineteenth century.

Arguably, Freud's early theories can be read as a critique of the late-nineteenth-century effort to deem immoral—and to criminalize—sexual pathologies. In the sexological and psychiatric literature of the time, the concept of perversity, in particular, was often the target of criticism (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 56-57). In direct opposition to this line of thinking, Freud developed his theory of sexuality by placing the concept of perversions as the cornerstone. In doing so, Freud not only refrains from impugning perversions as immoral and illegal; he identifies perversions as innate components of human sexuality. In the course of writing about fetishism, Freud demonstrates that the same tendencies present in 'perverted' behaviours are also present in the expression of so-called normal sexuality: looking, kissing, and scratching, for example (Freud 1905a, 13).

Further, I argue that Freud's eventual reworking of his ideas on fetishism can be contextualized with his larger theoretical contributions. After 1905, when Freud introduced the concepts of the castration complex and the Oedipus complex, for example, he began to understand fetishist pathology as based on an internal norm. Moreover, when trying to develop an aetiology of fetishism, Freud found it difficult to integrate the concept into his own theoretical framework. This challenge led Freud to continually rearticulate his approach to fetishism according to different theoretical models—most often in relation to the ideas initiated by Binet.

As mentioned, in his study of neurosis, perversion, and fetishism, Freud frequently refers to the works of Binet and—to a lesser extent—the works of the German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing. I therefore find it relevant to examine the extent to which Freud's exploration of neurosis, fetishism, and perversion relied on the ideas expressed in those works; to explore the contributions Freud was able to subsequently make on this topic; and to discuss how Freud's reference to Binet and von Krafft-Ebing places his thinking in a larger theoretical evolution of such concepts as perversion, splitting, and trauma.

Further, I will explore how Freud introduced the concept of sexual perversion in connection to his views on the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neurosis. In fact, Freud conceived of some aspects of perversion in sexuality as "normal" manifestations present in a "normal" sexual life. According to Freud, perversion entails the negative of neurosis, as well as the compulsive and fixed forms of sexual expression in perverse pathologies. Freud's study of perversion and fetishism is driven by a biological argument: sexual urges are linked to the sexual excitability of certain parts of the body and to sexual stimulation via olfactory and gustatory pleasures derived from organic excremental matter (Freud 1985, 227). Accordingly, Freud developed his theory of perverse polymorphous sexuality in connection to both animalistic features of human sexuality and primitive cults, in which no internal normalization for sexuality can be found (Freud 1985, 227).

Freud's strategy for dismantling the traditional distinction between "normal" and "perverse" pathology was introduced in his letters to Fließ. Notably, Freud refrained from discussing perversions in relation to morality. In *Three Essays* (1905a), Freud explores the role of fetishism and the links between normal human sexuality and perversion. I will therefore discuss this work and the difficulties that fetishism presented for Freud within his own theoretical framework.

Next, I will examine Freud's attempt to develop an aetiology of fetishism and why his approach to fetishism changed when he began to elaborate his theory. I will explore what motivated Freud to theorize about fetishism in relation to an internal norm, eventually adopting a view of human sexuality that positions it as dependent on a sexual object. Freud applied the same theoretical framework used in his aetiology of neurosis to his aetiology of fetishism: specifically, the Oedipus Complex and the Castration Complex can be seen in the broader context of Freud's theoretical developments. In the discussion of this shift, I analyse the problems Freud faced in his attempt to incorporate fetishism into his own theoretical framework on neurosis. Freud's increasing concern with the formation of the fetish as a sexual object is also made clear.

To analyse Freud's exploration of fetishism after 1905, I use material from 1906–1920. In the discussion of what motivated Freud to rearticulate his approach to fetishism—as well as the problems he faced in elaborating the related aetiological theory—I ground the analysis in the following works: *Delusion and Dream in Jensen's Gradiva* (1907), *On the Genesis of Fetishism* (1909), *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910a), *A Case of Foot Fetishism* (1914a), and *A Child is Being Beaten* (1919). I will also review works that look at Freud's study of fetishism in the context of broader theoretical developments.

Further problematizing Freud's thinking on fetishism, I turn to his later works, in which he again reconsidered the concept of perversion developed as part of his aetiological theory. Specifically, Freud explored theoretical topics related to fetishism as a pathology and considered themes related to different disturbances. This discussion, then, will focus on the following works by Freud: *Fetishism* (1927), *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1939), and *The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence* (1939). Here, I will also contextualize the larger psychopathological concerns and developments that motivated Freud's late studies of fetishism.

To support the main argument of this dissertation, I will discuss Jacques Lacan's interpretation of Freud's theory of fetishism. This will show the philosophical importance of Freud's theory of fetishism as a model for Lacan's theory of subjectivity. In addition, a systematic study of fetishism in Freud's works will clarify why Lacan's thinking on this subject is dominated by interpretations of Freud's theorization of fetishism from a pathological standpoint. This substantiates the decision to discuss Lacan's ideas on fetishism in the last chapter of this dissertation: Lacan makes certain specific interpretations of Freud's theorization on fetishism and perversion *without* considering Freud's questions regarding the topic. For this reason, I will explore how

Lacan's interpretation of Freud's work was focused on his goal of defining perversions as a clinical category—and selecting fetishism as a subject of inquiry in addressing the question of perversions (Lacan 1956a, 198).

Methodology

Freud embarked on his study of fetishism in an attempt to develop his theory of sexuality—and to fill various clinical and theoretical gaps in his conceptualization of this phenomenon. In the following chapters, I will evaluate the relevant literature to analyse the contexts in which Freud engaged with the concept of fetishism. This will illustrate the problems that Freud confronted in formulating his ideas; this will also show how Freud attempted to solve his theoretical problems by referring to the conceptualizations of fetishism and splitting introduced by Binet.

Reading Freud's texts in chronological order (of publication) allows for a better understanding of how his thinking developed over time. It enables us to grasp the problems on which Freud focused within the context of his work. Further, the chronological approach is well-suited to examining the context in which Freud applied the concept of fetishism and how he did so in light of his theoretical and clinical concerns. In some of the aforementioned texts, Freud refers to fetishism in passing, so to speak, only in relation to the central subject at hand; in other texts, fetishism is the central strategy of his theorization.

Lastly, I review the presentations of case histories of fetishism, in which Freud directly addresses this pathology. His first case-history presentation on fetishism was held in 1909; it was published in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* journal only in 1988. The second presentation, held in 1914, was published only in 1974, in the collected minutes of the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society[1]. In Freud's 1927 essay, *Fetishism*, he refers to other cases of fetishism, for which additional information later became available, as provided by the American-Hungarian psychoanalyst Franz Alexander and the work of the American psychoanalyst David J. Lynn.

In this dissertation I will employ—in brackets and italics—selected terms from the original versions of Freud's works in German. This is to bring out the nuances in Freud's vocabulary. This approach supports the importance of continuities and

[1] The German edition consulted for the 1909 case history of fetishism was published in *Aus dem Kreis um Sigmund Freud* (1909d), and the German edition consulted for the 1914 case history of fetishism was published in *Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung* (1914b).

modifications in Freud's theoretical elaboration in both his body of work and his letters to Fließ. Freud's concepts and ideas are based on a range of important terms that he employs. In discussing these terms, I have used as a reference Freud's original works, in German, published in their entirety by Imago. I have also used the *Gesamtausgabe* edition published by P*sychosozial Verlag*. When referencing the German terms *Geschlechtstrieb* (genital drive) and *Sexualtrieb* (sexual drive), I have highlighted the differences between the Kistner translations (2016) in the 1905 edition of *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. I have chosen to adopt Kistner's English translation because she distinguishes between the sexual impulse and the genital impulse.

To illuminate the clinical and theoretical model Freud used to discuss neurosis and perversions, I analyse the models proposed—and the assumptions made—by the authors Freud referred to when exploring perversion. Further, to establish the backdrop for this discussion, I provide commentary on the main works of the authors Freud refers to in his exploration of fetishism. The author cited most frequently is Alfred Binet; the second-most-important author cited is Richard von Krafft-Ebing. References to these authors' bodies of work are based on the editions that Freud referenced— the editions he kept in his personal library, according to the scholarship of Davies and Fichtner (2004) and Sulloway (1983).

Finally, I will discuss Alfred Binet's work in reference to its original French edition. In the case of Richard von Krafft-Ebing, the work regarding perversions has been published in different editions over the years. I use the seventh edition, in German, of 1892, as this was one of the editions owned by Freud. I also use the English translation of this edition, published in 1893. This literature—and the vocabulary therein—comprises the starting point for Freud's ideas on perversions.

Chapter 1

Under the Influence: Freud and the Work of Binet and Krafft-Ebing

The central research question of this dissertation concerns Freud's investigation of fetishism. I problematize Freud's study of fetishism by arguing that, in 1905, at the very moment Freud introduced fetishism in his theorization of human sexuality, fetishism undermined his theory of perversion and of infantile sexuality. In order to solve the problems posed by fetishism, Freud progressively redefined this concept. I argue that during this process, Freud turned to the ideas of his predecessors, in particular Alfred Binet and his ideas on fetishism and neurosis. After years of engaging with Binet's ideas on fetishism, Freud returned to Binet's ideas on splitting, finally developing fetishism and splitting into major topics of Freud's theory of psychopathology. In this chapter, I will examine the ideas of Freud's predecessors which Freud dealt with during his exploration of fetishism and splitting. I will also highlight how these ideas connect with the line of argument that I develop in this dissertation.

While Freud initially considered fetishism to be a sexual perversion, scholars have noted that Freud's psychoanalytical theory of perversions initially arose from the late- nineteenth century psychiatric approach to perversions (Lantéri-Laura 2012, 76–7; Sulloway 1983, 279–89). This observation highlights a foundational element of my argument in this dissertation. Specifically, Freud's propensity for relying on the literature from various academic disciplines—psychiatry, neuropathology, and sexology—influenced the direction of his thinking on fetishism and other sexual perversions. This fact provides important insights into why Freud chose to focus on fetishism in the first place—and how his thinking on the subject evolved. My goal in this chapter is twofold: first, to better understand the role of Freud's predecessors and colleagues in his reconsideration of perversions and whether human sexuality should be understood independently of a sexual object; and second, to better understand the influence of Freud's predecessors and colleagues on the evolution of his explanation of fetishism as a phenomenon. I consider these explorations to be crucial to understanding Freud's challenges with fetishism in 1905. In this chapter, I discuss the influence of the literature on neurosis, perversion, and fetishism written by Freud's contemporaries, specifically by the French psychologist Alfred Binet and the German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing. This literature review will provide the foundation for my subject of this dissertation: the meaning of Freud's reliance on particular sources for his theoretical models and concepts of fetishism. In the context of my argument in this dissertation, this literature review establishes that throughout the process of conceptualizing his theory of psychopathology, Freud returned to the same early theoretical framework implicit in the field of neuropathology at the time, in particular the ideas of Alfred Binet.

Freud referred to Alfred Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, originally published as an article in 1887; and to Richard von Krafft-Ebing's book *Psychopathia Sexualis* which appeared in several editions after its original publication in 1886. This review of Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's works will establish that Freud used this material as the foundation for his critique of sexual normativity and the pathologization of perversions. In particular, Freud's appropriation of Binet's ideas on fetishism and neurosis will be revealed as leading to the reconsideration of Freud's own theory over the years. At the end of the nineteenth century, Binet and Krafft-Ebing were among the most prominent authors in the field of neuropathology in Europe (Andersson 1962, Sulloway 1983, Hirschmüller 1989, Bercherie 2004). Freud's awareness of these authors' work dates from before the 1890s, when he began to develop his theory of neurosis and perversion. Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas expressed in these works influenced heavily the scientific environment in which Freud's study of perversions, fetishism, and neurosis took place.

In this dissertation, the works of Binet and Krafft-Ebing are discussed for four main reasons. First, these works provide the outline within which Freud first explored fetishism, albeit nominally, in 1905. (It is worth noting that Freud's letters to Fließ mention Krafft-Ebing's work on perversion prior to 1905.) Second, Freud (1909a) at one time cited both Binet and Krafft-Ebing as the leading authors of the relevant literature on fetishism. Third, over the years, Freud continually referred to these two authors specifically when discussing cases of fetishism, and when writing other texts on fetishism, other perversions, and sexuality. Fourth, these works provide insight into the ways in which fetishism had already challenged Binet, Krafft-Ebing, and indeed their scientific cohort—before Freud himself undertook the subject.

Further, Freud's references to Binet and Krafft-Ebing—and his intense interest in their work—was not restricted to the topic of fetishism. In fact, his scientific interest in these authors began even before his theoretical engagement with the concept of perversion. In the late 1880s, Freud had already referenced their work in deliberating the use of hypnosis. Later, in the beginning of the 1890s, in formulating his aetiology of neurosis, Freud engaged with the clinical frameworks of both authors, especially when discussing Binet's ideas on hysteria.

When considering Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's works on fetishism, three facts should be noted. First, both authors were equally aware of the religious origins of the concept of fetishism as argued by Max Müller (1878), and of the fact that his work was a common reference on this topic (Binet 1888a, 1; Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 12). With differing degrees of emphasis, Binet and Krafft-Ebing explored the similarities

between religious fetishism and fetishist perversion. They also employed religious terms— such as cult, adoration, and veneration—to describe the relationship of perverse individuals with their fetish objects.

Second, in their exploration of fetishism, Binet and Krafft-Ebing shared mutual interests such as the aetiology of perversion and its role in clarifying the features of normal sexual and romantic behaviour. Both authors also referred to each other's work. Binet's mention of Krafft-Ebing's work was of only minor significance as it was a mere bibliographic reference in a footnote to a discussion of the role of heredity in homosexuality. Krafft-Ebing's work Binet referred to was published in 1877, more than a decade before the German psychiatrist started writing about fetishism in 1889. In contrast, Krafft-Ebing's reference to Binet's work indicates an extensive influence in the German psychiatrist's exploration of fetishism.

Thirdly, the ideas presented in these works were relevant in the scientific environment in which Freud's theorization on perversions and fetishism took shape. In this sense, an exploration of these works will shed light on the models from which Freud adopted the concept of perversion in the late 1890s. It was also from these works that he, in 1905, incorporated other concepts in his discussion on sexuality.

1.1 Freud and the Foundational Research of Alfred Binet

According to my argument in this dissertation, over the years, Freud progressively undertakes a return to the ideas of the French psychologist Alfred Binet on fetishism and splitting. Freud does so in order to solve the challenges that fetishism poses to his theory in 1905; it eventually enables him to put fetishism and the concept of splitting at the centre of his theory of psychopathology, towards the end of his work life (late 1930s). In this section as well as in the following sections, I will examine Binet's ideas on both the topic of splitting and the that of fetishism.

Freud's early work (1880s and 1890s) in psychopathology bears the influence of Binet, as well as Binet's contemporaries in the broader field of neuropathology, such as Pierre Janet. It is undeniable that Freud was influenced by an entire scientific landscape of ideas populated by the ideas of different authors. However, considering my argument—that Freud engages in an ongoing debate with Binet's ideas about fetishism, and eventually returns to Binet's ideas about splitting—I will show the extent to which Freud was aware of Binet's work on the subject. Subsequently, I will elucidate Binet's models—the models to which Freud turns his attention at various points over the years. A discussion of Binet's ideas is pertinent to my line of argument: this discussion will enable us to see how Freud engaged in developing

some of Binet's ideas on fetishism and how this culminated in challenges for Freud to connect fetishism to his theory of perversion and infantile sexuality.

Freud's theoretical-clinical interest in this field was sparked as he began to question whether disorders should be regarded purely as a disease of the brain. This led Freud to a fellowship at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, in 1885–1886, under the guidance of the eminent French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot. At the Salpêtrière, he encountered a psychodynamic approach to certain psychic disorders (Hirschmüller 1991, 13, 18). Among the cohort of scientists in Paris at the time, both Binet and Janet were disciples of Charcot, and they were engaged in developing Charcot's theories. During this period of Freud's immersion in French neuropathology, two important concepts were systematically discussed at the Salpêtrière: the idea that the psychological impact of emotionally-relevant events can cause pathologies, and the idea that parts of the psyche can become fragmented. My analysis of Freud's work on fetishism will reveal the influence of these two concepts on Freud's theorizing from the 1890s until his last works, in 1938. Further, proceeding to the next step in my argument, I will show how these ideas motivated Freud to problematize fetishism in the first place and over the years; how these concepts influenced the theoretical and clinical framework that Freud adopted to solve problems related to fetishism; and how this culminated in Freud's return to Binet's ideas about fetishism and splitting.

At the Salpêtrière, both Freud and Binet studied under the guidance of Charcot; Binet worked as Charcot's assistant. One of the treatments in use at the Salpêtrière during Freud's fellowship was hypnosis: under hypnosis, patients exhibited fragmentation of the psyche. Results from these treatments also helped shape the debate about whether trauma is responsible for the symptoms of certain pathologies (Fischer-Homberger 2004; Nicolas, 2000). In his retrospective report on his time at the Salpêtrière (Freud 1886, 5, 12-3) Freud describes the scientific milieu he encountered; he also reveals his keen interest in the theories circulating in French neuropathology at the time.

At the Salpêtrière, Freud likely observed Charcot's work with hysteric patients, conducted with Binet and his colleague, Charles Féré. Freud in 1887 acquired the book published by Binet and Féré entitled *Animal Magnetism* (*Le Magnetisme Animal*), in which they documented their experiments (Davies and Fichtner 2004, 45). Their research conducted at the Salpêtrière coincides, in part, with Freud's time there (Wolf 1973, 45). What exactly was Binet and Féré's research about? They wanted to understand the different psychological states manifested in neuroses and during hypnosis—such as fragmentation of the psyche—and to relate these to sexual

and other kinds of sensory excitations (Binet and Féré 1887, 68, 76, 112, 157). It was in 1888 that Freud first referred to Binet and Féré's ideas presented in *Animal Magnetism* (Freud 1888c, 78). This marks the start of Freud's work on the topic of excitability. He hoped it would help him understand the cause of neurosis. As I will discuss later, Freud's inquiry into excitability led him to a deeper exploration of the subject of sexuality.

As a result of their experiments with hysterical subjects who had been hypnotized, Binet and Féré emphasized the importance of the erogenous zones (*zones érogènes*) (Binet and Féré 1887, 95, 112). Although they did not specify the location of the erogenous zones in their subjects, Binet and Féré observed that excitation of these zones led to reflexive reactions and attacks of hysteria as well as genital sensations and states of agitation of such intensity that patients experienced orgasms (Binet and Féré 1887, 112). Binet and Féré concluded that the erogenous zones were analogous to the hysterogenic zones (*zones hystérogènes*) that Charcot considered to be responsible for attacks of hysteria as well as convulsions (Binet and Féré 1887, 19, 112). This constitutes evidence of the early connection being made between neurosis and sexuality. Moreover, Binet and Féré's conclusion exemplifies the line of clinical reasoning that forms the basis of Freud's early theory of neurosis.

Many years after the 1887 publication of *Animal Magnetism*, in which Binet and Féré published their ideas on erogenous zones, Freud undertook a more detailed study of the concept in his efforts to develop an aetiological theory of neurosis. Freud (1985, 212) adopted a stance similar to that of Binet: Freud saw that sexual excitations originating in the erogenous zones corresponded to hysterical and other neurotic symptoms. This insight was fundamental to Freud's theories of psychopathology (Freud 1905b, 29, 82). The concept of erogenous zones is also fundamental to Freud's concept of perversion according to his initial approach to fetishism. Thus, the concept of erogenous zones is a fundament to Freud's critique of normal sexuality (Freud 1905a, 13).

1.1.1 Binet and the Concept of Doubling

Given my argument in this dissertation—that Freud returned to Binet's ideas on splitting in the 1920s and 1930s—I am compelled to elaborate on the specifics of Binet's ideas on this topic. I will therefore discuss in this section how Binet conceptualizes the subject of splitting in the context of French neuropathology—and how he differentiated his conceptualization from the ideas of his contemporaries. In doing so, I will also demonstrate how Freud was likely aware of the debate Binet undertook on the subject of splitting.

In their report on hypnosis experiments in *Animal Magnetism*, Binet and Féré described a phenomenon they found striking: "doubling" (*dédoublement*). They cited, for example, doubling of consciousness (*dédoublement de la conscience*) (Binet and Féré 1887, 50, 107); doubling of objects (*objet dédoublé*) (107, 168); and doubling of images (*dédoublement de l'image*) (170, 180–1)[2]. Although Binet and Féré offered no theory to explain these phenomena in 1887, Binet featured the concept of doubling in later studies. Freud addressed these studies directly in his early search for the aetiology of hysteria. After Freud's first reference to Binet and Feré's appears in 1888 (Freud 1888c, 78), in 1889, both Freud and Binet attended an international congress in Paris, the first of its kind devoted to the topic of hypnosis (Chertok 1967, 68; Piéron 1954, 398).

In the 1890s, Freud collaborated with Josef Breuer on two works: an article, *Preliminary Communication* (1893) and the volume *Studies on Hysteria* (1895). In these works, Freud and Breuer re-purposed some of Binet's foundational ideas on *dédoublement*, adopting the German term *Spaltung* (splitting). Scholars have pointed out that, since the early-nineteenth century, the term *Spaltung* had been used widely in philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry (Scharfetter 1999, 36; Lanteri-Laura and Gros 1992, 14-15). Across these disciplines, and within the German language, "splitting" (*Spaltung*) was used in many different ways: a range of phenomena were described using the same term. Consequently, scholars consider splitting to be a misleading term (Scharfetter 1999, 36; Lanteri-Laura and Gros 1992, 14-15). In their repurposing

[2] The English editions of Binet's essential works on *dédoublement* during this period, such as *Animal Magnetism*, *On Double Consciousness*, and *The Alterations of Personality*, varied in their use of English terms for the French term *dédoublement*. The English editions used "division", "double", "doubling", and "duplication" (Binet 1890a, 60; 1896, X, 3, 87; Binet and Féré 1889, 72, 146, 227-8, 243-4). In order to clearly distinguish Binet's thinking from Freud's, I will use the English term "doubling" in this dissertation. Freud and Breuer used the word "splitting" to refer to Binet's work on doubling. Doubling is also implied in Freud and Breuer's theorization about the mechanism that causes splitting (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12; 1895, 190, 229, 249).

of Binet's ideas on doubling, Freud and perpetuated this problem of usage[3]. Indeed, Freud and Breuer deployed the term to refer to diverse phenomena studied at the Salpêtrière. They also used "splitting" to encompass—if not to appropriate—terms coined by Pierre Janet; "desegregation" is one example (Scharfetter 1999, 41). This supports the finding that Freud's early views on splitting were not influenced by Binet exclusively. However, I will take a closer look at Binet's ideas on the subject for the benefit of my argument in this dissertation. I will discuss the models of splitting to which Freud turns his attention by the end of his career. Here, my main argument is that these models of splitting resemble Binet's discussion of doubling.

This raises the question of what, exactly, Freud meant by "splitting". In the 1890s, Freud's references to splitting represent an altered state of the psyche in which consciousness, personality, groups of psychic representations, and the ego, all undergo a change. In this context, "splitting" means the inability to synthesize mental activity (Freud 1894, 46; Freud and Breuer 1895, 232). Freud and Breuer considered "splitting" to be a symptom of neurosis, and believed it to have a sexual origin.

In the following chapters, it will become clear that after his earlier theorization of neurosis, Freud abandoned the study of splitting—and, accordingly, Binet's concept of doubling. However, Freud eventually reintegrated the notion of splitting into his theory of psychopathology. I will show that such a reintegration can be read as a reconsideration of Binet's ideas on doubling. This occurred after 1905, when Freud began to explore fetishism by adopting the ideas on the topic discussed by Binet.

A closer look at the Freud-Binet connection suggests that, having initially adopted Binet's ideas on doubling, in the 1890s, Freud can be seen as having evolved, by the end of the 1930s, his entire theory of psychopathology based on the concept

[3] Other German-speaking traditions were inspired by the works of Binet and Janet in order to theorize about pathologies in the form of an evolution of the concept of splitting (*Spaltung*), such as the Swiss psychiatric tradition. For example, Eugen Bleuler's leading work at the Burghölzli Hospital in Zürich developed the concept of schizophrenia in the form of an exploration of the concept of splitting (Bleuler 1911, 5). Bleuler's concept of schizophrenia was clearly dependent on the developments of French neuropathology (Moskowitz, 2006). Before Freud, Bleuler had also spent time at the Salpétrière in Paris, in 1884-5, to study with Charcot, and with Janet at the Collège de France (Hell 2001, 21; Stotz-Ingenlath 2000, 154). Later, in 1902, Bleuler cultivated scientific and institutional connections with Binet. Bleuler sent his assistant, Carl G. Jung, to Paris to attend Binet's lectures at the Salpétrière. Through Jung, Bleuler proposed to Binet an institutional Zurich-Paris collaborative partnership, to replicate Binet's experiments at the Burghölzli (Kerr 1993, 55-6; Shamdasani 2003, 47). Binet's influence is apparent in the abundant references to Binet's experiments and observations Jung made in his early works—before his engagement with Freud. These references were predominantly in support of his discussion of splitting (*Spaltung, Abspaltung*). (Jung 1902, 76; 1904, 91).

of splitting. Freud developed his theory of psychopathology after theorizing at great length on fetishism, Binet's celebrated subject in the field of sexology. In the 1890s, Freud's inquiry into the symptomatology of hysteria motivated him to theorize about the sexual aetiology of neurosis. In these investigations, Freud explicitly and continually refers to Binet's ideas—as well as to the ideas of Janet. More specifically, Freud investigated the role of splitting in hysteria. By analysing Freud's work on splitting, I will demonstrate in the following chapter that Freud and Breuer in 1893 and 1895 referred directly to Binet's ideas and work. I will also show that, whereas Freud engaged in a continued critique of Janet's ideas over the years (Casullo 2019, 48), this is not true with regard to Binet's ideas. Existing literature overemphasizes the relationship between Freud and Charcot as well as the relationship between Freud and Janet. However, in line with my argument in this dissertation, I maintain that Freud discussed Binet's ideas more fruitfully and at greater length than he did the ideas of Charcot and Janet.

In their search for the mechanism that causes splitting, Freud and Breuer developed a psychological theory that differs from that of Janet. In terms of chronology, we should note that both Binet and Janet had by 1890 already expressed their diverging views on the phenomenon that Freud and Breuer came to call "splitting." As we will see, my discussion of the contrast between Binet and Janet's interpretations of doubling is crucial: it will illuminate the similarities between Freud's and Binet's criticisms of Janet's ideas. Subsequently, this will enable us to verify the reasoning behind Freud's approach to Binet's ideas. Examining Freud's ideas in the context of Binet's and Janet's supports my argument: that Freud's later view—that splitting was connected to both neurosis and fetishism—frames psychoanalytic theory, in part, as an evolution of Binet's theory of doubling.

1.1.2 The Meaning of "Doubling": Binet versus Janet

In several works written during the 1880s and 1890s, Binet describes the psychological phenomena associated with doubling. Scholars identify Binet as the first thinker to refer to the concept of doubling (Ellenberger 1970, 145; Foschi 2003, 45). As we will see in Chapter 5, Jacques Lacan, too, cites Binet's works on doubling as vital to this topic, followed by Janet and Freud. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Binet's studies were part of a larger debate—concerning double-personality, multiple-personality, double- consciousness, and dissociation—during this era in France, as acknowledged by the literature that examines Binet's theories on the topic (Alvarado 2010; Foschi and Cicciola 2006; Hacking 1995; Ellenberger 1970). This literature tends to emphasize the differences between Binet's ideas and those of other authors in the French context, in particular the works of Janet. However,

existing literature only fleetingly explores the question of how Binet's ideas on doubling influenced Freud in the longer term. Therefore, a detailed account of how Binet differentiated his conceptualization of doubling from his contemporaries is crucial to developing the problematic of this dissertation.

While developing his theory of doubling in this context, Binet became critical of studies conducted by his French contemporaries; these studies were confined to psychologically disturbed subjects (Binet 1890a, 12–13). Binet and Janet clearly influenced one another, referenced each other's work, and probably met frequently (Ellenberger 1970, 355). Yet, Binet's ideas evolved in striking contrast to those of Janet (Binet 1889a, 157; 1890a, 42; 1890b, 187). For example, Janet claimed that the unity of personality is a psychological aggregation of consciousness that can suffer disaggregation only in pathological cases such as hysteria (Janet 1889, 305, 367). He also asserted that the pathological states of double-consciousness and dissociation point to an innate incapacity for synthesizing the psychological aggregation of consciousness and psychological misery (Janet 1889, 453, 444).

Scholars note that, in France, Binet's criticism of Janet's ideas on the normal unity of the ego represent the main criticism of Janet's argument (Carroy and Plas 2000, 235). Contrary to Janet's idea of the normal unity of the ego, Binet (1889a,169; 1889b, 340), supported by his experience with normal subjects, in 1889 took issue with Janet's term mental dissociation (*dissociation mentale*). Binet claimed that even Janet himself had confessed to having problems with the term. Binet argued against Janet's view of dissociation as a failure of association of consciousness. Binet's criticisms led him to important conclusions about the psychology of the unconscious: in contrast with Janet's idea of dissociation, Binet (1889a,169) argued for the idea of association—consciousness and the unconscious operating simultaneously in the psyche. Binet (137) opted for a doubling of the ego (*dédoublement du moi*) that is explained by the existence of a second consciousness, which functions simultaneously with the subject's main consciousness—a second personality functioning alongside the main personality.

Freud, too, opposed Janet's ideas. Freud rejected Janet's claims that hysteria represents an incapacity for psychic synthesis—evidence of degeneracy or a restriction of consciousness (Freud 1894, 46; Freud and Breuer 1895, 230–1, 238). As Freud developed his theory of the aetiology of neurosis, he contrasted Janet's arguments with an idea that is essential to Binet's theory of fetishism: the aetiological importance of precocious sexual experiences (Freud 1896b, 157). The fact that Binet and Freud expressed similar criticisms of Janet's explanation supports the

argument of this dissertation: that after a long debate with Binet's ideas on fetishism, Freud's later thinking on splitting aligns with Binet's ideas. When Freud and Breuer sought to find the mechanism that causes splitting—using as a basis Binet's work on doubling—they also rejected Janet's explanation that splitting is caused by a weakness or incapacity of the ego for psychic synthesis and association. Instead, Freud and Breuer postulated a splitting mechanism in which a strong ego acts by suppressing and repressing. This, too, is consistent with the ideas formulated previously by Binet. (This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 2.)

In the course of his exploration of the sexual aetiology of neurosis, Freud's main reference on splitting was Binet's work *The Alterations of Personality* (*Les Altérations de la personnalité*), published in 1892 (Freud and Breuer 1893, 7). In this work, Binet synthesized the conclusions drawn from his experiments, shifting his perspective from psychopathology to the foundation of individual psychology in the process (Foschi and Cicciola 2006, 367, 369). In his book, Binet's ideas culminated in a theory of doubling that argued for the presence of paradoxes in normal consciousness and personality—rather than for the pathological disaggregation of consciousness, as Janet had claimed. Moreover, Binet claimed that both personality and consciousness are inherently duplicitous (Binet 1892, VIII, 315–6; Foschi and Cicciola 2006, 367, 369). Before theoretically defining personality and consciousness in terms of doubling, Binet had theorized about fetishism and the fetish object. In each case, he stressed the inherent duplicity of both the psychic attitude of the fetishist and the fetishist perception of the fetish object. These ideas, as I argue in this dissertation, are essential to Freud's later theory of fetishism.

In *The Alterations of Personality*, Binet addressed the problem of coexisting personalities in occurrences of the doubling of the ego[4] as well as the doubling of the consciousness[5] (Binet 1892, 82). Binet made clear that there was no existing theory to explain the phenomenon of doubling (Binet 1892, 1). Given this, Binet described and defined personality and consciousness in terms of doubling based on the results from his studies and experiments (Binet 1892, VIII). Further, he discussed the simultaneity of two wills and of distinct selves in the same individual[6]

[4] According to Binet, the fragmentation of the ego (*morcellement du moi*) is in the background of a considerable number of mental phenomena (Binet 1892, I). In the introduction of his book, Binet expressed his particular interest in studying the doubling of the ego (Binet 1892, VIII).

[5] In *The Alterations of Personality*, Binet connected the notions of doubling of the ego and doubling of consciousness to the notion of doubling of personality (*dédoublement de la personnalité*) (Binet 1892, 280).

[6] Here, in reference to the conceptualization of doubling, in addition to his own experiments, Binet is also drawing on the French philosopher Hippolyte Taine's accounts of automatic writing.

(Binet 1892, 83). According to Binet, these phenomena are closely associated with hysteria[7] (Binet 1892, 81). Binet claimed that this group of occurrences can be understood as alterations of personality; these alterations can occur in many different forms in normality as well as in individuals diagnosed with several categories of pathologies (Binet 1892, 2). Freud began in 1893 to refer to Binet and his discussion of splitting. Freud harnessed the concept of splitting to theorize about neuroses such as phobias, obsessional neurosis, and psychoses.

In *The Alterations of Personality*, Binet also discussed the cases of doubling mentioned above with regard to suggestion (Binet 1892, 223), somnambulism (Binet 1892, 1), and spiritualism (Binet 1892, 295). He then concluded that doubling is the mechanism that explains how a subject perceives an object as unacceptable or forbidden, and then splits his perception by preserving the unacceptable or forbidden features of the object as unconscious perceptions[8] (*perception inconsciente*) (Binet 1892, 256–7, 269-70, 274). According to Binet (1892, 269-70), the subject, as a means of defending (*scotomi*) himself, suppresses (*supprime*) sensations and images related to a particular object. The subject's defence (*la défense*) against an unacceptable or forbidden object allows for removal of the conscious perception of the object—without suppressing the sensation related to the object. Thus, doubling enables a second consciousness to modify the perceived object (Binet

[7] In the introduction of the book, Binet refers to studies on hysteria as a motivating factor for his exploration of related phenomena such as alterations of personality (Binet 1892, I). The second part of the book, on coexisting personalities, is also mostly focussed on phenomena that occur in cases of hysteria (Binet 1892, 81).

[8] Before explaining this phenomenon in terms of doubling in 1892, Binet conducted a detailed examination of how perceived objects are modified through several mental processes of negation (*négation*) (Binet 1890c, 137). Binet's systematic account of processes of negation is particularly comparable to Freud's concerns with psychic mechanisms in the 1920s. In this case, Freud came to approach fetishism with the aim of refining his characterizations of forms of negation, refusal, and disavowal. I will discuss Freud's theorization of psychic mechanisms in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. In Binet's work published in 1890, "Inhibition of phenomena of the conscience" (*L'inhibition des phénomènes de conscience*), he investigated situations that demonstrate the impossibility of certain representations, images, and sensations to coexist in consciousness (Binet 1890c, 154). Just as Freud came to study similar situations in his 1925 work, "Negation", Binet had discussed, thirty-five years before, conscious gestures and words of negation that function as a means of pushing away contradictory representations from consciousness that are logically incompatible (Binet 1890c, 137). In order to explain the relegation of forbidden perceptions in consciousness, Binet explored forms of negation by which objects are recognized and then rejected (Binet 1890c, 140). In addition to substitutions of memories (*substitutions de souvenirs*) (Binet 1890c, 146), Binet explored suppression (*suppression*) as a means by which individuals exclude antagonistic representations and perceptions from consciousness (Binet 1890c, 154-155). These topics and terminologies are essential to Freud's exploration of neurosis in the 1890s and of fetishism in the 1920s and 1930s.

1892, 257). This determines the subject's stance toward that which was perceived: the subject's ideas of, attitudes towards, and rationalizations of the perceived object[9] (Binet 1892, 270).

Thescotomtual terminology for these phenomena was coined by Binet, who was also the first to outline the very framework Freud used to investigate the sexual aetiology of neurosis. More specifically, following the problematization presented in this dissertation, the developments in psychological studies initiated by Binet—especially the studies concerning the doubling of the ego—constitute a formative influence on Freud's eventual focus on fetishism, perversions, and neuroses. In fact, as I will demonstrate, Freud's gradual process of relating his insights from his theory of neurosis to the subject of fetishism culminated in a discussion of the splitting of the ego. Freud described the splitting of the ego similarly to the way in which Binet had described doubling, 1892.

When Freud began to think about an aetiology of fetishism, he incorporated the concept of splitting. (This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.) In this case, Freud (1909a, 155) did not merely emphasize the relevance of Binet's work on this topic; Freud in fact aligned his theory with Binet's concept of doubling of perceptions, claiming that the formation of the fetish depended on the splitting of early childhood perceptions. In Chapter 4, I will discuss Freud's late work on fetishism. Here we will see that Freud (1927, 1940a, 1940b) applied this same concept—without referring explicitly to Binet—in describing how a subject comes to have coexisting yet contradictory attitudes towards perceptions of reality, some of which the subject finds unbearable. In this way, Freud's view of splitting intersects with Binet's use of doubling in relation to an unacceptable or forbidden object (Binet 1892, 256–7, 270-4).

In 1895, when Freud and Breuer were re-purposing Binet's ideas on doubling, Freud's work titled *Obsessions and Phobias: Their Psychical Mechanism and Their Aetiology* was published in the *Psychological Year*, a journal founded and edited by Binet[10]. This is relevant to my line of argument; it adds to Freud's recognition of

[9] Here, too, Binet strives to conceptualize doubling. He (1892, 265) explores the phenomenon of insensitivity to certain objects and of systematic or partial anesthesia. Binet's study of these phenomena is part of his review undertaken in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of *The Alterations of Personality*, in which he aims to clarify a confusion in the terminology used in the discussion of other experimenters such as Pierre Janet, Hippolyte Bernheim, Charles Féré, Paul Richer, William James, and Jules Liegeois. Binet argues that these experiments demonstrate that the psychological phenomena in question consist of a doubling of the subject's consciousness and personality (Binet 1892, 280-1).

[10] Freud owned numerous issues of *Psychological Year* (Davies and Fichtner 2004, 23).

Binet's developments. In *Obsessions and Phobias* (1895c, 79), Freud argued for his early aetiological idea of defence of the ego. In the same volume of the journal, Binet published his work titled *Fear in Children* (*La peur chez les enfants*). Here, Binet linked fear in children to threats of punishment and having parts of their bodies cut off; Binet also noted that infantile fear is strongly motivated by imagination (Binet 1895, 226–31, 234–9). Moreover, Binet emphasized that fear plays an important part in the child's psychic make-up.

Scholars claim that this specific work by Binet played an important part in the origin of Freud's concept of the Castration complex (Kern 1975, 310). Binet expressed the view that infantile fear develops via a displacement mechanism; this concept exerted a particular influence on Freud's thinking about the Castration complex (Binet 1895, 241–5; Kern 1975, 310). Binet's views on the role of fear indeed precede Freud's concept of the Castration complex. Moreover, Binet's ideas play a central role in Freud's development of his concepts of neurosis and fetishism over the years. When investigating the causes of fetishism in terms of defensive aetiology, Freud (1914a, 1927, 1940a, 1940b) claimed that the Castration complex is an essential cause of this perversion.

1.1.3 Binet Responds to Freud

I will now shift my focus to Binet's considerations of Freud's ideas. This is significant to the continuity of my argument; indeed, it informs Binet's evolving concept of doubling. In fact, Binet defends the relevance of the concept of doubling to discussions on psychopathology. This supports my argument that Freud takes a similar tack when he assigns to splitting a central role in his theory of psychopathology, towards the end of his work. I will show that, by extending his formulations in *The Alterations of Personality*, Binet evolved his conceptualization of doubling to enable the discussion of psychiatric pathologies other than hysteria—the preeminent neuropathological topic of study at the French school at Salpêtrière. Additionally, this inquiry will shed light on my argumentation in Chapter 5; I will show that Lacan begins to elaborate his ideas on psychiatry and psychoanalysis by discussing Binet's concept of doubling as it relates to psychiatric issues.

From 1909 until the year of his death in 1911, Binet wrote critically about Freud's theory on hysteria and his psychoanalytic method. Nevertheless, Binet deemed Freud's ideas and methods important to the general development of psychology at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. Further, Binet noted that Freud's ideas were unknown in France, and that they were still evolving (Binet 1909, XI; Binet and Simon 1910, 93–4). However, Binet's comments on Freud's theory were not

based on a direct reading of Freud's work[11], but on accounts given by his followers (Binet and Simon 1910, 93).

In 1909, Binet wrote about the future of psychology in his journal *Psychological Year*. Binet listed Freud's method—and the use of psychoanalysis in Swiss psychiatry—among the current developments in the field of pathological psychology (Binet 1909, X-XI). Later, in the preface of the 1910 issue of the journal, Binet commented on the diffusion of—and interest in—Freud's theories in Germany (Binet 1910, V). In collaboration with the French psychologist Théodore Simon, Binet also published an article titled Hysteria (*Hystérie*) in the 1910 issue of *Psychological Year*. The article was part of the authors' broader survey of contemporary theories of hysteria and other pathologies, titled *Definition of the Main Mental States of Insanity* (*Définition des principaux états mentaux de l'aliénation*) (Binet and Simon 1910, 61). Binet and Simon opposed the idea that the cause of hysterical accidents is linked to alterations in women's reproductive functioning, exaggerated sexual continence, an excess of sexual pleasures, or sexual abuse (Binet and Simon 1910, 67). According to the authors, these hypotheses were presented in theories on the hysterical mental state, such as Breuer and Freud's theory of hysteria (Binet and Simon 1910, 68–71). Consequently, Binet and Simon (1910, 95–6) considered Freud's aetiological theory to be retrogressive; Freud claimed that hysteria is caused by obstacles in sexual life, unmet sexual needs, and disturbances of the sexual instinct. Binet and Simon claimed that Freud's theory represented a return to old-fashioned aetiological beliefs about hysteria; they also believed Freud's theory led to misunderstandings, such as the assumption that hysteria was an illness unique to the female sex (Binet and Simon 1910, 68).

[11] In his consideration of Freud's ideas on hysteria, Binet relied on the comments made by the Swiss neurologist, Édouard Claparède on Freud's theories (Binet 1909, 96). Binet also referred to Swiss psychiatrists who applied Freud's psychoanalytic method, such as Eugen Bleuler, Carl Gustav Jung, and Adolf Meyer (Binet 1909, X–XI). In addition to Claparède's work, Binet was possibly made aware of Freud's ideas through Jung, who published an article about Freud's psychoanalytic method of dream analysis in the 1909 issue of Binet's *Psychological Year* (Jung 1909, 160). The correspondence between Freud and Jung reveals that it was Binet who requested this contribution to the journal. Jung reported his contact with Binet to Freud in 1908, on the eve of this publication (Jung 1974, 107, 174, 177). It was in this same 1909 issue that Binet first documented Freud's theories and method as part of the major developments in the field of pathological psychology that year. As previously reported, years before engaging with Freud, Jung had established direct contact with both Binet and Pierre Janet in France. In 1902, Jung went to Paris to attend both Binet and Janet's lectures, as well as to observe their experiments (Bair 2003, 68–9). Jung's interest in at these activities was not only motivated by Bleuler's scientific and institutional ambitions for connections with Binet, but also by Jung's mentor at the time, the Swiss psychologist Théodore Flournoy, who was a collaborator and friend of Binet (Bair 2003, 68–9; Klein 2011, 239).

In Freud's view, the study of hysteria is meant to focus largely on the sexual constitution of humans. By 1910, Freud had already explored the causes of hysteria and argued that it originated in the perverse nature of the sexual drive. Freud saw the study of hysteria as offering the paradigm for the conceptualization of sexuality (Freud 1905a, 24). Binet, in contrast, saw fetishism as the best subject through which to explore sexuality and perversion. To Binet and Simon, the study of hysteria was especially relevant as evidence of the existence of doubling (Binet and Simon 1910, 114–20).

In 1910, in opposition to Freud's and Janet's theories[12], Binet and Simon (1910, 117) argued for Binet's concept of doubling, as outlined in his book *The Alterations of Personality*. They claimed that the mental state observed in hysteria constitutes a doubling of personality, in which hysteria manifests itself as the separation of consciousness, with separate and independent personalities that coexist and alternate in the same individual. Each personality has a particular attitude that orients it towards different goals and simultaneously leads the two to ignore one another (Binet and Simon 1910, 114). By evolving Binet's earlier claim on doubling, in 1910, Binet and Simon claimed that this process of doubling underlies various pathologies[13] (Binet and Simon 1910, 126–37). For example, while acknowledging the diagnostic differences between insanity with conscience (*folie avec conscience*) and manic-depressive insanity (*folie maniaque scotomiza*), Binet and Simon (1910, 119–20, 126–37) claimed that the process of doubling grounds the aetiology of both pathologies. In his views on psychopathology expressed in the late 1920s

[12] In their survey of contemporary theories on hysteria, Binet and Simon (1910, 68–71) classified Janet's theory, along with Freud and Breuer's, as that of the mental state in hysteria. Binet and Simon (1910, 114, 119) argued that theories of the mental state of hysteria can be replaced by the idea of separating consciences, that is, doubling (*dédoublement*). They also compared Freud and Breuer's theorization of mechanisms, such as conversion and symbolization, to Janet's idea of disaggregation in hysteria. They concluded that both theories are part of a broader theory of the mental state of unconsciousness (*inconscience*) (Binet and Simon 1910, 109, 112). Insofar as these theories posited the mental state of unconsciousness, Binet and Simon (1910, 113) considered the notion of unconsciousness to be inaccurate and insufficient. Additionally, Binet and Simon (1910, 93) claimed that Breuer and Freud's ideas were quite similar to Janet's and were likely influenced by Janet. Moreover, they claimed that Janet's theoretical formulations of the mental state in hysteria were both the most prominent on the topic and clearer than Breuer and Freud's (Binet and Simon 1910, 71, 93).

[13] Binet seemed to be convinced of the importance of his psychopathological insight on doubling. After all, by the time Binet wrote this work with Simon, he was aware of his influence, for instance among Swiss psychiatry and psychology. According to Wolf's biographic work on Binet, as soon as the above mentioned article was on press for the 1910 issue of *Psychological Year*, Binet asked Simon to send copies to Freud, Kraepelin, and Bleuler, to alert them about his claims. Although Binet considered Freud, Kraepelin, and Bleuler as authors worthy of responding to his discussions, no evidence of their answers has been found (Wolf 1973, 265–6).

and 1930s, Freud makes a comparable assumption. After struggling to develop a theory of fetishism, Freud ultimately followed the line of reasoning set out by Binet: identifying splitting as the foundation of various pathologies. It is my view that Binet's insistence on postulating doubling as the foundation of various pathologies plays a crucial role in our ability to connect Freud's late concept of splitting to Binet's concept of doubling.

1.1.4 Binet Challenges his Mentor—Charcot

In this dissertation, I argue that towards the end of his career, Freud assigns a key role to both the phenomenon of fetishism and the concept of splitting in his theory of psychopathology. During the development of his psychoanalytic ideas, Freud constantly engages with the phenomenon of fetishism by engaging with Binet's ideas on the subject. For this reason, in this and the following sections, I will discuss Binet's ideas on fetishism.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Freud (1927, 1940a, 1940b) brought together two well-known topics in the work of Binet: the notion of the splitting of the ego, and Binet's most celebrated subject in nineteenth-century sexology—fetishism. In line with Binet's ideas expressed in 1910, Freud (1927, 1940a, 1940b) now also argued for two contrary, independent attitudes to describe the splitting in fetishism. In his final written works, the connection between splitting and fetishism became his ultimate strategy for arguing that the human psychic synthetic function is vulnerable to a great many disturbances (Freud 1940b, 276). Moreover, Freud (1940a, 203) came to acknowledge, as did Binet with regards to doubling (Binet 1892, VIII, 2; Binet and Simon 1910, 117–20), that splitting underlies various pathologies. It is therefore logical to infer that Binet's ideas form the background against which Freud designed his research on the sexual aetiology of neuroses and on problems related to perversions. (Freud's various models and strategies, which he developed as a response to Binet's work, will be discussed in Chapters 2-4 of this dissertation.)

Binet's handling of fetishism was of major significance to Freud. In the course of exploring fetishism, Freud (1905a, 1907, 1909a, 1914a) referred directly to Binet's ideas, particularly those in the outstanding work *Fetishism in Love*. The evidence of this text's great value to Freud is even found in discussions on topics other than fetishism. For instance, Freud also applied Binet's ideas to the aetiology of perversions in general (Freud, 1916-17, 1919). Binet's influence on Freud endured: it is evident in the period when Freud was developing his own ideas about toplcs such as trauma, infantile sexuality, and psychosexual development (1905c, 1914a, 1916-17).

Originally, Binet's *Fetishism in Love* (*Le Fétichisme dans L'Amour*) was published in 1887, in France, in the *Philosophical Review* (*Revue Philosophique*). The following year, the article was included as the first in a series by Binet, published in *Studies of Experimental Psychology* (*Études de Psychologie Expérimentale*) (Binet, 1888a). Here, the topic of fetishism is one of a number of Binet's scientific interests—such as the psychology of microorganisms; hysteria; practice of hypnosis; and the intensity of mental images. In the evolution of his investigations, these studies reflect a diversification of Binet's interests in the years following his work at the Salpêtrière hospital. After 1886, Binet worked at the embryology and zoology laboratories of the Collège de France (Wolf 1973, 69, 71).

A key feature of Binet's interests in this period was his theoretical concern with heredity and reproduction (Wolf 1973, 69). In his work the Collège de France, Binet (1888b, 353) undertook an extensive review of modern theories of heredity and reproduction, entitled *Modern Theories of Generation and Heredity* (*Les scotomi modernes de la scotomiza et de l'hérédité*). Here, Binet dedicated a section to theories of so-called plastic forces (*forces plastiques*) dating from antiquity to the nineteenth century. He discussed Ernst Haeckel's concept of "Plastidules," through which heredity is understood in terms of the influence of outer conditions on the inherited undulatory motion of organic molecules (Binet 1888b, 556-7). Binet's (1888a, 8, 23) investigation of fetishism led him to qualify sexuality and love as possessing plastic qualities. In his frequent revisiting of Binet's ideas over the decades, Freud found in Binet resources for his theoretical developments. In a direct reference to Binet's ideas on fetishism, Freud then found evidence that the sexual drive (libido) is characterized by plasticity (Freud 1916–17, 346). In *Fetishism in Love*, Binet's position on fetishism clearly presents a departure from his previous ideas—and those of Charcot—concerning the roles of both heredity as well as chance events in the development of sexual perversions. In fact, Binet's innovation was to propose that pathologies are the result of an interplay between innate and external factors. This innovative thinking is the main reason that fetishism posed a riddle for Krafft-Ebing and for Freud.

When Binet published his *Studies of Experimental Psychology* (1888a, 62–3), he had not yet formulated his theory on doubling. He had, however— in Fetishism in Love—highlighted fetishism and the fetish object as special phenomena that manifest contradictory elements. In *Studies of Experimental Psychology* Binet classified fetishist individuals as sexual perverts (Binet 1888a, 6) and claimed that sexual perversions are formed early in an individual's life (Binet 1888a, 49). He was clearly aware of the religious implications of the concept of fetishism, and therefore imbued the term with a new connotation, so as to specifically describe sexual perversion (Binet

1888a, 3). According to Binet, sexual perverts' adoration of inanimate (*inert*) objects resembles the adoration of savages for their religious fetishes in all aspects. However, he did make a distinction between both fetishisms, stating that, "The term fetishism seems to us to suit this kind of sexual perversion quite well. These patients' adoration of inanimate objects such as nightcaps or boot nails resembles in all respects the adoration of the savage or the negro for fish bones or for shiny stones, except the essential difference is that in the cult of our patients, religious adoration is replaced by a sexual appetite" (Binet 1888a, 3).

To differentiate this particular sexual perversion, Binet (1888a, 2) employed the terms "love fetishism" (*fétichisme amoureux*) and "fetishism of love" (*fétichisme de l'amour*). According to this definition, fetishism in love life represents the blind adoration (*adoration*) of the beloved person's body parts, faults, or caprices (Binet 1888a, 2). Here, Binet studied cases of eye, hand, hair, and olfactory fetishism (Binet 1888a, 8); the adoration of such objects is evidence of the plasticity of love (*amour plastique*) (Binet 1888a, 8, 23). Binet emphasized that his definition of fetishism implies the adoration of things that are unfit to directly satisfy reproductive ends (Binet 1888a, 65). Notably, in *Fetishism in Love*, Binet (1888a, 3) presented a strategy for more precise analyses of fetishism: the idea was to extract from pathological facts information to enable a better understanding of the psychology of normal love. Binet's idea here is directly relevant to the problematization of this dissertation: Freud, in his theory set out in *Three Essays*, gives a central place to Binet's link between (fetishistic) perverse sexuality and normality. In 1905, like Binet, Freud, too, selects fetishism as the means by which to explore the link between (fetishistic) perverse sexuality and normality. However, as I will show via my argument in Chapter 3, Freud was unable to establish the relationship between normal and fetishist sexuality in his theory of infantile sexuality.

As demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, Freud's psychoanalytic theory of perversions emerged from the late-nineteenth-century psychiatric approach to perversions. Given that Freud adopted Binet's ideas when theorizing fetishism as a sexual perversion, I will discuss below how Binet's *Fetishism in Love* represents a debate with the psychiatric approach to perversions leading to the emergence of the concept of fetishist perversion. Binet (1888a, 2) presented Fetishism in Love as, in some sense, a response to observations made by French psychiatrists Jean-Martin Charcot and Valentin Magnan in Inversion of the *Genital Sense and Other Sexual Perversions* (*Inversion du sens scotom et autres perversions sexuelles*), published in 1882 in the *Archives of Neurology* (*Archives de neurologie*). According to Binet, Charcot and Magnan's article presents the best observations of fetishism (Binet 1888a, 2);

however, there is no mention of "fetish", "fetishism", nor any religious term. Charcot and Magnan (1882, 301) described a case deemed the inversion of the genital sense (homosexuality), as well as four other cases classified as perversions of the sexual instinct (*perversion de l'instinct sexuel*).

Scholars argue that before the nineteenth century, "diseases of the sexual instinct" were not a consideration (Davidson 1990, 316). Charcot and Magnan's article demonstrates that only through the concept of perversion did it become possible to attribute diseases to the sexual instinct—as well as to interpret various types of sexual dysfunctional acts in medico-psychiatric terms. Binet's theory of fetishism was regarded as an evolution of Charcot and Magnan's concept of perversion of the sexual instinct; as such, Binet's theory of fetishism marks the emergence of the category of fetishist perversion. In this context, Freud's adoption of Binet's ideas come into even sharper focus: in his early exploration of the sexual drive and fetishism, Freud argues for a scotomizationon of perversion for the very reason that there was no "natural morbid entity" of sexuality before nineteenth-century psychiatry invented one (Davidson 1990, 316). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, Freud's later adoption of Binet's ideas made it problematic for Freud to "fit" fetishism into his concept of perversion.

Charcot and Magnan (1882, 297) labelled certain cases as perversions of the sexual instinct; here, individuals' sexual interest focused on parts of the body and articles of clothing—the female buttocks, women's boots, shoes, nightcaps, and unisex white aprons, for example. Charcot and Magnan's article on the subject contains accounts of the earliest events in childhood and puberty that cause irresistible sexual excitement and interest. Charcot and Magnan also stressed the role of the imagination, ideas, and fantasy-based stories associated with the objects that inspire sexual arousal, as well as many types of clinical "accidents"— spasms, insomnia, and neck pain, for example—caused by the strength of these ideas in the patient's imagination (Charcot and Magnan 1882, 312–3). Binet (1888a, 2) made remarks on precisely these cases as described by Charcot and Magnan. However, he also explored his own cases, as well as other accounts in French literature and philosophy, by authors such as Dumas, Belot, Condillac, Descartes, and Rousseau.

In their detailed observations, Charcot and Magnan (1882, 317) focussed primarily on the morbid basis of pathologies. They pointed to aspects of hereditary neuropathy, neurological deficits, and disorders of the nervous system. Yet according to the authors, from an aetiological perspective such instinctive anomalies must be generally understood as effects of degeneration (Charcot and Magnan 1882, 314).

Notably, Charcot and Magnan (1882, 298) refrained from distinguishing between the morbid states that they described. Both the inversion of the genital drive and the perversion of the sexual instinct were considered symptoms of the same pathology and were merely variations in terms of the degree of degeneration.

Charcot and Magnan's article was considered a milestone in the clinical exploration of sexual perversions (Bonnet 2008, 188) in France. Indeed, in 1887, the article provided intellectual fodder to Binet, whose response to the approach of Charcot and Magnan was clear: he disagreed with the exclusive focus on the morbid entity of perversion. In his psychological approach, Binet wrote: "For the psychologist, the important fact is elsewhere; it is found in the direct study of the part, in the analysis of its formation and its mechanism, [which is] the light that these morbid cases shed on the psychology of love" (Binet 1888a, 7).

In the 1880s, the problem of the formation and mechanisms of neuropathologies was approached from an increasingly more psychological perspective in connection to "accidental" experiences—patients' random but determinative experiences (Fischer-Homberger 2004, 54). Following this new approach, the aetiological point of view of psychic excitement gained importance. Consequently, the details of accidental experiences and their association with psychic excitement were more closely examined (Fischer-Homberger 2004, 45–6). Charcot had already attributed to sexuality the role of providing the shocking, frightening, and traumatic impact of accidental experiences. Thus, Charcot considered accidental experiences to be significant in the aetiology of neuropathologies (traumatic neurosis) (Fischer-Homberger 2004, 102, 156). Binet's *Fetishism in Love* was published in the context of these ideas, as described by Fischer-Homberger (2004)—although she does not refer to Binet directly.

By adopting the psychological concept of impression and connecting this to sexuality, Binet (1888a, 42, 47–8) aimed to investigate the aetiological value of accidental impressions. Thus, his reference to the sexual aspect of accidental experiences places *Fetishism in Love* at the centre of the debate about the role of traumatic (sexual) early-childhood experiences in the formation of pathologies. Later, Freud (1914a, 244) referenced Binet directly when he assumed that early sexual impressions in childhood—in which fetishism originates—are traumatic experiences.

In his discussion of Charcot and Magnan's work, Binet stated that accidental experiences at the root of sexual perversion always take place in early childhood, as early as age five. Binet concluded that very young children can experience

sexual excitement (*excitation sexuelle*) (Binet 1888a, 46). In *Fetishism in Love*, Binet (1888a, 46) described how sexual arousal in childhood can coincide with accidental circumstances. According to him, these accidental circumstances can profoundly alter human sexuality and the sexual impulse (*impulsion sexuelle*) (Binet 1888a, 21, 44). In *Fetishism in Love*, Binet honed the ideas that young children can be sexually excited, and that early, indelible sexual impressions can lead to sexual perversion. These ideas were to become Freud's building blocks for both seduction theory (late 1890s), and for his theory of human sexuality (1905).

In *Fetishism in Love*, Binet also addresses the topic of heredity. Binet's assumptions support the factor of heredity in fetishism, but he considers it to be the foundation on which the perversion develops. In a discussion of a case of hand fetishism, Binet writes, "… heredity has certainly only paved the way; it is not what may have given the sexual impulse its particular form" (Binet 1888a, 21). Further, he argues that, once assigned to a basic disposition, heredity fails to explain the particular form of fetishism (Binet 1888a, 41–4). Binet states his opinion clearly: "But heredity, in our opinion, is not capable of giving this illness its characteristic form; when one individual adores boots and another adores women's eyes, it is not heredity that is responsible for explaining why their obsession relates to one object rather than another. […] Heredity does not invent anything and it creates nothing new; it has no imagination, it has only memory. It has even been rightly called the memory of the species. So, it doesn't solve the problem, it just displaces it" (Binet 1888a, 41).

What is the relevance of presenting the above idea from Binet's *Fetishism in Love* at this point in the argument? Indeed, six years after Binet conceived of heredity as an inadequate explanation for the aetiology of fetishism, Freud came to a similar idea, as he began to search for the origins of neurosis (Freud and Breuer 1893a, 4). Another similarity is apparent in the methodological elements preferred by Binet in *Fetishism in Love* and Freud's elaboration of his psychoanalytic method during the 1890s. Binet's position on the aetiology of fetishism led Freud to apply his particular psychological approach, and to appreciate different categories of clinical data such as patients' memories of events in childhood and in puberty (Binet 1888a, 18); the sexual intensity of their visual and auditory impressions; the obsessive sexual fixation on ideas; and the process of association of ideas through either resemblance or contiguity (Binet 1888a, 31). Indeed, Freud eventually credited Binet—twice—for his pre-psychoanalytic approach (Freud 1916–17, 348; 1919, 182). In debunking heredity as a causal factor, Binet paved the way for "accidental" or chance events to be regarded as a formative factor in perversions: "There are strong reasons to suppose that the form of these perversions is to a certain point acquired and fortuitous.

As we will show later, there was an accident in the history of these patients, which gave the perversion its characteristic form. It is understood that such a fortuitous circumstance plays as capital a role only because it impressed on a degenerate" (Binet 1888a, 42).

To further investigate the role of these accidental impressions, Binet (1888a, 8) selected cases of fetishism in which these impressions were related to odours, hands, hair, and eyes; he studied objects such as costumes, handkerchiefs, nightcaps, boots, and white aprons, via the work of Charcot and Magnan as well as others (Binet 1888a, 35). He also noted how accidental impressions could explain what Binet calls fetishes of psychic qualities and exhibitionism (Binet 1888a, 49).

For all these cases, Binet (1888a, 18–9, 51–4) detailed patients' memories and identified the circumstances that created the fetish-inducing sexual impressions. Binet also documented the developments in puberty that produced an association of ideas linked to those initial impressions. Given its high level of detail and comprehensiveness, this method accounts for why Binet's book was recognized—especially by Freud himself—as an extraordinary work. Binet's approach precedes Freud's idea of the "afterwardsness" (*Nachträglich*) of the recollection of traumatic sexual experiences (Freud 1895e, 413; Freud and Breuer 1895, 169). Prior to Freud's theorizing on the causes of neurosis, Binet, in *Fetishism in Love*, developed an aetiological idea that coincided with that of Freud and Breuer (1895, 169): that traumatic (sexual) experiences are at the basis of the formation of neurotic symptoms. As Binet saw it (1888a, 17–20), this association of ideas is responsible for the formation of the fetish object evolving into an obsessive and intense psychic fixation in relation to the object. Eight years after the publication of Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, Freud and Breuer (1895, 169) affirmed that the formation of neurotic symptoms is a result of early childhood traumatic experiences.

1.1.5 Binet, Rousseau, and the Nature of Fetishes

I will now address the connection between fetishism and doubling as it appears in Binet's *Fetishism in Love*. To support my argument that Freud used fetishism as a vehicle for studying splitting, it is vital that I establish how Binet elaborated on fetishism—and that Binet established his ideas on this subject before Freud did so.

In exploring the idea of a more refined form of fetishism, Binet turned to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau[14]. Binet came to classify this kind of fetishism as a "cult of psychic quality" (1888a, 49). Bearing in mind the influence of Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, this exploration of fetishism for "psychic qualities"—the form of fetishism in which the individual is focused on a particular personality trait of the loved one, including everything from a moral position to a certain psychological disturbance—was ground-breaking for Freud. Binet's discussion of fetishism in this context exerted a powerful influence on Freud, spurring him to make the connection between fetishism and the aetiology of neurosis—in particular, in his later theory of splitting. While Binet did not further develop his ideas on the relationship between doubling and fetishism, Freud used the idea of doubling as the basis for splitting, raising the idea of split perceptions, attitudes, and drives (Freud 1909a, 155; 1914a, 245; 1915, 150). In his later theories of the fetish object, Freud employed an idea that closely resembles Binet's: fetishism as a dualistic phenomenon, and the fetish object as dualistic in character (I will explain this idea later in this chapter). Freud also adopted Binet's idea of the fetish as characterized by contradictory elements. In this regard, Freud did not refer to Binet, however (Freud 1927a, 157).

Binet's (1888a, 49) study of fetishism in the work of Rousseau focussed on the author's autobiographical book, *Confessions*. Binet deployed the concept of fetishism to explain Rousseau's singular taste for dominant mistresses (Binet 1888a, 56). Binet recounts Rousseau's memories at the age of eight, when Rousseau was disciplined by his caregiver, Mademoiselle Lambercier. Binet highlights that, at this early age, Rousseau experienced sexual arousal—in both the shame of Mademoiselle Lambercier's verbal reproaches, as well as the pain from the physical punishments he received, such as being spanked by Lambercier—an act presumably performed by hand. (Binet 1888a, 49–50). Binet describes Rosseau aptly as experiencing a phenomenon that felt like the "voluptuousness of pain" (Binet 1888a, 60–3).

Binet used the "voluptuousness of pain" example to argue that fetish objects are a double-sided (*double face*) phenomenon, and can simultaneously encompass contradictory features (Binet 1888a, 62). In the case of Rosseau, the childhood sexual impression created an association between the female hand and the "voluptuous" pain he experienced when beaten by a woman. Binet writes: "What gave birth to this perversion, or at least what gave it its form, was a fortuitous [random] event,

[14] Binet suggested that this phenomenon can be understood as a spiritualist love (*amour spiritualiste*). He suggested this in view of trying to contrast Rousseau's fetishism with purely "plastic love" (*amour plastique*) for material parts of a person's body (Binet 1888a, 57). However, Rousseau's case led Binet to again consider this kind of fetishism as directed at a part of the body (the hand) and an inanimate object (female boots).

an accident: the correction received from the hands of a young lady. In psychological terms, we can say that this perversion arose from a mental association" (Binet 1888a, 51).

According to Binet, Rosseau's hand fetish was a clear example of a double-sided phenomenon. Binet argued that the impact made by the beloved hand is directly painful, but that, through the association of ideas, the psychic quality of the injury is indirectly "voluptuous"; as a fetish object, the hand has the power to synthesize the contradictory features of the experience, manifesting an assemblage (*accolement*) of two contrary feelings such as voluptuousness and pain (Binet 1888a, 62-3).

Binet observed that, through mental association, body parts as well as artificial and insignificant objects can become the intense focus of pleasure. Further, he explained how, through association, various acts that are morally or physically painful can evoke pleasure. Thus, he concluded that voluptuousness of pain is a double-sided phenomenon (Binet 1888a, 62). Likewise, he argued, the double character (*double caractère*) found in Rousseau's hand fetish can be found in patients that fetishize female boots. Boot fetishists, Binet claimed, love the physical suffering caused by women. This kind of fetish (*espèce de fétichisme*), he stressed, is not at all strange (Binet 1888a, 62).

Regarding homosexuality, also widely considered to be a disturbance of the sexual instinct in the nineteenth century, Binet (1888a, 44) argued that patients' pursuit of same-gender sex partners is also the result of external events that the patients cannot actively recall. Binet added that the "accidents" or random events observed in these cases were, in themselves, insignificant (Binet1888, 47–8). What mattered was that these events were deeply and permanently registered in the memory of fetishists, leaving indelible traces in their psyche. In the case of an individual with a pre-disposition for a perversion, Binet continues, the coincidence of childhood sexual impression and infantile sexual excitement leads to a strong, obsessive mental association after puberty. In adulthood, this obsessive association characterizes the alteration of the sexual impulse that is manifested in fetishism (Binet 1888a, 44–8): "The lasting modifications [to the sexual impulse] do not come from above, from the realm of ideas. On the contrary, they proceed from bottom to top, coming up from the domain of unconscious instincts, feelings and impressions" (Binet1888, 48). On recognizing that this configuration of events disturbs sexual development, Binet (1888a, 47–8) recommended medical observation for the patient. The goal of this was to clarify to what extent these disturbances in sexual development contrast with normal psychic development.

In the case of olfactory fetishes, Binet (1888a, 25) observed that certain erotic connections are motivated by smell. He noted that, given the importance of smell in many animals, the olfactory sense appears to be connected to primitive practices, thus making the power of smell central to fetishes (Binet 1888a, 25). In some cases, the pathological impulse linked to smell leads individuals to experience genital excitations—without being aware of the smell or any related memory (Binet 1888a, 27).

In developing his concept of perversion, Freud (1985, 227, 279) made a similar connection between the erotic role of odours in humans, animals, and the rituals of primitive religious cults—an idea explored in the next chapter. As in Binet's theory, this connection was essential to Freud's (1905a, 13; 1909a, 156) conceptualization of perversion and fetishism. I argue that Freud's challenges with fetishism begin in 1905, when he encounters problems in relating his theory of perversion to the phenomenon of fetishism. In the following section, I will discuss how Binet established such a relationship; I will also establish that Binet made this connection before Freud did so. A closer look at how Binet connected both human and animal sexuality with fetishism will shed light on why Freud, in giving a central place to such a connection in his *Three Essays*, comes to encounter problems with his own conceptualization of perversion.

1.1.6 Sexuality and Fetishism

Binet expanded his ideas on fetishism by drawing a connection between fetishism and both human and animal sexualities. Binet concluded that normal sexuality and love are the result of numerous sources of sexual excitement, which function as a symphony (*symphonie*) of excitements. According to Binet (1888a, 84), normal love is the result of a complicated kind of fetishism (*fétichisme compliqué*).

Like Binet, Freud (1985, 279; 1912, 189) also expressed the idea that human sexual excitement results from the connection between different sources of perverse pleasures. And, like Binet, he explored the connection between human and animal sexualities in his discussion on fetishism. In fact, when he first explored fetishism in 1905, Freud (1905a, 16) did so in order to demonstrate the existence of different (partial) drives in human sexuality, as well as how normal and perverse sexual excitement depends on different partial sexual drives.

Binet (1888a, 8) acknowledged that the difference between normal sexuality and certain cases of fetishism (involving the eye, hand, and hair, as well as the olfactory sense, for example) can be hard to define. As such, Binet argued for the existence of

a subtle difference between the ways in which normal people and perverse fetishists relate to the loved person, the loved person's material objects, and the loved person's body parts. Years after Binet, Freud elaborated his own critique of sexual normativity and the pathologizing of perversions. He did this by exploring Binet's claim that fetishism is closely related to normal sexual phenomena. In direct response to Binet, Freud (1905a, 16–7) appropriated the same strategy when introducing fetishism as the building block of his theory on human sexuality.

As outlined in *Fetishism in Love*, these nuances illuminate the differences between fetishistic and normal love. Binet concludes the argument by stating, "It should also be added that everyone is more or less a fetishist in love; there is a constant dose of fetishism in the most regular love. In other words, there is a major and a minor fetishism, like the big and the little hysteria. This is what gives our subject exceptional interest" (Binet 1888a, 4). For Binet, the psychological interest in his study on fetishism lies in the comparisons made between normal and fetishistic expressions of love and sexuality (Binet 1888a, 8–9). In Chapter 3, I will show how, in his *Three Essays*, Freud draws on Binet's link between normal sexuality and fetishism; how this phenomenon destabilized Freud's ability to reconcile these ideas with his theory of infantile sexuality; and how fetishism came to undermine Freud's conceptualization of perversion.

In *Fetishism in Love*, Binet distinguished between major and minor forms of fetishism. On the one hand, Binet characterized major fetishism (*grand fétichisme*) as having clear and recognizable signs (Binet, 1888a, 4). In major fetishism, individuals are led to extravagant acts such as cutting women's hair or stealing white aprons. On the other hand, Binet (1888a, 4–5) defined minor fetishism (*petit fétichisme*) as a hidden, inconspicuous condition. Thus, he underlined the importance of minor fetishism for understanding phenomena in a normal love life. Binet posits that fetishism in its minor form contains the particular love behaviour between couples that is often difficult to understand. (Binet 1888a, 5). In Chapter 3 I will also show that Freud revisits Binet's distinction between major and minor fetishism in order to solve the problems created by Freud's own theorization of fetishism, as formulated in his *Three Essays*.

Binet interpreted the difference between major and minor forms of fetishism as a matter of intensity; he proposed to measure that intensity in terms of physiological gradations as they apply to states of sexual arousal—e.g., the erectness of the penis in the state of fetishistic arousal. Consequently, he endeavoured to mark the point at which the sexual interest in the parts of the female body started to deviate from normal physiology (Binet 1888a, 15). According to him, in pathological

cases, this mark is defined by the intense genital excitation (erection) that takes place through the mere contemplation of the object. He considered such a degree of arousal to be higher than the normal rate (Binet 1888a, 15). This idea of Binet's is relevant to my core argument: that Freud returns repeatedly to Binet's ideas to solve problems relating to fetishism. This repeated return to Binet's thinking is also evident in Freud's final works, in which he places fetishism at the centre of his theory of psychopathology.

Binet also set out an argument on the role of material objects in normal love, asserting that the search for material objects in normal love corresponds with that search in cases of fetishism. In the idolatry of normal love, the cult of material objects is explained by the fact that they remind the lover of their beloved (Binet 1888a, 35). In this sense, such objects receive a kind of borrowed value (*valeur d'emprunt*) from the memory of the loved one (Binet 1888a, 36). As for fetishist pathology linked to inanimate objects, Binet (1888a, 36) claimed that in these cases the inert object acquires independence and does not evoke the image of a person: the object is now loved for itself. Thus, it is through substitution that the worship of a part of the body or an attribute of the beloved person becomes the main interest (Binet 1888a, 84). Exploring Binet's pioneering ideas on this topic is relevant to my argument in this dissertation: in the following chapters, I will show that when Freud discusses fetishism in *Three Essays*, he links it to the topic of the overvaluation of the fetish object. I argue that in *Three Essays*, the concept of fetishism disrupts Freud's theory. I also argue that the concept of fetishism disrupts Freud's effort to relate the topic of the overvaluation of the fetish object to his own theory of infantile sexuality, which he characterized as lacking an object. Therefore, as my argument demonstrates, Freud more than once returned to Binet's ideas in *Fetishism in Love*, seeking to explain how there can be an overvaluation of a sexual object in childhood.

Freud and his predecessors consider that understanding sexual fetishism also helps to understand phenomena that are not necessarily erotic, such as how artificial objects can evoke the memory of a person. In 1895, eight years after Binet linked fetishism and substitution, Freud (1895e, 407) began to explore the worship of material objects; this was in the course of theorizing about the normal mechanisms of memory and substitution. It was in 1905—ten years after he first began exploring these mechanisms—that Freud framed his first classification of fetishism in terms of unsuitable substitutes for the sexual object (Freud 1905a, 16).

In his study of fetishism, Binet drew a comparison between sexual fetishism, normal love, and religious fetishism. This comparison relates directly to my argument in

this dissertation: in Chapter 3, I will argue that, when Freud presents a theory on the belief in objects as part of his psychoanalytic developments, he fails to connect religious fetishism to sexual fetishism. In contrast to fetishist pathology, in which the patient worships and adores only one body part or an inanimate object—resembling the cults and adoration of the savages—Binet (1888a, 84) concluded that normal love is the result of complex fetishism. This means that for Binet, in normal love the beloved person is chosen not primarily for reproductive reasons, but rather because she or he has, for example, beautiful eyes or beautiful hair. Binet (1888a, 84–5) stated that normal love and sexuality are polytheistic, whereas fetishism is a monotheistic love and sexuality. Normal sexuality and love are focussed on the whole person. In contrast, the excitement in fetishistic love stems from a single part or aspect of the loved person. In Binet's words: "…love, instead of being excited by the whole person, is now excited only by a fraction. Here, the part replaces the whole, the accessory becomes the principal." (1888a, 84).

Freud's (1905a, 17) first definition of fetishism in *Three Essays* is similar to Binet's above definition, proposed eight years prior. Binet's investigation aimed to demonstrate that normal sexuality is fundamentally dependent on a group of excitations that together constitute normal foreplay to the sexual act. From the time that Freud first cited Binet's theory of fetishism, Freud claimed that the many excitements comprised by normal sexuality are neither uniquely genital, nor do they aim uniquely at copulation. I present this idea of Binet's here because in 1905, Freud uses fetishism to further this discussion, scotomizng the partial drives of the human sexual drive. Here too, Freud fails to specify which type of excitation of the sexual drive accounts for fetishism. (This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.)

Freud was not the only thinker directly influenced by Binet's ideas on fetishism. Before Freud engaged with Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing was paying close attention to Binet's thinking. Given that Krafft-Ebing's ideas were essential to Freud's exploration of the concept of sexual perversion, in the next section I will discuss the role of fetishism in Krafft-Ebing's debate with the ideas in *Binet's Fetishism in Love.*

1.2 Freud and the Influence of Richard von Krafft-Ebing

In this section, I discuss the influence of Richard von Krafft-Ebing's psychiatric and sexological ideas on Freud's theorization of fetishism. This is relevant to my argument in that Freud initially presented his theory of fetishism as a sexual perversion. In fact, Freud relied on Krafft-Ebing's idea of sexual perversion, and this reliance influenced the direction of his thinking on fetishism. This contributes to the problematic of this

dissertation, in that Freud's direct dependence on Krafft-Ebing's ideas on perversion intensified Freud's difficulties in relating fetishism to his theorization of both perversion and infantile sexuality in *Three Essays*.

In developing his theory of sexuality and neurosis, Freud drew heavily on the writings on sexuality, sexual perversion, and fetishism by Krafft-Ebing. Krafft-Ebing (1891, 1899) wrote short papers on fetishism, but most of his understanding of fetishism and the cases of perversion were compiled in the various editions of his renowned book, *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1893a). For Freud, the period from 1896 to 1904 culminated in the publication of *Three Essays*, which included the concept of sexual perversion. The correspondence between Freud and Fließ during this period bears evidence of Freud's study of, and reliance on, Krafft-Ebing's ideas for scientific, clinical, and professional reasons.

When Freud reviewed the pertinent literature on fetishism, he stated, "In Krafft-Ebing, one finds, at least to a greater extent than elsewhere, everything essential in clear and honest descriptions" (Freud 1909a, 151). On this occasion Freud set himself the task of solving what he called "the riddle of fetishism" (158). A discussion of Krafft-Ebing's work shows that, in fact, fetishism was already a riddle to Krafft-Ebing long before Freud undertook the topic. This was mostly due to Krafft-Ebing's encounter with Binet's *Fetishism in Love*. Krafft-Ebing was motivated to gradually place fetishism at the centre of his exploration of normal sexuality and the aetiology of sexual perversions. Binet's ideas on these topics were a key influence on Krafft-Ebing's in evolving his own ideas on the aetiology of perversions, as well as defining new classifications of perversions, such as masochism. Krafft-Ebing's work is evidence of the topic of perversions presenting an intriguing problem in the neuropathology and psychiatry of Freud's era—even before Freud himself addressed the subject.

1.2.1 Krafft-Ebing and the Problem of Perversions

At the end of the nineteenth century, Krafft-Ebing's ideas on sexuality, as well as his classification of sexual perversions, were chiefly referenced in the field of psychiatry (Sulloway 1983, 279–89). Krafft-Ebing's classification is directly linked to the problematization of this dissertation, given that fetishism is one of the sexual perversions classified by Krafft-Ebing. This is important to my line of argument, insofar as Freud, in following Krafft-Ebing's classification in *Three Essays*, fails to find evidence that sexual perversions can be demonstrated in childhood in line with his theory of infantile sexuality. For this reason, in this section it becomes essential to elaborate on Krafft-Ebing's ideas about this topic.

In *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1893a), his major work of medical and psychiatric knowledge about and insights into sexuality, Krafft-Ebing presented his study on sexual perversions. Freud owned various editions of *Psychopathia Sexualis*, including a signed copy, as well as several other books by Krafft-Ebing on psychopathology and sexuality (Davies and Fichtner 2004, 289–302; Sulloway 1983, 296). All of Krafft-Ebing's books testify to the ways in which he was influenced by Binet on the subject of sexuality; thus Binet's ideas on fetishism, via the work of Krafft-Ebing, further affected Freud, who subsequently appropriated Krafft-Ebing's theory found in *Psychopathia Sexualis*. When Freud (1905a) presented his theory on sexual perversions in *Three Essays*, he followed Krafft-Ebing's classifications—including that of fetishism as a type of sexual perversion—as well as Krafft-Ebing's conceptual framework. As will be discussed later in this dissertation, this fidelity to Krafft-Ebing's thinking over the years carried conceptual challenges for Freud. After presenting his theory on sexual perversions, Freud (1909a, 1914a) continued to refer to Krafft-Ebing when exploring fetishism, and even discussed one of his fetishism cases. Freud also referred to Krafft-Ebing's works when discussing perversions and other subjects on sexuality (Freud 1905b, 1908a, 1910, 1918).

But what is Krafft-Ebing's definition of perversion? In *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 56) categorized perversions under the term *paresthesia*, which refers to abnormalities of the genital drive (*Geschlechtstriebs*). "With the opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the genital drive, every expression of it that does not correspond with the purpose of nature, — i.e., propagation, — must be regarded as perverse" (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 56). He added that in perversions, disgust is overcome. Freud deepened Krafft-Ebing's theory of disgust and related it to his ideas on fetishist pathology. As for abnormalities of the genital drive, Krafft-Ebing explored the four major perversions: sadism, masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality (Davidson 2001, 76, 136).

According to Krafft-Ebing, sexual perversion is considered a sign of an abnormal constitution of the central nervous system; this abnormal constitution is heritable: "In all pathological perversions of sexual life, the cause must be sought in the brain" (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 223). This was in line with his claim that, as a whole, the sexual drive is located in the nervous system and in the brain. Nevertheless, elements from the psychological sphere of sexuality that were not included in Krafft-Ebing's account of the brain—fantasies, dreams, and personal history, for example—were equally important to his understanding of sexual perversion. Given that Freud's need to solve theoretical problems surrounding fetishism after 1905, he was mainly interested in the topic of fantasy in line with Krafft-Ebing's ideas; this will be discussed in the following chapters.

Krafft-Ebing commented on the role of fantasies (*Phantasie, Phantasiebildern*) in fetishist perversion (1893a, 154, 156). Here, he argued that in several pathological cases where the fetish is absent, coitus is possible. However, coitus is incomplete and enforced through the help of fantasies about the fetish (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 154). Consequently, pathological fetishism is often a cause of psychical impotence. Given that the focus of sexual interest is limited to the fetish, Krafft-Ebing reasoned, excitability in response to normal stimuli decreases (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 154). In several of his works, Freud, too, explored the role and cause of fantasy in perversion, particularly in fetishism (1909b, 1910a, 1914a, 1927a). It is also worth noting that in establishing his aetiology of sexual perversion, Krafft-Ebing addressed the role of seduction during childhood; this is evidenced in the cases described in *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 165, 176). In developing his theory of seduction, Freud (1985, 219) derived confirmation from Krafft-Ebing's work.

1.2.2 Perversion and Perversity

Krafft-Ebing's conceptualization is crucial to the overall problem of this dissertation: as I will discuss in this section, Freud's decision to explore particular concepts of Krafft-Ebing's became consequential to Freud's theory of fetishism. In addition, shedding light on Krafft-Ebing's conceptualization supports the argument that differentiates Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism. This will be discussed in this section. (The context in which Freud comes to adopt Krafft-Ebing's concepts will be detailed in the next chapter.)

As shown in his letters to Fließ, Freud (1985, 213) began to employ the notions of both perversion and perversity (*Perversität*). Perversity was a concept coined by Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 56) to describe particular perverse acts not considered to be pathological but immoral[15]. On the one hand, Krafft-Ebing used the term perversity to refer to the temporary immoral conduct of normal individuals who deviate from the norm on a contingency basis (Oosterhuis 2012, 151). On the other hand, Krafft-Ebing related the concept of perversion to innate, autonomous, unavoidable, and permanent characteristics of sexuality (Oosterhuis 2012, 151).

[15] In his book *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing wrote: "Perversion (*Perversion*) of the sexual instinct (*Geschlechtstriebs*), as will be seen from what follows, is not to be confounded with perversity (*Perversität*), in the sexual act; since the latter may be induced by conditions which are not psychopathology. The concrete perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is not decisive. In order to differentiate between disease (perversion) (*Perversion*) and vice (perversity) (*Perversität*), one must investigate the whole personality of the individual and the original impulse leading to the perverse act" (1893a, 56–7). Later in the book, he emphasized: "No case has been demonstrated in which perversity (*Perversität*), has been transformed into perversion (*Perversion*)—into a reversal of the sexual instinct (*Gescblechtsempfindung*)" (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 190).

Freud's 1896 letters to Fließ, in which Freud uses the terms perversion and perversity, already identifies the problem of whether perversion is intrinsically linked to a moral issue. This problem is directly related to the subject of this dissertation: the ways in which Freud's theorization of human sexuality can be considered normative or pathological. Krafft-Ebing's theoretical gesture of isolating perversity from the concept of perversion was intended to separate perversion from moral or legal connotations. Once perversity denoted a temporary or contingent immoral conduct that did not imply a constitutional basis, it did not suit Freud's theoretical undertaking concerning sexuality. When introducing perversion as a human condition in *Three Essays*, Freud, in turn, discussed the concept of perversion as a morally unbiased concept. Freud's position here is important: elucidating it will help to clarify the overall problematic, particularly the issue of the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories on fetishism. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the psychiatric tradition at the base of Lacan's theorization of fetishism assumes that this phenomenon is explained by constitutional theories of perversity.

Returning to Krafft-Ebing's theory of perversion, on the question of the heritability of perversions, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 155) stated in *Psychopathia Sexualis* that fetishism depends on a congenital general psychopathic disposition. However, as evident in the 1890s edition of his book onwards, Krafft-Ebing broadened his understanding of fetishist aetiology by adhering to the above-mentioned ideas of Binet[16] (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 18–9).

In 1890, Krafft-Ebing published a supplement to his *Psychopathia Sexualis* entitled *New Research in the Field of Psychopathia Sexualis* (*Neue Forschungen auf dem Gebiet der Psychopathia Sexualis*) (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 6). In this edition, he devoted a section entitled, "Binet's Explanation" (*Binet's Erklärung*), to Binet's aetiological theory of fetishism. After citing the importance of Binet's *Fetishism in Love* in his book, and discussing cases from Binet´s work[17] , Krafft-Ebing judged fetishist pathology to be only partially congenital, depending on the patient's individual circumstances. Negotiating with Binet's ideas, Krafft-Ebing attempted to see fetishism independent

[16] Further, from the book's third edition (1888) onwards, Krafft-Ebing addressed the existence of sexual desire for women's shoes (1888, 52); the theft of female clothing motivated by sexual desires; and the act of masturbating with inanimate objects such as statues (1888, 61). In the fourth edition of the book (1889), Krafft-Ebing devoted a section to "fetishists," thereby referencing the work of Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso (Krafft-Ebing 1889, 62).

[17] Krafft-Ebing discussed the following cases from Binet's *Fetishism in Love*: A case of sexual excitation concerning an unconscious olfactory impression (1893b, 28), Rousseau's case of mental peculiarities of women (1893b, 122), case 74 of eye fetishism in *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1893b, 157), Descartes' case of fetishism for bodily defects (1893b, 162), and a case of fetishism for a peculiar costume (1893b, 169).

of its object. From the time of publication of his supplement, *New Research*, Krafft-Ebing stated that the inquiry into the essence of fetishist phenomena (*dem Wesen fetischistischer Phänomene*) was central to his new studies (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, V). However, Krafft-Ebing was continually confronted by the inevitability of the fetish object.

The significance of Krafft-Ebing's confrontation with the fetish object for the problematic of this dissertation lies in the question of whether sexuality can be understood independently of a sexual object, as Freud—in his *Three Essays*—assumes to be the case with infantile sexuality. In my framing of the argument, Freud fails to relate this assumption about infantile sexuality to fetishism as an object-dependent phenomenon. Given that Krafft-Ebing—before Freud—was also challenged by the fact that fetishism implies an object, I will discuss this topic in the following section.

1.2.3 Masochism and its Relation to Fetishism and its Object

I will now discuss how, after adopting Binet's ideas, Krafft-Ebing dealt theoretically with the fetish object. This relates to my argument insofar as Freud, seeking to solve problems created by fetishism in 1905, would have been interested in Krafft-Ebing's idea as a way of understanding the origin of fetishism.

How did Krafft-Ebing's interpretation of fetishism differ from Binet's? Krafft-Ebing identified masochism as the essence of fetishism. Based on Krafft-Ebing's putative coining of "masochism" as a concept—evident in his *New Research*, 1890 (Oosterhuis 2012, 149–50)—it is arguable that his concept was derived from Binet's theory on fetishism. In fact, the section that he devoted to "Binet's Explanation" in *New Research* was not designed to discuss fetishism as such; it was designed to introduce the concept of masochism[18]. In this section, Krafft-Ebing credited Binet's concept of fetishism for allowing him to solve the puzzling fact that the "object of individual attraction (fetish)" is a psychic element that is, however, represented by female body parts and clothing items (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 6–7). So, despite identifying masochism as the essence of fetishism, Krafft-Ebing professed that his interest in Binet's ideas lay in the fact that Binet stipulated an object of fetishism (*das Objekt des Fetischismus*). According to my problematization, Krafft-Ebing's early definition of masochism illustrates the challenges Freud encountered in the following decade with perversions in *Three Essays* precisely by following Krafft-Ebing's classification. Given that fetishism and masochism are among the representative perversions explored

[18] In the editions of *Psychopathia Sexualis*, published in the years preceding the introduction of the concept of masochism in *New Research*, Krafft-Ebing (1888, 50; 1889, 59) devoted sections to specifically discussing passive flagellation.

in *Psychopathia Sexualis*, I will argue in the following chapters that other important perversions (such as voyeurism, sadism, and inversion) privileged by Krafft-Ebing also depend on an object. Freud's decision to explore this set of phenomena made it difficult for him to continue to assume that childhood sexuality lacks an object.

Krafft-Ebing defined masochistic perversion based on which body parts the woman used to carry out acts of humiliation and/or violence against the individual with the perversion. Thus, Krafft-Ebing's definition of masochism[19] referred to the sexual excitation that stems from those female body parts readily capable of abuse, such as the hand and the foot (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 2, 7). Krafft-Ebing noted that Binet had accurately observed the masochistic significance of foot and shoe fetishism, as well as hand fetishism, in Rousseau's case[20] (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 6–7). Krafft-Ebing (1890b, 7) agreed that these were cases of fetishism, albeit strange types of fetishism (*sonderbare Art des Fetischismus*). This explanation implied a reclassification of the group of men with a sexual interest in aggressive, disdainful women who take pleasure in demeaning them. Krafft-Ebing (1890b, 6) considered this kind of fetishism (*Binet's amour spiritualiste*) in terms of masochism. Finally, after having emphasized the prominent role that female feet, shoes, and hands play in these particular perversions, Krafft-Ebing considered these variations on fetishism to be part of masochism (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 7).

It can be argued that the consideration of human sexuality as dependent on a sexual object explains why the concept of fetishism was being investigated so widely before the invention of masochism. This illustrates that, by the end of the nineteenth century, Freud's predecessors had already problematized the question of whether human sexuality should be understood independently of a sexual object. This is the case with Krafft-Ebing's attempt to posit masochism as the motivation for fetishism and the fetish object. Thus, it is arguable that Krafft-Ebing's version of masochism, in its relationship to fetishism and the fetish object, recognizes human sexuality as dependent on a sexual object. This is acknowledged by the insights and the

19 Krafft-Ebing coined the term masochism in reference to the Austrian writer Leopold van Sacher-Masoch. However, before Krafft-Ebing´s 1890 *New Research*, his references to the works of Sacher-Masoch were made in the context of discussing contrary sexual feeling, that is, homosexuality (Krafft-Ebing 1888, 18; 1889, 59). This lends credence to my argument that his adoption of Binet's theory of fetishism was decisive to his conceptualization of masochism.

20 An additional fact in favour of the decisive role of Krafft-Ebing´s adoption of Binet's theory of fetishism for his conceptualization of masochism are his references to Rousseau's *Confessions* before Krafft-Ebing´s 1890 text, *New Research*. Prior to his interest in Binet's discussion of Rousseau's fetishism, he had indirectly mentioned Rousseau's *Confessions* when discussing contrary sexual feeling. However, he did not show any further interest in Rousseau's accounts at that time (Krafft-Ebing 1888, III, 122; 1889, III, 105).

terminology highlighted by Krafft-Ebing (*Objekt, Gegenstand*) in his *New Research*. Through engaging with fetishism, Freud pursued Krafft-Ebing's late-nineteenth-century attempt to study the human sexual drive as independent of its object (Freud 1905a, 13, 16). I argue that it is debatable whether Freud's initial studies of both fetishism and masochism provide a rethinking of human sexuality as independent of a sexual object. More specifically, Freud's (1905a, 12–3) theoretical manoeuvre was to study fetishism and masochism in terms of deviations in the aim of the sexual drive and, consequently, to develop a critique of the biological norms that unite sexual drive and object. As with Krafft-Ebing and his New Research, the problems Freud encountered in this context result from his adopting Binet's ideas on fetishism; any theory of fetishism defies plausibility if it does not stipulate dependence on an object. (This will be further discussed in Chapter 3.)

In the years following publication of his *New Research*, Krafft-Ebing reversed the prevailing line of thinking: he adopted a theoretical approach that framed a certain kind of fetishism as a subset of masochism—thus deeming it to be deeply rooted in the sphere of love (1893a, 141-6). Though he continued to agree with Binet's aetiology of fetishism, Krafft-Ebing also stipulated that fetishism depends on a masochistic disposition. In subsequent editions of *Psychopathia Sexualis*, he devoted a long section to foot- and shoe-fetishism as degrees of masochism (1893a, 123) that are midway perversions between full-blown masochism and fetishism itself. According to Krafft-Ebing, when sexual interest is limited exclusively to the female feet and shoes, fetishism is expressed as a relation between subjugation and the masochistic desire for self-humiliation. Thus there remain unconscious masochistic motives (*Unbewusst Gebliebener Motivation*), such as being trod upon by a female foot or shoe, which characterize masochists' fetishes par excellence. (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 128-129). In the following chapters, I will show how Freud—in striving to solve the problems he encountered in formulating his aetiological theory of fetishism—evolved this theorization of Krafft-Ebing. In the following section, I will present how Krafft-Ebing initially elaborated this idea.

1.2.4 Towards a Shared Aetiology of Fetishism

In developing his aetiological theory of fetishism, Freud (1909a, 152; 1914a, 245) referred to—and elaborated on—Krafft-Ebing's connection between foot- and shoe-fetishism and masochism. In *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing wrote of this connection: "The idea of being trod upon etc. remains in the depths of unconscious life (*Tiefe des Unbewussten*) and the idea of the shoe alone, the means for such acts, rises into consciousness" (1893a, 132). As discussed earlier, this conclusion is a development of Binet's theorization of the dual character of Rousseau's fetishism

related to the female hand and boot. Binet had regarded this kind of fetishism as the assemblage of contradictory elements. In turn, Krafft-Ebing theorized that this assemblage is constituted of conscious and unconscious elements. When Freud (1909a, 155) reviewed Krafft-Ebing's ideas on fetishism and discussed fetishist cases from *Psychopathia Sexualis*, he developed an idea similar to Krafft-Ebing's: that by means of splitting, the fetish synthesizes both repressed unconscious as well as conscious elements. (We will return to this in Chapter 3.) Lastly, Krafft-Ebing cites cases in which fetishism occurred in association with homosexuality. Again, in his late theorization of fetishism, Freud (1927, 154) also made this connection.

Consistent with Binet's ideas, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 155) assumed that in every case of fetishist pathology, a triggering early-childhood event—often relating to women—had occurred. Freud, too, held a similar a view, asserting that neurotic symptoms form as a result of early-childhood experiences (Freud and Breuer 1895, 169). Later, according to Krafft-Ebing, with the first awakenings of the *vita sexualis*, the early-childhood impression is associated with a lustful feeling, thus becoming the principal object of the individual's sexual interest. Despite giving credit to Binet for his ideas, Krafft-Ebing asserts that fetishism is the result of complicated mental processes, and that it is virtually impossible to identify the precise beginning of the fetishist perversion (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 19). Freud, in turn, having inherited the riddle of fetishism, focused his investigations on the question of the fetish's origin. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, Freud's study relied directly on the theory and cases in Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Freud 1909a; 1914a). In the context of my argument, this is crucial, in that it demonstrates the reasons why Freud relied on his predecessors in further elaborating his psychoanalytic aetiology of fetishism—even after 1905. Before Freud, Krafft-Ebing, in *Psychopathia Sexualis*, already presents an aetiological theory of fetishism that considers the interplay between the sexual drive and Binet's ideas of a sexual impression as coming from an external source; Freud engaged in a similar attempt to solve the theoretical challenges posed by fetishism. (I will discuss this in the following chapters.)

To account for the drives responsible for sexuality, Krafft-Ebing applied Binet's psychological ideas to his own theoretical framework. In discussing the origins of fetishism, Krafft-Ebing stressed the aetiological role of the causal sexual impression in awakening the genital drive—and the patient's sexual life (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 155, 169). Further, Krafft-Ebing also recognized that in most individuals, the sexual drive awakens far before the physical possibility of intercourse. He added that these early desires frequently concern the impression of the female form when dressed (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 167).

Over the course of the twelve years following the publication of Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Freud took Binet's model—which stipulated the accidental cause as the origin of fetishist perversion, and the innate disposition of the sexual drive—and evolved that model into the two aetiological cornerstones of his theory of sexuality. Krafft-Ebing's adoptions of Binet's ideas led Krafft-Ebing to give fetishism a central role in his argument on the major topics of normal human sexuality[21] (1893a, 17). Thus, Krafft-Ebing assumes that a fetish can maintain its significance without being pathological (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 19). To the extent that Freud brings perversion closer to normal sexuality in 1905—as will be explored in the chapters to come—it is debatable how far Freud distances himself from the ideas of his predecessors in his theory of sexuality. After all, Binet had already established this close link, and Krafft-Ebing had followed up on Binet's thinking.

To understand the normal significance of fetishism in sexuality, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 23) dedicated a section of his book to the physiological processes that support the drives in charge of sexuality. Such physiological processes underlie the psychic aspects of sexual life, such as sexual emotions, sensations, and sexual impulses. As for the drives in charge of sexuality, Krafft-Ebing employs throughout his book the terms for both genital (*Geschlechtstrieb*) and sexual drives (*Sexualtrieb*). Although he systematically differentiates between them, he does not provide any explicit or detailed definitions for these concepts. However, his book does detail features of the sexual drive. As will be discussed in the following chapters, Freud also came to engage with Krafft-Ebing's theoretical framework. However, Freud focusses on the concept of the sexual drive in order to develop his theory of sexuality (1905a, 1–2); this enables his critique of the genital drive as entailing one aim only: reproduction.

According to Krafft-Ebing, the sexual drive is a function of the cerebral cortex, the part of the brain in charge of emotions, ideas, and impulses. He notes that the sexual drive in humans is not as intermittent as it is in animals (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 24); in humans, the sexual drive exists continuously, yet its intensity varies in the period

[21] Krafft-Ebing pointed to the importance of Binet's contributions to the study of fetishism as a means to understanding normal love, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 18–9); he claimed that by elucidating these mental processes, one can understand the physical and mental desire to possess the beloved object (*Gegenstands der liebe*). Following the line of argument set out in *Fetishism in Love*, Krafft-Ebing in *Psychopathia Sexualis* highlights the essential role of fetishism in his physiological model of normal sexuality. Here, the physiological facts of fetishism explain the sexual preferences of a certain person over others (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 18–20).

of sexual maturity when it is governed by a physiological law[22]. Krafft-Ebing reserves the term genital drive for physiological processes in the reproductive glands, the purpose of which is the perpetuation of the species (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 23). In *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing connects both sexual and genital drives. He argues that the continuous intensity of the sexual drive plays a role in the normative purpose of the genital drive. According to Krafft-Ebing, the emphasis of erotic ideas and feelings of pleasure produced by the sexual drive leads to the urge of the genital drive (1893a, 24).

Freud's critical undertaking on the pathologization of the perversions and sexual normativity in *Three Essays* rests heavily on Krafft-Ebing's theorization of these concepts. In 1901, when he began to plan the writing of a theory on human sexuality, Freud had already begun to draw heavily on *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Freud 1985, 448). Until *Three Essays*, in 1905, his criticism of the pathologization of perversions and of sexual normality depended largely on the psycho-physiological features of the sexual drive as described by Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 24–8). In elaborating his critique, Freud (1905a, 12) points to the constant intensity of the sexual drive in humans. Moreover, in 1905, Freud gave fetishism a central role in deconstructing the distinction between normality and perverse pathology. This discussion formed part of a study of the characteristics of the sexual impulse. The following chapters of this dissertation will elucidate the relevance of this; in fact, Freud's deconstruction of the distinction between normality and perverse pathology undermines his theory of perversion.

[22] As in *Fetishism in Love*, in *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing, in describing the psycho-physiological process of the sexual drive (1893a, 24–8), gives special attention to the role of the olfactory sense in sexual life. He cites the sexual relevance of the olfactory sense in animals, and he reconsiders the connection between sexuality and the sense of smell based on their locations in the brain, citing their proximity to each other in the cerebral cortex (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 24). Krafft-Ebing's argument concerning the influence of olfactory perceptions proves fundamental to Freud, as well; we see evidence of this in Freud's letters to Fließ, as well as in *Three Essays*. In his letters, Freud adopted a phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspective in theorizing about human sexual excitation as linked to olfactory and gustatory pleasure from corporal excrement. Freud, in his case studies of fetishist pathology, also adopts this link between olfactory perceptions and sexual excitement.

In *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing focuses on fetishist pathology to explore the manifestations of both the sexual drive (1893a, 164, 168)[23] and the genital drive[24] (1893a, 156–7, 171, 173). Krafft-Ebing claims that fetishism involving body parts does not exceed the limits of the normal stimulation of the genital drive (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 153). As I contend throughout this dissertation, this is an essential idea to Freud's study of the sexual drive and to his critique of normal sexuality[25]. However, according to Krafft-Ebing, the distinguishing feature of pathological fetishism is the *limiting* of sexual interest to a particular part of the body—and the need for the fetish to be activated if the patient is to perform coitus[26] (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 153). This also applies when the sexual interest is limited to artificial objects, in which case there is also a correspondence with the processes of the normal psychic *vita sexualis* (1893a, 154).

So far in this chapter, we have seen how the concept of fetishist perversion developed since Binet challenged Charcot and Magnan's concept of perversion of the sexual instinct. Most scholars (Davidson 1987a, 41) contend that the medical concept of perversion did not exist prior to the literature that Freud relied on to develop his own conceptualization of perversion. In this chapter, I also established that such literature was not only responsible for the emergence of the concept of perversion as such, but for the emergence of a type of person: the pervert/fetishist. This refers

[23] When Krafft-Ebing discussed the object of the sexual drive in case 76 of hand-fetishism, he discussed Binet's ideas and employed the sexual drive as linked to the individual's sexual interest in objects (fetishes) that are not appropriate for coitus. This case of hand-fetishism shows that the sexual drive manifests itself independently, given that the fetish existed before the individual's sexual interest in the opposite sex was manifested. After the awakening of the attraction to the opposite sex, the fetish becomes attached to the person of the opposite sex. (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 161). When Krafft-Ebing discussed case 81 of fetishism for gaiters, corsets, and silk dresses, he employed the sexual drive as being responsible for the specific conditions (fetishes) that are responsible for the individual's attraction for the opposite sex to be effective. (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 168).

[24] When Krafft-Ebing discussed pathological fetishism, he wrote about the genital drive in order to claim that fetishism for parts of the body does not extend beyond the limits of what normally stimulates the genital drive (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 156). Further, when Krafft-Ebing discussed fetishism of artificial objects or clothing, he claimed that this can be regarded as a pathological phenomenon, because such objects are not linked to the genital drive, as they are not normal sexual stimuli (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 157).

[25] Within Krafft-Ebing's clinical framework, perverse impulses like this are also connected to another conceptual element, erogenous zones (*Erogene zonen*). Under pathological conditions, different parts of the body, such as the anus, may take on the significance of an erogenous zone (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 31). Freud's elaboration of the concept of erogenous zones is also essential to his theory of sexuality.

[26] Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 153) wrote: "It would seem reasonable to assume, as the distinguishing mark of pathological fetishism, the necessity for the presence of the fetish as a *conditio sine qua non* for the possibility of performance of coitus".

to the characterization of individuals whose sexual interest is focused on parts of the female body and articles of female clothing. My review of Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's work on fetishist perversion in this chapter shows the context in which the concept of fetishism came into existence. I have also shown how these authors highlighted the relationship between fetishism and normal sexuality/normal romantic life. As will be detailed in the following chapters, rather than deem perversions pathological, Freud ascribes perversions to the realm of normal sexuality; in *Three Essays*, Freud radically depathologizes perversions. As we have seen, over the decades, Freud faced crucial problems in trying to categorize fetishism as a perversion while adopting Binet the Krafft-Ebing's ideas on fetishism. Puzzled by how to categorize fetishism, Freud then applied the same theoretical framework used in the aetiology of neurosis to that of fetishism. By relating fetishism to his ideas on neurosis in the years to come, Freud goes on to explain fetishism as a (neurotic) pathology; Freud also asserts fetishism itself as the central phenomenon in his overall theory of psychopathology. As part of the problematization, I consider Freud's difficulties in trying to categorize fetishism. In the following section, I will examine how Krafft-Ebing's ideas about neurosis shaped Freud's initial distinction between neurosis and perversion.

1.2.5 Freud's Stance on Neuro-Psychosis and Psychoneurosis

In analysing Freud's theory of psychopathology, the clinical concepts of neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis—coined by Krafft-Ebing (Andersson 1962, 156–8; Bercherie 2004)—also come into play. In the 1890s, Freud studied these concepts extensively (1985, 227), connecting them to splitting and perversion. Scholars also point to Freud's engagement with Krafft-Ebing's classification of neuropathology as the basis of Freud's theory of neurosis (Krafft-Ebing 1893b, 301, 305, 474; May-Tolzmann 1996, 64, 71). Here, we may well ask ourselves what Freud's reasons may have been for this? This is because, in addition to relating the onset of neuroses to physiological phases related to sexuality, Krafft-Ebing (409) also relates "constitutional" neurosis to cases in which the sexual drive is stimulated in a perverse way and later manifests itself in puberty and onwards (Krafft-Ebing 1893b, 477). In the next chapter, I will describe how, by subscribing to Krafft-Ebing's clinical concepts, Freud undertakes a deeper theorization of the role of sexuality in the origin of neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis. This leads Freud to formulate an initial theory of psychopathology in which he creates an opposition between neurosis and perversion. Investigating this initial psychopathological theory in Chapter 2 is essential to the development of my conceptual framework in this dissertation; indeed, Freud's initial theory of psychopathology did not hold up to greater scrutiny.

In working with the concepts of neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis, Freud in the 1890s aimed to develop a theory of sexuality grounded in neuropathology—"constitutional" neurosis. Freud conceived of both clinical notions as a defence against sexuality and "perverse impulses", which is also a notion coined by Krafft-Ebing. In a clear response to Krafft-Ebing, Freud, trying to explain the constitutional basis of psychoneuroses, was at first led to adopt fetishism as a perversion. Starting in the late 1870s, Krafft-Ebing developed his work on neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis, describing these phenomena in his renowned *Psychiatric Manual* (*Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*) (Sulloway 1983, 296); Freud owned two editions of this work (Davies and Fichtner 2004, 299-300). Krafft-Ebing defined these illnesses[27] based on how they affected individuals with healthy brains. (Krafft-Ebing 1893b, 301). In Krafft-Ebing's (1893b, 307) *Psychiatric Manual*, the psychoneuroses are positioned as of greater interest than neuropsychoses. In the period spanning 1890 to 1905, Freud developed his aetiological thinking by using Krafft-Ebing's clinical terminology[28].

Consistent with my argument in this dissertation, in this chapter I discussed the ideas of the predecessors with whom Freud engages in the course of his exploration of fetishism and splitting. In doing so, I also stressed how these ideas are linked to the narrative arc of my argument in this dissertation. I have shown that Freud's early theory of the neuroses was developed under the classification established by

[27] According to Krafft-Ebing (1893b, 301), psychoneurosis is acquired "accidentally"—by chance—and affect the individual in a parasitic way. Krafft-Ebing describes neuropsychoses as neurotic disturbances influenced by psychological processes, with prominent psychic symptoms (1895, 36) (1893b, 24). He adds that "neuropsychosis" is the scientific term for what is generally known as "neurosis" (Krafft-Ebing 1895, 122) and that neuropsychoses could be explained as stemming from disorders related to the sexual functions, sexual excess, and the abuse of the reproductive organs (Krafft-Ebing 1893b, 199).

[28] Although Freud (1894, 1896a, 1926) wrote crucial works in the 1890s in which he employed the term neuropsychosis, his use of this term was not widespread. In contrast, Freud (1895e, 1896b, 1898, 1905a, 1926) Freud used the notion of psychoneurosis consistently from the 1890s until the 1920s. Once established in Vienna, Krafft-Ebing became the president of the *Society for Psychiatry and Neurology* (*Verein für Psychiatrie und Neurologie*), a body to which Freud delivered his lectures on the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neurosis. In the meetings of this society, Krafft-Ebing debated directly with Freud, challenging Freud on his early ideas of the sexual aetiology of neuroses. In 1895, he chaired Freud's (1895a) lecture, *The Mechanism of Obsessions and Phobias*. Freud's lecture illustrates his decision to incorporate Krafft-Ebing's ideas on neuropsychosis. Freud presented in his lecture his ideas about the psychological processes of defence, to provide explanations for neuropsychosis (1895a, 77). Later, in 1896, when Freud (1896c) lectured on the role of early sexual stimulation in childhood in the aetiology of hysteria, Krafft-Ebing again chaired the meeting. Expecting recognition from Krafft-Ebing, Freud (1985, 184) presented the idea of early sexual stimulation as the decisive factor in the development of neuropsychosis (1896c, 220). In 1897, Freud revealed to Fließ his interest in Krafft-Ebing's descriptions of perversions as valuable material for his aetiological ideas (1985, 219) and began employing several of his terms, such as perverse impulses (1985, 239, 255).

Krafft-Ebing. I have also shown that Freud's theories on the causes of splitting were based on Binet's (and Janet's) ideas. As such, in the following chapter, I will further investigate the problematization of how Freud arrived at the concept of perversion. Indeed, it was the concept of perversion that first led Freud to discuss fetishism.

Chapter 2

Neurosis as "The Negative of Perversion"

In the previous chapter I discussed the main theoretical sources upon which Freud relies to formulate his theory of fetishism: the concept of splitting and perversion. We saw that Freud's first theoretical approach to fetishism, in 1905, related fetishism to the concept of perversion. In line with the main arguments in this dissertation, in this chapter I will explore how and why Freud came to engage with the concept of perversion in this context. As part of his aetiology of neurosis, Freud's theoretical goal was to build an oppositional relationship between neurosis and perversion. We can trace Freud's interest in fetishism—although he did not use the actual term until 1905—to a letter to Wilhelm Fließ dated 6 December 1896. Freud gives an account of an adult female patient's report on her brother's and father's peculiar sexual compulsion:

> *A fragment from my daily experience: One of my patients, in whose history her highly perverse father plays the principal role, has a younger brother who is looked upon as a common scoundrel. […] the brother told her that when he was 12 years old, his sexual activity consisted in kissing (licking) the feet of his sisters when they were undressing at night. In association, she recovered from her unconscious the memory of a scene in which (at the age of 4) she watched her papa, in the throes of sexual excitement, licking the feet of a wet nurse. (Freud 1985, 213).*

At that time, Freud was developing his theory of the causes of neurosis. This passage reveals that Freud was focused not only on the female patient's hysterical (neurotic) symptoms, but on the behaviours of the patient's brother and father. This insight, replete with the label "highly perverse" (*höchst perverse*), aligns directly with what Freud (1909a, 158) began to call "*perversen Fussfetischisten*"—perverse foot fetishists.

At this point, we can examine the quoted passage in the context of the problematic of this dissertation, namely, Freud's theoretical challenges with fetishism. Following the structure of the argument presented in the introduction and in the first chapter, Freud's problem with fetishism began in his 1905 *Three Essays*, when his theory of perversion and of infantile sexuality did not allow for a comprehensive, consistent understanding of fetishism. Yet, in the context of the quoted passage of Freud's letter of December 1896, his concern relates to sexuality in puberty and in adulthood. As we will see in the following sections, in 1896 Freud already applied an idea similar to Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, namely, the aetiological value of strong early sexual impressions. However, in the context of the above quotation, Freud did not have in mind an explanation for either the origin of fetishist perversion or for the fetish object; rather, he used a different logic to explain the cause of pathologies. Freud's

key interest in linking the aetiological idea of this strong early sexual impression to his patient's account is the fact that this impression is seen as a premature confrontation with adult sexuality, given that his patient was four years old. It was also a traumatic confrontation: the child witnessed her father's sexual excitement when licking a woman's feet. In the course of this chapter, I will explain that Freud's theoretical investigation in this context relates to how different pathologies are linked to the moment of an early, disturbing (traumatic) encounter with sexual stimulation, usually involving adult sexuality. Freud categorized this as seduction. Thus, in this context, neurosis and perversion are different outcomes of seduction.

This is relevant to my overall argument because Freud's theory in which perversion results from early sexual stimulation follows a different line of thought than the one he later developed and published in 1905, that is, the idea that infantile sexuality should be understood from the perspective of perversions. However, Freud did not anchor his seduction theory in a broader theory of infantile sexuality: he simply did not have one yet. As I will discuss in the sections to come, he only embarked on a proper theory of perversion and of infantile sexuality—developed in more detail in his *Three Essays*—after encountering problems with his seduction theory. Only then, fetishism emerged as a problem.

As I will detail later in this chapter, Freud's description of perverse actions (such as in his letter of December 1896) eventually led him to begin to identify perversion as a consequence of the ineffectiveness of—or even the complete absence of—defence against early exciting sensations linked to olfactory and gustatory pleasure from bodily excretions—like urine and faeces—as well as from the entire surface of the body. Later, Freud (1909a, 158) described cases of pathological perverse fetishism underlying fetishists' interest in feet-licking. Nevertheless, maintaining the argumentative structure of this chapter and bearing in mind Freud's account of perversion in his letter to Fließ in 1896, the man's fetishist behaviour did not pose a theoretical problem for Freud since such a perverse behaviour is just one form of adult sexuality. Therefore, the way in which Freud explained how his patient faced the confrontation with her father's fetishism in the context of the seduction theory shows that at that juncture—in 1896— the conceptual problem with fetishism had not yet presented itself. The fact of the young girl prematurely encountering her father's (fetishistic) sexuality does not constitute a problem with the phenomenon of fetishism *per se*. Although in the quoted 1896 letter to Fließ, Freud was interested in the perverse behaviours of the patient's brother and father, he had not yet adopted Krafft-Ebing's classification, in which fetishism is one of the main types of perverse sexual activity.

Freud's account of December 1896 sheds light on another fact pertinent to the central question of this dissertation. Freud's description makes clear that he already knew that it was possible for a child in puberty—his patient's brother—to be sexually interested in an object, in this case, a woman's feet. Given that in 1896 Freud saw no reason for concern with the specificity of fetishist perverse activity, he did not problematize the idea that in puberty, sexuality can already imply a fetish object. Only after 1905 did Freud face the challenge of having to explain the origins of fetishism, considering that infantile sexuality can exist without an object. From 1905 on, Freud asks himself how the introduction of the object (fetish) can be explained. This is a question Freud explored throughout his work, by repeatedly engaging with Binet's ideas on the subject. (We will return to this in Chapter 3).

The correspondence between Freud and Fließ documents the line of thought that led Freud to introduce sexual perversion to his theories; the correspondence also illustrates the accompanying theoretical elements that supported his early understanding of perversion. During the 1890s, Fließ's work was very influential to Freud (Sulloway, 1983), who followed the development of Fließ's ideas with great interest. Fließ was working as an otolaryngologist in Berlin (Masson 1985, 1), and he studied such subjects as the importance of olfaction in sexuality and neurosis; the existence of childhood sexuality and its connection to excretory functions; and essential human bisexuality. Fließ's inquiries began years before Freud himself. In this chapter, I will provide a more detailed account of how Freud's inquiry led him to explore sexuality in greater depth and, consequently, to introduce perversion. First, however, I will explore how the concept of perversion was introduced. By the time Freud debuted the concept of sexual perversion, sexuality had already become a cornerstone of his theory of psychopathology. According to Freud (1894, 52), sexuality is responsible for a range of mental illnesses. The biological foundations of sexuality provided Freud with a physical basis for understanding various symptoms grouped as neuroses, especially psychoneuroses. Freud's thinking is therefore similar to the discussion on sexuality and perversion by Binet and Krafft-Ebing; in fact, Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* is discussed in the correspondence between Freud and Fließ.

The context of Freud's account of the perverse (fetishist) behaviour of licking female feet, related to Fließ in December of 1896, was already part of a theoretical strategy to understand the relationship between perversion and the cause of neurosis, a strategy that would soon lead Freud to introduce ideas about infantile sexuality. In this letter to Fließ, Freud (1985, 212) made connections between perversion and his idea of "abandoned erotogenic zones". This implies that he considered the

perverse impulses of the licking behaviour to be a vestige of early-childhood sexual excitation. These sexual excitations, he reasoned, originated in childhood, stemming from specific erotogenic zones in the body that were "abandoned" later in the child's development. However, in adult life, the sexual excitations persist in the form of perverse impulses. Freud's strategy in 1896 was to justify his idea that neurotic individuals repress these perverse impulses—and replace them with neurotic compulsions or hysterical symptoms (Freud 1985, 213).

Freud's understanding of sexual perversion as sexual urges stemming from the earliest bodily sensations became increasingly prominent in his theories of the late 1890s. Freud saw these sexual urges as involving an animalistic tendency to focus on the various human orifices such as the mouth, anus, nose, genitals, etc. Freud claimed that this sexual-organic aspect of erogenous zones found in perversions was exactly what the defensive symptoms in neurotic patients intended to keep at a distance. (Freud 1985, 212). This implies that Freud conceived of neuroses—as opposed to perversions—as a defensive pathology. Broaching this early opposition at this juncture is fundamental to the argument I am developing in this dissertation: How did fetishism challenge Freud's theorizations? As I will elaborate on in the following chapters, from *Three Essays* onwards, Freud assumed that the phenomenon of fetishism presents an obstacle to this opposition between neurosis and perversion. In continuing to problematize this, in the following sections I will discuss how Freud engaged with the task of solving destabilizing effects of fetishism on his theories. I will demonstrate how, by the end of his career, Freud comes to favour fetishism as an ultimate model for his theory of defence—just as he did initially with the neuroses.

The next step is to examine how Freud formulated his thinking early on. In a letter written to Fließ dated 24 January 1897, Freud summarizes this oppositional relationship between neurosis and perversion: "I am beginning to grasp an idea: it is as though in the perversions, of which hysteria is the negative, we have before us a remnant of a primeval sexual cult, which once was—perhaps still is—a religion in the Semitic East (Moloch, Astarte). […] Perverse actions, moreover, are always the same—meaningful and fashioned according to some pattern that someday will be understood" (Freud 1985, 227). In this passage, Freud's concept of perversion is connected to that of an archaic religious cult. Later, Freud gives a detailed account of fetishists' behaviour by employing religious terms that reflect the origin of the notion of fetishism as a cult-like behaviour. (Freud 1905a, 1907, 1910, 1909a). Michel Foucault (2003) argues that in the scientific literature on sexuality from the end of the nineteenth century, a relationship had been identified between perversion, archaic and primitive rituals, cults and infantilism. Further, he claims that Freud's theory

of sexuality subsequently became the catalyst that normalized human sexuality (Foucault 2003, 13, 32, 102, 265). This claim maintains that the behaviour seen in perverse pathologies—archaic rituals, primitiveness, and infantilism—deviate from the normative biological aim of human reproduction. According to Foucault, Freud and his contemporaries sought to integrate this non-reproduction-oriented sexual behaviour into the classification of sexual disturbances (Foucault 2003, 286-287).

Keeping Foucault's claim in mind, it is relevant to review and discuss the context in which Freud first applies his concepts of perversion and fetishism. The connection established by Freud between perversions and ancient religious cults allows him to explore perversions from a non-pathological perspective. In line with the argument of this chapter, it is worth remembering that at this juncture, Freud does not yet conceive of fetishism as a specific phenomenon; he is not yet actively engaged with puzzling out either the origins of fetishism or the reason for particular objects of fetishes. In the above-mentioned passage from his letter to Fließ, Freud (1985, 227) strives to understand the very pattern (*Muster*) in human sexuality that shapes perversion. Further, he recognizes that there are common cultural and historical elements that form the basis of perversion; these are the vestiges of a primeval stage of human sexuality.

Freud (1985, 227) points to actual religious cults, such as Moloch and Astarte, to integrate their features—which they share with perversions—into his theory of the naturally perverse disposition in human sexuality. However, in this comparison, he does not classify these features as sexual disturbances[29], nor does he link perversion to an abnormality. Instead, his association of perversion with primitive religious cults is intended to reveal an archaic state of sexuality directed towards an essential human eroticization of bodily excretions—such as the act of sucking blood—as well as the potential human pleasure gained from aggressive acts, such as cutting off a piece of a young female's genitals (Freud 1985, 227).

In his correspondence with Fließ between 1896 and 1897, Freud theorizes that non-functional bodily pleasure—that is, sexual pleasure that does not serve the reproductive function—represented by the concept of perversion, is associated with the essential features of human sexuality. Therefore, rather than classify perversions as sexual disturbances (Foucault 2003, 286-287), Freud links perversions to the characteristics of sexuality found in animals and in early (childhood) phases

[29] In this context, the cult of the god Moloch is directly associated with child sacrifice (Bergmann, 1992); the rituals devoted to the goddess Astarte relate to forms of sacred prostitution (Budin, 2008).

of human development (Freud 1985, 223 and 230). The oppositional relationship between neuroses and perversions became the fundamental argument of Freud's aetiological ideas about psychopathology. This fact is crucial to this chapter's argument, as it reveals Freud's thinking on perversion and neurosis. As Freud came to consider sexual perversion as the core of the conflicts resulting in psychoneuroses, he sought to determine how perverse impulses played a role in the formation of neurotic symptoms. In the following chapter, I will discuss how, given that fetishism could not be explained by this theory of perversion, Freud went on to frame fetishism in terms of the formation of neurotic symptoms. First, however, I will examine Freud's theoretical understanding of the cause of perversions.

In his first exploration of the link between neurosis and sexual perversion, Freud also explores the *cause* of sexual perversions. As he expresses in his letters to Fließ in 1896–1897—Freud sees perversion as playing a crucial role in the evolution of his theory of sexual stimulation in childhood (seduction theory). Also in the 1896 letter to Fließ, in describing the perverse behaviour of the individual licking women's feet, Freud writes: "For another consequence of premature sexual experiences is perversion, of which the determinant seems to be that defence either does not occur before the psychic apparatus is completed or does not occur at all" (Freud 1985, 210). According to this, perversion is a result of the absence of a defence against premature sexual experiences that occur before the completion of a child's "psychical apparatus," that is, before the age of four (Freud 1985, 209–210). Consequently, perversion is manifested in adulthood as a sexual compulsion fuelled by impulses that stem from the memory of pleasurable sexual experiences in childhood (Freud 1985, 209–210). Here, Freud made a connection between particular aspects of perversion and normality, postulating that, normally, not *all* sexual experiences release pleasurable feelings (Freud 1985, 209); most adult sexual experiences that stem from childhood usually generate pleasure. Freud claims that the reproduction of these sexual experiences evokes a pleasure that cannot be inhibited. Therefore, at this point in Freud's thinking, perversion represents a compulsive excess of this type of uninhibited pleasure.

Referencing Freud's early thinking on perversion is crucial to the problematic of this dissertation: it is precisely this conceptual framing of perversion that begins to break down in *Three Essays* (1905), when fetishism is introduced. As will be discussed in this chapter as well as the next, Freud would later face difficulties in upholding this definition of perversion, specifically, when he wished to contextualize perversions with his thinking on fetishism. It was his adoption of Binet's ideas that led Freud to modify his initial theory of fetishism, and, more dramatically, to view fetishism as a

negative—rather than a positive—expression of perversion, albeit the result of a defensive process[30].

As detailed in the introduction, in this dissertation I problematize Freud's approach to fetishism, demonstrating how, over time, he turns to Binet's ideas on fetishism in order to solve conceptual problems raised by this phenomenon. Freud's trajectory of evolving his psychoanalytic theory of fetishism can be seen as the gradual application of his early theory of neuroses to the idea of fetishism. Confronted with the difficulties imposed by the phenomenon of fetishism, Freud returns to the ideas of Binet's *Fetishism in Love* and Binet's ideas about doubling. Freud then tries to solve the theoretical problems of fetishism that arose in 1905 by evolving his early theory of neuroses. Therefore, in the following sections I will 1) discuss Freud's early ideas on the aetiology of neurosis. Again, this is to trace Freud's efforts to solve the theoretical problems posed by fetishism, as well as to document the evolution of his psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. In doing so, I will 2) pursue the main argument of this chapter, demonstrating that Freud's theory of perversion is responsible for his choice of engaging with fetishism as a particular phenomenon—from *Three Essays* onwards.

2.1 Freud's Aetiological Thinking about Neurosis

This section begins with a review of Freud's aetiological thinking of the 1890s. My goal is to clarify how the concept of perversion entered Freud's work as a consequence of his concern with the aetiological role of sexuality in neurosis. I will also elaborate on how Freud began his theoretical engagement with Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas. The discussion is organized around the concepts of perversion, erotogenic zones, organic sexual repression, and disgust.

When Freud began to explore sexual perversions, his intention was to theorize about sexuality in order to understand the aetiology of neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis—based on Krafft-Ebing's classification—in the form of a discussion of Binet and Janet's ideas on splitting. As Freud came to understand the importance of sexuality, he evolved his definition of sexuality from a generic to a more detailed theoretical one. His work until 1896 had been guided by the incorporation of new perspectives into his neuropsychological framework. When Freud felt compelled to address the problems he encountered upon introducing perversions into his

[30] In Freud's approach to perversions in the late 1890s, he did not yet distinguish between different kinds of perversion. In a few brief comments on cases from this period, Freud linked perversions to different sexual activities such as sexual seduction (Freud 1985, 212), male excitement triggered by young girls (Freud 1985, 96), and zoophilia (Freud 1985, 223).

framework, he was not looking for an explanation for the sexual deviance attendant to fetishism. Instead, his aim was to establish the basic conditions for investigating the unconscious psychic content of the neuroses.

We can trace the theoretical paths to Freud's aetiological theory by outlining its main elements: affect, trauma, splitting, defence, seduction, and perversion. Freud develops these concepts in his work published in the 1890s[31]. With the aim to problematize Freud's challenges with fetishism, I will explore these concepts in detail. This will allow us to understand how Freud once again mobilized these same concepts—and reworked them in service to developing his psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. Freud's first step was to formulate an aetiological model to explain the psychological mechanism behind hysterical splitting and its subsequent symptoms, especially hysterical conversion (Freud and Breuer, 1893a). Freud (1894) later applied the same aetiological model to explain phobias, obsessional representations, paranoia, and selected hallucinatory phenomena. In this period, Freud broadened his theorization of psychopathology by discussing Binet's ideas and by using Krafft-Ebing's classification (neuro-psychosis and psychoneurosis). To further my argument, in the following sections I will discuss Freud's aetiological concepts. Originally, Freud intended these concepts to explain neurosis; later, Freud applied these concepts to his psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. The relevant concepts are: affect, trauma splitting, defence, seduction—and finally, perversion.

2.1.1 Affect

In his thinking on psychopathology in the 1890s, Freud applies liberally the notion of affect, including the notion of sexual affect; he also defines the psyche according to the concept of affect. In 1890, Freud describes affect as psychic state that produce various forms of excitement (Freud 1890, 287-8), and he assumes that all psychic states are affective. He argues that affects can lead to pathological changes such as neurotic symptoms (1890, 285). After 1890, Freud began to articulate his conceptualization of affect and sexuality to understand neuroses: he uses the notion of the affects of distress and fright to explain the aetiology of neurosis [32] (Freud and Breuer 1893, 84). Further, Freud uses the concept of displacement, also known as the transposition of affects, to explain the defensive mechanism of neurosis (Freud 1894, 58). Given my argument in this dissertation, it is important to consider Freud's

[31] The six conceptual elements found in the articles and papers of the 1890s correspond with the terms found in *Preliminary Communication* (1893a), *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* (1894), *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), and *Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses* (1896c).

[32] In 1893, when writing on trauma, Freud and Breuer (1893a, 84) defined distressing affects as follows: 'Any experience which calls up distressing affects—such as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain—may operate as a trauma'.

conceptualization of affect at this juncture. In fact, Freud comes to understand fetishism from the point of view of defence by remobilizing the concept of affect. (In Chapter 4, I will explore ways in which the concept of affect is central to Freud's theorization of fetishism.)

2.1.2 Trauma versus Heredity

Freud began the development of a psychological theory of the cause of neuroses by undertaking a rejection and criticism of heredity as an explanation and main factor in the aetiology of neurosis. As discussed previously, although Freud was greatly influenced by Charcot's work on neurosis, Freud did not completely reject it as a predisposing factor; rather, Freud increasingly criticized Charcot's ideas on the role of heredity[33].

As discussed in Chapter 1, Binet's critique (1888a, 41) of the aetiological relevance of heredity contrasts with the work of Charcot. Later, Freud's critique challenges heredity in a similar way, shifting the aetiology of neurosis from heredity to accidental sexual impressions. Nevertheless, in Freud and Breuer's (1893) work, as well as in Freud's solo work (1893a, 1895) that cites non-hereditary causes of neuroses, no reference is made to Binet's critique of heredity; nor is there a reference to Binet's subsequent alignment with Freud's aetiology of trauma. This is relevant to my argument: insofar as Freud returned to the ideas of *Fetishism in Love* in order to solve the theoretical problems caused by fetishism, he did so by evolving Binet's initial ideas on trauma. I will discuss this in the following section. In the coming chapters, I will also examine in detail how Freud ultimately elaborated this theory.

The more Freud considered traumatic (sexual) experiences as the basis for neurotic symptoms, the more he employed psychological ideas in his aetiological thinking. Issues such as the mechanisms of memory as well as the conflict of representations in the psyche, defence, and repression, became central to Freud's understanding of the "afterwardsness" of traumatic sexual experiences (Freud and Breuer 1895, 169). To Freud, hereditary factors remained a general, unspecified condition in the aetiology of neuroses; non-hereditary factors, however, became more and more important in

[33] Some scholars (Fischer-Homberger 2004, 77) claim that it is Freud—not Charcot—who emphasizes hereditary causes in Charcot's works. In fact, Charcot points to the importance of traumatic events as the cause of neuroses. Charcot employs psychological concepts that are fundamental to Freud and Breuer's work, such as unconscious pathogenic representation and the ego as a vulnerable set of representations. This positions Freud's ideas as part of an evolution of trauma theory (Fischer-Homberger 2004, 104, 110).

his thinking on the development of neuroses[34] . In the next section, I will detail how Freud initially formulated his trauma theory.

2.1.3 The Origin of Freud's Trauma Theory

First, we must recall that Binet's ideas on fetishism precede Freud's stipulated connection between sexuality and traumatic childhood experiences that lead to the development of neurotic symptoms in later life. This concept first appears in Binet's *Fetishism in Love* (1888a, 18–9, 51–4). Although Freud and Breuer (1893, 1895) refer to Binet in the same works in which they theorize about this concept precisely, they do not refer to Binet with regard to this topic nor to *Fetishism in Love*. However, in line with the argument of this dissertation, it is crucial to recognize that Freud, in applying the theoretical framework he used in the aetiology of neurosis to that of fetishism, came to appropriate Binet's ideas textually in his own aetiological framing of trauma. (This will be examined in detail in the following chapter.)

Both Freud and Breuer describe the causal connection between hysterical symptomology and its precipitating events (Freud and Breuer 1893, 7). They state that accidental moments play an important role in the cause and development of hysterical disturbances. (Freud and Breuer 1893, 4). In their view, however, it is not the moment of the traumatic accident that is the operative cause of the illness; rather, it is the distressing affects that accompany those experiences which cause illness (Freud and Breuer 1893, 6). Among these distressing affects, fright, anxiety, shame, and physical pain are most prominent, according to Freud and Breuer. They further note that in traumatic hysteria, the main aetiological factor is psychic trauma. This is the affect of fright (*Schreckaffekt*) (Freud 1893a, 6), which results in the development of hysterical symptoms. Consequently, they argue, hysterical symptoms are based on a symbolic relationship with the event and are caused by a particular psychic trauma or several partial psychic traumata. According to Freud and Breuer (1895, 6), these psychic traumata play a role not only in the development of hysterical symptoms

[34] Freud's eventual criticism of heredity does not imply that he refrained from elaborating his aetiological ideas within the context of inheritance, however. As will be discussed later, in the context of Freud's seduction theory, when the concept of perversion begins to play a role in his thinking, he conceives of a generational aetiological theory of families in which the actions of perverse seducers lead to both perversions and neuroses in other family members (Freud 1985, 222–3, 279, 342). Furthermore, in Freud's later investigation of fetishism, he theorizes about fetishism in reference to cultural heritage (1910, 96).

but in their persistence, as well[35]. This line of reasoning about trauma supports the problematic of this dissertation; as will be discussed in the following chapters, Freud adopted Binet's aetiological idea of powerful sexual experiences. Having done so, Freud progressively transformed this idea into a concept of trauma linked to the affects—an idea developed early in the 1890s. Thus, Freud came to explain fetishism by employing notions such as "frightening away" (*Abschreckung*) experiences (1914a, 244) and "frightening affect" (*Schreckwirkung*) (1940b, 256), which allegedly lead to psychic trauma. In the next section, I will explore Freud's early use of another concept crucial to the structure of this dissertation: splitting. As I have already established, at various stages of addressing the challenges of fetishism, Freud revisited Binet's ideas on splitting—and used fetishism as a vehicle for resolving his ideas the topic.

2.1.4 Splitting

The most significant reflection of Binet's influence in Freud's early aetiological thinking is "splitting," a key concept in Freud's work from 1890 to 1900. As detailed in the previous chapter, Freud and Breuer repurposed Binet's ideas on splitting. In reference to a pathological state that characterizes hysteria, splitting remains a fundamental concept in Freud's later theorization of fetishism. This is why discussing splitting in Freud's early theory of neurosis[36] is fundamental to my argument. (Chapter 4 will examine Freud's reconsideration of splitting in fetishism in the

[35] According to Freud and Breuer, psychic trauma becomes inscribed as a permanent memory (1895, 6); the recollection is ultimately responsible for the hysteria, because of the traumatic nature of the event (Freud and Breuer 1893, 7; 1895, 221). Freud and Breuer noted that repressed emotions and representations associated with the trauma can be discharged by talking about it (1895, 6). They called this process "abreaction". This discharge of excitation characterizes hysteria due to the patient's attempts to repress, forget, and exclude the traumatic representations from their associations (Freud and Breuer 1893, 10), because these are distressing representations (Freud 1893a, 96, 227, 302). Given the research presented in this dissertation, it can be argued that, during the implementation of sexuality in his aetiological theory of neurosis in the 1890s, the pathogenic representations that Freud (1892–3, 121) conceptualizes as distressing and contradictory are associated with questions of morality. In the case histories presented between 1892 and 1895, such representations of Freud's patients were described, for instance, as ideas connected to shame due to the inability to suppress feelings of hatred and contempt for family members; ideas of refusal to carry out important intentions; ideas and memories that lead to feelings of disgust related to sexuality; as well as ideas of guilt and self-reproach for enjoying the company of men rather than fulfilling family duties (Freud and Breuer 1895, 92, 131, 146, 170). As will be discussed in the next section, the moral content of these representations is associated with Freud's early use of the term perversion to denote immorality.

[36] Freud's concern with splitting in the 1890s features in *A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism* (1892–1893), *Preliminary Communication* (1893a), *Freud's Obituary to Charcot* (1893a), *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* (1894), and *Studies on Hysteria* (1895).

light of Binet's thinking, as well as Freud's reconsideration of his entire theory of psychopathology).

In the1890s, Freud gradually bolsters his arguments about splitting[37] with the notion of defence of the ego. Freud's works from this period can provide a deeper understanding of splitting in relation to Binet's (1892, 269-70) model of doubling—in which the subject defends itself by the process of suppression. Just as Binet treats splitting in hysteria in the work *The Alterations of Personality* (1892), Freud in 1895 explores the assumption that the psyche is divided rather than unified[38]. Also in line with Binet's ideas expressed in *The Alterations of Personality*, Freud and Breuer investigate the formation of a second personality due to splitting (Freud and Breuer 1895f, 287), linking the different strata of the ego to the notion of personality (1895f, 299). In Freud's works of the 1890s, splitting implies the formation of a psychic group separated from the ego (Freud and Breuer 1895, 133). This formation indicates different levels of functioning and different sets of representations and memories (Freud and Breuer 1895, 116). Freud and Breuer (1893, 12) elaborate on the ideas of Binet (and Janet) by declaring the psyche's dissociative, split state to be a product of traumatic experiences.

Consistent with how Binet frames "doubling," Freud and Breuer argue that splitting is a basic element of hysteria (1893a, 12). They describe how the recollected pathogenic representations of psychic traumata emerge in abnormal states of consciousness. According to this view, hysterical patients' efforts to suppress and repress the recollected pathogenic representations and the affect of the psychic

[37] As already discussed, in line with the literature of the time (1893, 12), these closely related terms are represented by the work of Charcot's disciples in France, namely Alfred Binet and Pierre Janet (Freud and Breuer 1895, 227, 249). In Freud's aetiological discussions of neurosis (especially hysteria) during this period, such an abnormal state of the psyche was described using a set of closely related terms: "double conscience" (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12), "splitting of the consciousness" (*Spaltung des bewusstseins*) (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12; Freud 1894, 46), "hypnoid states" (*hypnoiden Zustände*) (Freud and Breuer 1893, 16–7; Freud 1894, 46), "splitting of the psyche" (*Spaltung der Psyche*) (Freud and Breuer 1895, 190), "dissociation of personality" (Freud and Breuer 1895, 250), "dissociation of the consciousness" (*Dissoziation des bewusstseins*) (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12, 227) and "splitting-off of groups of representations" (*Abspaltung von vorstellungsgruppen*) (Freud and Breuer 1893, 12; Freud 1894, 50).

[38] This assumption is found in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895f) in Freud and Breuer's discussion on the effects of the splitting in hysteria on the ego, consciousness, and personality. For example, when they discussed the pathogenic psychical group of ideas that is excluded from the ego as a consequence of the splitting, they claimed that the ego has different strata (*Schichten*), layers, and portions (*Anteile*). (Freud and Breuer 1895f, 290). They also claimed that while elements of consciousness are excluded from the ego, they are simultaneously kept in the psyche (Freud and Breuer 1895f, 133).

traumata lead to splitting. In contrast to Janet's (and other thinkers') emphasis on psychogenic and degenerative factors in splitting, and in opposition to Janet's idea of the *weakness* or incapacity of the ego undergoing splitting, Freud and Breuer argue for the *strength* of the ego in supressing and repressing pathogenic representations by means of defence (Freud and Breuer 1895, 111-2, 116, 166, 269, 278; Brown, Macmillan, Meares, Van der Hart 1996, 482-4). In the 1890s, Freud did not establish a connection between splitting and his concept of perversion. At this juncture, Freud was focused mainly on hysteria in his initial psychopathological theorization, and not yet on fetishism. Recognizing that in this context Freud did not relate his discussion of Binet's (and Janet's) ideas on splitting to his early development of a theory of perversion is important for further stages of my argument in this dissertation. For example, in Chapter 5 I will discuss how Lacan evolved another model of Binet's conceptualization of doubling in which he does include fetishism as a perversion from the outset of his psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory. According to my argument in this dissertation, in Freud's final theory of psychopathology, which focuses on the link between splitting and fetishism, Freud uses fetishism as a model for the defence process. Therefore, in the section below, I will elaborate on how Freud initially formulated his concept of defence.

2.1.5 Defence

In their work from 1893 to 1895, Freud and Breuer employ these notions of "suppression" and "repression," without defining them in detail. They use both terms interchangeably with "defence" (Strachey 1962, 10) and argue that both suppression and repression are intentionally motivated by the patient. As for the concept of "splitting," Freud and Breuer claim that as soon as the memories corresponding to the non-abreacted trauma reach the necessary threshold of intensity, they are excluded from the associative process. This exclusion leads to a dissociation of the consciousness—that is, splitting (Freud and Breuer 1893, 10–2). Further by evolving the ideas of Binet and Janet, Freud and Breuer connected splitting to sexual content and puberty (Freud and Breuer 1895, 245–6).

In most of the cases he examined, so Freud argues, sexual life was responsible for causing a set of neurotic symptoms that he characterized as defensive symptoms. Freud claims that in neuroses, sexual excitation undergoes a transposition, which occurs due to disturbances in a person's sexual life (Freud 1985, 74). As Freud clearly rejected Janet's theory of degeneration in *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* (published in 1894), sexuality began to provide aetiological support to Freud's notion of the defence process. "So far as I have been able to see my way in cases of this kind, what is happening is that a perpetual defence is going on against sexual ideas that

are continually coming up afresh—a piece of work, that is to say, which has not yet come to completion" (Freud 1894, 53–4). In his view, the defence process serves to ward off a morally repugnant sexual representation that is—to varying degrees—related to real events (Freud 1894, 47). Further, he states that sexual experiences and sensations (*sexuelles Erleben und Empfinden*) cause the emergence of incompatible representations (Freud 1894, 52). He writes:

In all of the cases that I have analysed, it was the subject's sexual life that gave rise to a distressing effect of precisely the same quality as that attached to his obsession. Theoretically, it is not impossible that this effect should sometimes arise in other fields. I can only report that so far, I have not come across any other origin. Moreover, it is easy to see that it is precisely *sexual life* that brings with it the most copious occasions for the emergence of incompatible ideas. (Freud 1894, 52)

Freud relates the splitting of consciousness to other types of illness. He does this by linking splitting to sexuality and arguing for a psychological mechanism rather than a hereditary aetiology. The ego's effort to avoid incompatible representations that coincide with the splitting of consciousness explains the emergence of obsessional neurosis and hallucinatory psychosis (Freud 1894, 48–9). The following year in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), when continuing the debate on Binet and Janet's ideas on splitting, Freud and Breuer argue that these distressing representations are sexual in nature (1895, 88, 164, 234). Here, splitting is associated with the incapacity of the ego to cope with distress stemming from the pre-sexual period. This distress has no effect during childhood; the distress takes on traumatic power only later, in the form of memories (Freud and Breuer 1895, 133). Thus, in this phase of his thinking, Freud believes that sexual memories can produce stronger effects than the original experiences themselves. He suggests that the splitting-off of psychic groups may be a normal process in adolescent development. The later emergence of these split-off psychic groups through the ego's process of recollection provides frequent opportunities for psychic disturbance (Freud and Breuer 1895, 134).

Given that the incompatible (sexual) representations were considered inadmissible to consciousness, Freud and Breuer conclude that these representations must reside in the unconscious (1895, 225). Supporting this reasoning with their notion of defence, they further argue—in parallel to Binet's thinking in *The Alterations of Personality*—that the activity of the psyche is itself, divided (Freud and Breuer 1895, 225). Freud and Breuer consider this division of the psyche to be both conscious and unconscious, depending on whether it concerns admissible or inadmissible representations (Freud and Breuer 1895, 225). In terms of aetiology, this

duplication of the psyche's functioning is regarded as generating a predisposition to its pathological splitting (Freud and Breuer 1895, 225).

Freud and Breuer examine the defence process and the role of sexuality by analysing case histories; the authors trace the defence process' hysterical mechanism (already introduced by Freud in 1894). "The sexual needs of hysterical patients are no doubt just as variable in degree from individual to individual as in healthy people and they are no stronger than in them. The former fall ill from them, and, for the most part, it is precisely due to struggling against them, owing to their defence against sexuality" (Freud and Breuer 1895, 247). This quotation is key to my argument in this chapter. After all, Freud's theoretical exploration of sexuality will lead him to engage with the concept of perversion. What follows is an analysis of how Freud carried out this exploration.

As Freud elaborates on the sexual nature of neurosis, he begins to engage with various topics relating to sexuality, such as the particular sexual needs of hysterical patients and the process of sexual maturation (Freud 1895b, 1895e, 1895f; Freud and Breuer 1895). This growing concern with sexuality led Freud to differentiate elements of his own conceptual framework (1895b). Freud then turns to an analysis of the ongoing source of sexual excitation that comes from within neurosis, arguing that the affect is a reaction to an exogenous excitation. According to Freud, the affect is a brief state that operates with a single impact. On the contrary, the neurosis is a reaction to an analogous endogenous excitation, which operates as a constant force (*konstante Kraft*) (1895b, 112).

This testifies to Freud's theoretical effort to understand continuous somatic sexual excitation—and neuroses—in both men and women (1895b, 108–9) (1895b, 115). Here, he employs the term "sexual libido" (*sexuellen Libido*), which he describes as psychic pleasure, the psychic manifestation of somatic sexual excitement (Freud 1895b, 107). Freud also used the terms "genital drive" (*Geschlechtstrieb*) (1895b, 109) and "sexual drive" (*Sexualtrieb*)—without defining either concept[39] (1895b, 108). Freud's interest in these concepts suggest his early adherence to Krafft-Ebing's thinking, which led Freud to the concept of perversion. Similarly, in discussing

[39] In reference to the terminology concerning drives, in 1895, Freud wrote a small critical review of a book on the genital drive by the German gynaecologist, Alfred Hegar; *The Sexual Drive: A Socio-medical Study* (*Der Geschlechtstrieb; eine sozial-medizinische studie*) (Freud, 1895f). Freud judged that the book made a reduced assessment of the genital drive and that it did not provide any understanding of the problems connected with the concept. Crucially, Freud also highlighted the strength of sexual need in civilized human beings (1895f, 489).

Binet's ideas over the years, Freud paid attention to this same exploration (1909a); he came to discuss fetishism as a way to explore the concept of libido. (1916–17).

Freud also examined the natural characteristics of sexuality in a neurological context, as is evident from his draft of *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895e), which he sent to Fließ on October 8, 1895 (Freud 1895e, 356). In his draft, Freud emphasizes the connection between pathological defence and the role of sexuality[40] (1895e, 409–10). According to my argument, Freud developed a model of the symbol-and-substitution process by presenting an example of fetishism. This fact supports my argument in this dissertation: as the excerpt shows, prior to his *Three Essays*, experienced no tangible problem with his concept of fetishism. Only after 1905 did Freud need to confront the vagaries of the symbol-and-substitution process in fetishism. Below, I assert that Freud did not furnish an explanation for any version of a fetishist symbol-and-substitution process.

As detailed in the last chapter, Binet employed the concept of substitution to understand how fetishist worship of a specific body part or an item belonging to the beloved person can replace the whole beloved person (1888a, 84). Binet (1888a, 36) claimed that fetishism can explain the normal worship of material objects in normal love: in this context, material objects hold a memory of the beloved person. Later, Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 154), elaborating on Binet's ideas, also connects the notion of mnemonic symbols to the normal fetishism of objects such as handkerchiefs, shoes, and gloves, among other items.

In *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Freud—though he does not use the term "fetish"—discusses the normal formation of symbols by using the example of a knight who fights for a lady's glove. The knight knows the glove owes its importance to the woman. Further, the knight's worship (*Verehrung*) of the glove does not prevent him from thinking of the lady and serving her in other ways. In contrast, the hysterical symbol functions in a different way (Freud 1895e, 407). Freud explains that when a hysterical patient cries because a particular component of the event is recalled, the patient is unaware that this is due to the association between that component and other components or circumstances. In this case, the hysterical symbol completely replaces the distressing cathected memory. As Binet and Krafft-Ebing theorized before him, Freud's theoretical link between fetishism, substitution, and symbol reveals that, as early as 1895, Freud considered fetishism to be a normal

[40] In this context, Freud considers pathological defence to be the result of excessive normal defence (Freud 1895e, 409)—that is, the state in which intense, cathected, distressing (sexual) memories cannot be effectively repressed and replaced by symbols (Freud 1895e, 409-10).

model for symbolization and substitution. In line with the argument in this chapter, we see here that fetishism is not yet a problem for Freud. In fact, at this juncture Freud actually regards fetishism as a normal model as opposed to a pathological defence. This also supports the way in which I am problematizing Freud's challenges with fetishism. As will be discussed in the chapters to come, in grappling with the concept of fetishism and elaborating on Binet's theory, Freud (1909a, 151) first aligns the fetishist model for symbolization and substitution with that of hysteria. I will also show that, as part of his ongoing engagement with Binet's ideas, Freud develops a specific explanation for symbolization and substitution in fetishism (1910, 96) that culminates in an evolution of Binet's ideas of defence and trauma (1914a, 244).

Below, I develop my argument by exploring Freud's concept of seduction. This is relevant to understanding how Freud formulates a theory of fetishism over the years. Examining Freud's theory of seduction in this chapter is crucial, as it bears on Freud's theorization of perversion.

2.1.6 Sexual Seduction Theory

Freud's introduction of the concept of perversion into his thinking is linked to the role of sexuality in his aetiological theory of neurosis. When Freud first began to deploy the term "perversion," it was not yet clearly defined. Freud had not yet resolved whether a perversion should be characterized as immoral or not (Hirschmüller 2003, 123). In his letters to Fließ in which he addressed the role of sexual stimulation (known as his seduction theory), Freud characterized perversion as the act of a person who sexually stimulates a child. In this context, Freud assumes that neurosis is a consequence of the seducer's perversion[41] (Freud 1985, 342). At this juncture, Freud sees sexual perversion—along with neurosis—as one of the possible causal outcomes of early sexual stimulation.

When Freud began to articulate the concept of perversion in his theorization of the role of sexual stimulation in childhood, he considered it to be the consequence of an experience of sexual excitement that did not result in repression (neurosis) or self-reproach after puberty[42] (Freud 1985, 163). Freud connects childhood sexual stimulation primarily under the rubric of "sexual seduction" (*sexueller Verführung*)

41 Here, Freud considers heredity in the aetiology of neuroses, specifically in consideration of a generational legacy due to seduction of a child by the father (Freud 1985, 342).

42 Given Freud's claim that early sexual stimulation in childhood is a necessary condition for developing both neuroses and perversions (1985, 163), gradually, he was led to rethink his hypothesis that infantile sexual experience generates only "unpleasure." Consequently, the concept of perversion problematized the theory of defence against incompatible ideas as well as the assumption that infantile sexual experience generates unpleasure (Freud 1985, 163).

(Freud 1896c, 207). He describes sexual seduction as an external action from someone engaging in the sexual stimulation of a child's body (Freud, 1896c, 208). Freud writes: "I therefore put forward the thesis that at the bottom of every case of hysteria, there are *one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience*, namely occurrences that belong to the earliest years of childhood that can be reproduced through the work of psycho-analysis in spite of the intervening decades. I believe that this is an important finding, the discovery of a *caput nili* in neuropathology…" (Freud 1896c, 203). In this same context, Freud (1985, 219) finds in Krafft-Ebing's work a causal link between the experience of being seduced during childhood and the later experience of developing a perversion (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 165, 176).

Freud goes on to describe the processes by which stimulation in childhood occurs via seduction during a hypothetically asexual phase. Freud reasons that the early sexual stimulation (seduction) occurs when the child is sexually immature; only with the arrival of puberty does the memory of this early stimulation produce "unpleasure"—and subsequently result in defensive symptoms (Freud, 1896a, 1896b, 1896c). Freud's line of reasoning here is important to our sense of how he theorizes fetishism in the following decades. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, over the years that followed, Freud's psychoanalytic case histories of fetishism revealed that fetishism originates in incidents of childhood seduction; Freud theorized fetishism as the result of a defensive process.

In Freud's early works on seduction, the subject of splitting and direct references to Binet become less prominent. However, Binet's ideas and terminology remain present in Freud's description of early sexual (traumatic) experiences; in this description, Freud uses the following terms: sexual impressions (*sexuelle Eindrücke*) (1896c, 202), primary pathogenic impressions (*l'empreinte pathogene primaire*) (1896b, 154–5), and original impressions (*ursprünglichen Eindruck*) (Freud 1896a, 184). Freud's associates the concept of sexual perversion with a causal outcome of impression; this resembles Binet's thinking. Similarly, Freud himself likened his neurological approach to Binet's thinking on the aetiology of perversion[43].

[43] To explain the intense, uncontrolled character of neurotic symptoms, Freud argues that a "quota of intensity" can be attributed to the original experience of seduction (1896c, 217). After the stimulation of the child's body, a quota of energy remains stored in the child's psyche (Freud 1896c, 217). Freud's argument for this rests on his speculation that sexual experiences can accumulate. In cases of hysteria, childhood sexual experiences recollected after puberty evoke disgust and fright (1896c, 208). In cases of obsessional neurosis, patients displayed guilt and self-reproach after puberty because the individuals experienced pleasure during the childhood sexual incidents (Freud 1895, 144).

The idea that a child can experience pleasure from sexual seduction, as shown in the case of obsessional neurosis, comprises one reason that led Freud to doubt his seduction theory (1985, 261). He concluded that most of the seduction experiences recollected by his patients were not real (Freud 1985, 261). The possibility of sexuality in childhood led to the introduction of new elements in Freud's aetiological thinking. In letters sent to Fließ in 1896 and 1897, Freud expresses interest in the physiological development of the organic substratum of sexuality. He introduces new elements such as fantasies, impulses, perversion, infantile sexuality, and erotogenic zones. By 1897, Freud questioned the veracity of childhood seduction memories reported by his patients, considering these memories, in fact, to be fantasies (Freud 1985, 239). Taking into account the problematization of this dissertation, the introduction of this concept is relevant because, as I will discuss in the following chapters, in trying to contextualize fetishism in his theoretical framework, Freud employs both his ideas on seduction and those on fantasy to develop his theory of fetishism. Yet, advancing my argument in this chapter, in the following section I will examine Freud's early conceptualization of perversion.

2.2 Freud and "Perversion"

To better understand Freud's notion of perversion, I will now review how he first conceived of it. Later, I will focus on Freud's initial ideas about the aetiology of perversion.

2.2.1 Freud's Early Usage of the Term Perversion

When Freud first introduced the concept of perversion, it carried a moral connotation (Lantéri-Laura 2012, 76-77; Hirschmüller 2003, 115). Freud's adoption of a biological argument to explain perversion marks his distinction between perversion and moral qualifications. As the introduction of perversion becomes part of Freud's early theorizing about the psychoneuroses, the concept of perversion develops in parallel with Freud's investigation into the role of innate features of human sexuality. Whereas Krafft-Ebing presupposes a constitutional basis for psychoneuroses via the idea of nosography, Freud relegates this idea to the background. Freud sought to understand the pattern in human sexuality that shapes perversion—rather than the explanation for contingent immoral conduct represented by Krafft-Ebing's concept of perversity.

Before Freud began to theorize about the *concept* of perversions (in his letters to Fließ in 1896 and 1897) (Freud 1896–1897), he used the *term* "perversion" in his work and in his earlier letters to Fließ. For the most part, the terminology of perversion Freud used at the time carried a morally transgressive meaning

(1888b, 52; 1892–3, 123-6; Freud and Breuer 1895, 245–6); he used this vocabulary primarily in relation to hysteria[44] . Freud, then, began his theorizing about his concept of perversion in early 1896, when he outlined the possible outcomes of sexual stimulation in childhood. According to Freud, perversions refer to infantile sexual patterns of pleasure which endure in adulthood, in the form of a compulsion without repression (Freud 1985, 209–10). During the period in which he introduced the concept of perversion, Freud was not always consistent in his use of terms. This raises the question of how his later ideas concerning the association between perversion and immorality may have changed. These later developments are related to his exploration of sexuality, in which he considers perversion to be the permanence of infantile patterns of sexuality in adulthood (Freud 1985, 209–10).

As previously mentioned, the concept of perversity was coined by Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 56) and designates immoral acts that are not considered to be pathological. As for his use of the concept of perversion, in the letter referred to at the beginning of this chapter, Freud claims that the man's (fetishist) sexual excitation of licking women's feet is a perversion (Freud 1985, 213). Adult sexual behaviour of this kind, Freud argues, is a vestige of early childhood sexual excitation that persists in adult perversions in the form of impulses. The use in 1896 of both "perversion" and "perversity" expresses Freud's search for a set of concepts suitable for positing the positive aspect of sexuality against which neurotic individuals defend themselves. In this sense, Freud's theorization of perversions is not linked to perversity. In Freud's initial example referred to at the beginning of this chapter—the licking of a woman's feet—the fetishist perverse behaviour of the father is understood as non-repressed impulsive sexual excitation. Perverse sexual excitation of this kind stems from innate features of human sexuality in the absence of an internal norm to organize sexuality. In contrast, the neurotic son of the fetishist man is not healthy; the son has repressed these impulses. Before repression, according to Freud (1985, 213), the son's sexual activity at the age of twelve also consisted of licking women's feet. Here, Freud argues

[44] For example, when describing the evolution of hysteria, Freud uses the term "moral perversion" to describe one of the manifestations of degeneracy of the nervous system connected to hysteria (1888b, 52). Also in Freud's interest in hysteric cleavage (*Zwiespalt*) (1892-3, 122-3) led him to draw attention to peculiar manifestations of the psychic conflict in hysteria, such as perversion of the will (1892–3, 123) and perversion of character (1892-3, 127). He uses these terms to describe the misconduct and insubordination of patients during attacks of hysteria (Freud 1892–3, 123). By this time, the emergence of contrary wills and moral characters in were already extensively covered in Binet's *The Alterations of Personality* (Binet 1892, VIII, 19, 83, 138, 313). Also Freud and Breuer (1895, 245–6) employ the term perverse curiosity to refer to the behaviour of girls in puberty who are attentive to what they hear or read about the subject of sex and they differentiate hysteria from perversion and degeneration.

that, as a consequence of his repression, the son suffered from neurotic compulsions and abhorred perversity.

Here, Freud's line of reasoning is key to understanding how fetishism would challenge his theory set out in *Three Essays*, as I will discuss in the next chapter. In 1905, Freud introduced fetishism to argue that childhood patterns of perverse sexual arousal characterize normal sexuality in adulthood. At this stage, the status that Freud conferred on fetishism was no longer that of unrepressed, impulsive sexual behaviour, as he had initially characterized perversion. Freud's pursuit of differentiating *perversion* from *perversity* it also crucial, given that it supports my argument in Chapter 5, about the contrasts in Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism. Contrary to Freud's theory, Lacan's view of fetishism and perversion departs from theories on the constitution of perversity (immorality).

Having examined thoroughly Freud's search for a suitable conceptualization of perversion, I will now turn to Freud's initial understanding of the cause of perversion. This will enable me to finalize the argument posited at the beginning of this chapter.

2.2.2 Freud's First Aetiology of Perversions in the Late 1890s

In this section, I will focus on the conceptualization of perversion Freud used in 1905 to theorize about fetishism. Freud's deepening understanding of splitting and his debate with Binet's and Janet's ideas clearly gave way to the exploration of the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neurosis and perversion. However, Freud still uses the concepts of repression and defence at this time. He describes his first aetiological ideas of perversions by theorizing about infantile sexuality, perversion, and erotogenic zones. In his letters to Fließ in late1896 and 1897, Freud establishes the notion of perversion as a category that manifests non-repressed sexual compulsion (1985, 209–10, 280). This is the line of reasoning that gave rise to Freud's issues with fetishism in *Three Essays* (I will discuss this in the next chapter). Yet here, Freud states that during childhood, sexual discharge could stem from numerous parts of the body, namely the erotogenic zones (Freud 1985, 212), and he considers perversion to be a sexual compulsion without repression, due to the recollected sexual pleasure that occurred before the age of four (Freud 1985, 209–10, 280). This is supported by the idea that the defence is ineffective during early childhood.

According to Freud, there can be no repression of sexual experiences before the age of four, given that the psychic apparatus required for this is not yet sufficiently developed before this age (1985, 209). In perversion, the defence against premature sexual experiences does not take place before the development of the psychic

apparatus; alternatively, it does not take place at all. He writes: "Another consequence of premature sexual experiences is perversion, of which the determinant seems to be that defence either does not occur before the psychic apparatus is completed or it does not occur at all" (Freud 1985, 210).

When recalled at a later stage, these premature sexual experiences generate displeasure in some people (normal repressive forces) and pathological defence symptoms in others. They also persist as a sexual compulsion in some individuals, represented by perversion (Freud 1985, 209–10). Pathological defence is determined by repression. Repression, in turn, occurs only based on traces of memory from an earlier stage that have not yet been "translated" into the next phase of development (Freud 1985, 209). Ultimately, this process leads to the emergence of sexual psychoneuroses (hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and paranoia). Freud concludes that "hysteria is, in fact, not repudiated sexuality but rather, it is a repudiated perversion" (1985, 212). This aetiological reasoning concerning perversion grounded Freud's theory in which he establishes the relationship of opposition between neurosis and fetishism (Freud 1985, 227). Thus, while perversions refer to the persistence of infantile sexual patterns in adulthood as compulsions, neuroses are linked to defences (repression) against these patterns in the form of symptoms. As will be made clear in the next chapter, this idea is crucial to accounting for the difficulties fetishism would later pose to Freud's concept of perversion; over the years, the phenomenon of fetishism challenges this opposition between neurosis and perversion.

Adopting Krafft-Ebing's assumption that psychoneuroses depend on constitutional factors, Freud's inquiry into sexuality as a basis for psychoneuroses led him to articulate other concepts found in Krafft-Ebing's work. As part of Freud's biological argument for perversions, he presents a theory of abandoned erotogenic zones that share some features with Krafft-Ebing's (1893a, 31) clinical framework. Freud's acknowledgement that sexual impulses in early infancy are remarkably greater than he had previously considered constitutes an essential step in the modification of his views on infantile sexuality. Recognition of infantile erotogenic zones piqued his interest in a theory of normal sexual development. Thus, after Freud began questioning whether these acts of seduction towards a child actually happened or were mere fantasies, he understood infantile sexual experiences in relation

to innate developmental factors and as normal events in the infantile phase[45] (Freud 1985, 274). Freud states that perverse impulses occur alongside the structures of the unconscious (Freud 1985, 255); he attributes the perverse nature of sexual disposition to abandoned erotogenic zones and organic repression (Freud 1985, 212).

At this point in the discussion, Freud's ideas on abandoned erotogenic zones and organic repression enable us to turn to another topic that factors into Freud's attempts to theorize fetishism over the years—namely, sexually-exciting sensations associated with bodily excretions. In 1897, Freud (1985, 223) began to associate perversions with the predominance of sexually exciting sensations linked to olfactory and gustatory pleasure from bodily excretions such as urine and faeces—as well as the entire surface of the body. This is strikingly similar to what Binet (1888, 27) and Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 23) wrote on fetishism and its relation to human sexuality. In a sense, this similarity can be read as Freud's endeavour to collaborate with the insights found in Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's work. Freud progressively associates the capacity for sexual pleasure with the infantile erogenous zones; his argument takes on a more scotomizetic and ontogenetic cast in terms of the physiological developmental of changes responsible for the abandonment of erotogenic zones (1985, 279). In line with this argument, Freud concludes that perversions have an animal character (Freud 1985, 223). He sees a connection between children and animals concerning the infantile erotogenic zones and the sexual role of smells. Freud suggested that an organic factor plays a role in repression. He emphasizes the regions of the anus, mouth, and throat, pointing to the power of these sexual zones in animals. If the erotic power of the anus and mouth obtains in humans, however, Freud maintains the outcome is perversion: the sexually exciting sensations linked to olfactory and gustatory pleasure from bodily excretions are common to children, perverts, and

[45] Despite the shift in Freud's ideas after reassessing the role of seduction, he maintained the importance of childhood sexual experiences. Infantile sexual experiences, and the sexual impulses stimulated by these experiences, are the keys to Freud's explanation for why the memory of such experiences provoke "unpleasure" and repression at a later stage of life. Freud affirms that the details of the infantile sexual experiences involving the erotogenic zones can explain the symptomatology developed after puberty (Freud 1985, 279–80); normal physiological changes during development determine the abandonment of erotogenic zones (Freud 1985, 279). This stance allows Freud to explain why the later recollection of childhood experiences generates "unpleasure" and defence (repression). Further, Freud argues that in childhood, sexual excitation is connected to various erotogenic zones. After childhood, however, these areas of the body do not play a role in sexuality (Freud 1985, 279); during puberty, their sexual significance is assumed by the genitals. These developmental changes help to explain why, in retrospect, these experiences appear to be unpleasurable and to evoke disgust (Freud 1985, 279–80). Consistent with Freud's biological arguments in late 1896 and 1897, this means that "unpleasure" has a physiological—rather than a cultural—basis.

lower animals (Freud 1985, 279). To support my argument, it is important to note that Freud does not posit a detailed correlation between infantile sexual practices and those of the pervert. In the next chapter, I will analyse how this poses a problem when Freud relates fetishist perversion to infantile sexuality.

Freud's notion of repressive forces—especially disgust—introduced in the late 1890s, is another idea associated with perversion that creates decades-long conflict with the concept of fetishism. I will discuss this conflict in greater detail in the chapters to come. Below, I will review how Freud elaborated this idea in the current context. Freud had already regarded repulsion, disgust, shame, and morality as normal repressive forces related to sexual experiences (1985, 163–4). By considering a developmental explanation in 1897, Freud claimed that the organs responsible for taste, and particularly the sense of smell, activate the formation of reactions (disgust, shame, and morality) in normal development. Freud (1985, 230) held that the abandonment of erotogenic zones in childhood was linked to changes in the evolutionary development of the human species, specifically the acquisition of an upright posture and its psychophysiological repercussions. With the successive development of an upright posture, the nose and mouth moved incrementally away from the anus. These phylogenetic changes were linked to the disappearance of the sexually exciting sensations linked to olfactory and gustatory pleasure from bodily excretions[46] (Freud 1985, 280).

Consequently, disgust, morality, shame, and other higher intellectual processes emerge from these phylogenetic changes[47]. Accordingly, the phylogenetic abandonment of the former sexual zones is at the basis of the sense of disgust. Such abandonment is a clinical condition that can cause defence (repression) and, consequently, perversion and neurosis. As a clear evolution of Krafft-Ebing's assumption that perversions are characterized by the overcoming of disgust (1893a, 56), Freud sets disgust as a clinical index for both perversion and neurosis (Freud 1985, 280-1). He argues that the development of the human upright posture is an essential factor in the understanding of disgust. In line with Krafft-Ebing's

[46] With the attainment of an upright position, the human child is partially raised from the ground; this leads to the reduction of olfactory stimuli. Thus, the libidinal impulses rooted in the olfactory sense are reduced, resulting in an olfactory disgust towards excretions. Freud emphasizes the similarities between lower animals and infants (1985, 230, 254). In normal human maturity, as a rule, these libidinal impulses and the erotogenic zones to which they are connected no longer have a sexually exciting effect, because they have no influence on the libido.

[47] This is another explanation for why the memories linked to the abandoned erotogenic zones generate disgust—rather than pleasure—in normal sexual life. Finally, the neuroses are to be seen in terms of a specific erotogenic zone stimulated in childhood; the subsequent onset of the sense of disgust is attributed to a phylogenetic organic repression (Freud 1985, 280).

Psychopathia Sexualis, Freud defines perversion according to the persistence of these libidinal impulses, which is otherwise supposedly overcome in normal development by the barriers of disgust. It is important to consider Freud's thinking on perversion and disgust: in the following chapters, we will see that after the *Three Essays*, Freud failed to apply this index of disgust to fetishism.

Throughout the years, fetishism became a preoccupying challenge for Freud, a riddle he felt compelled to solve. Therefore, in this chapter I have reviewed Freud's early aetiological theory of neuroses. We have seen how Freud reclaimed concepts from this theory to formulate a psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. We have also seen how, in doing so, Freud evolved Binet's early theory of fetishism and splitting. In this chapter I have also looked at how Freud arrived at his conceptualization of perversion and infantile sexuality, as well as how he used examples of phenomena categorized as fetishism—without feeling compelled to problematize them. This is relevant to the next point in the argument of this dissertation, which appears in the next chapter: from his *Three Essays* onwards, Freud had trouble parsing fetishism with his earlier thinking on perversion and infantile sexuality. Freud's difficulty stems from the fact that fetishism embraces both perversions and normal features of sexual life. In the next chapter, I will address how Freud tried to solve the riddle of fetishism: by reviving his theoretical engagement with a key influence from the 1890s, Alfred Binet.

Chapter 3

Fetishism in Freud's *Three Essays* and Beyond (1905-1920)

In this chapter we examine the beginning of Freud's problems with fetishism, as well as his subsequent attempts to solve these problems. This chapter will cover Freud's work from 1905 to 1920. The theoretical developments expressed in Freud's letters to Fließ were published first in Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*—hereafter referred to as *Three Essays*—in 1905. This is where Freud elaborates on his aetiological thinking about infantile sexuality and perversions, concepts first introduced in 1896. *Three Essays* is also a work in which Freud details his findings on neurosis—and describes his views on normal sexuality in puberty and adult sexual life.

My main argument in this chapter is clear: in writing about fetishism in *Three Essays*, Freud was confronted with glaring inconsistencies in his own theories. Thereafter, Freud attempted to solve these conceptual gaps by relating the phenomenon of fetishism to his theory of neurosis from the 1890s. Freud's reformulation of his ideas on fetishism can be read as an attempt to develop the conceptual framework initially advanced by Binet. In reshaping his approach to fetishism, Freud took into account e.g., "infantile sexual theories", the Oedipus complex, and the castration complex, all of which he developed after 1905. In this revised approach to fetishism, Freud was led to revise his idea that infantile sexuality lacks an object, and then to move on to frame human sexuality as dependent on a sexual object.

3.1 The Place of Fetishism and its Problems in Freud's *Three Essays*

In *Three Essays*[48], Freud finally sets out a theory of human sexuality that can be read as a critique of both sexual normativity and nineteenth-century theories of sexual psychopathology. *Three Essays* documents the evolution of more than ten years of Freud's thought on the aetiology of neurosis; for the first time, Freud presents human sexuality as the cause of neuroses. This leads to his assumption that neurosis is the negative of perversion. While Freud in 1905 was determined to explore human sexuality, his overarching goal at the time was to understand the cause of neuroses.

[48] To help clarify my argumentation in the broader context of the debate about the stages of Freud's theorization of fetishism, I use as a reference the first edition of Freud's *Three Essays*. Given that Freud revised this book in its subsequent editions—las he evolved his psychoanalytic theory (Van Haute and Westerink 2016, viii)—the first edition is most appropriate to my inquiry. This edition allows me to contextualize more precisely the problems that Freud encountered with fetishism since his initial theorization, in 1905. The same applies to the stages of Freud's attempts to solve these problems over the years. Although the secondary literature on Freud's theory of fetishism (Rey-Flaud 1994; Assoun 1994) acknowledges that Freud initiated his theory of fetishism in *Three Essays*, these works consider the last edition of the Freud's book. However, the secondary literature loses sight of Freud's problems with fetishism, as well as when and how those problems began.

In *Three Essays*, Freud's conceptual framework for his theory of sexuality is based on the ideas of Binet and Krafft-Ebing. Freud builds his assumptions about human sexuality around the concept of the sexual drive and its development (Van Haute and Westerink 2016, xxvii). Interestingly, this results in a discrepancy between aetiological theories; on the one hand, Freud follows Krafft-Ebing's thinking in his discussions of the innate disposition toward neuroses and perversions via the concept of the sexual drive; on the other hand, this innate disposition alone does not parse with Binet's explanation of fetishism.

In *Three Essays*, Freud uses the term fetishism for the first time. He opens his discussion of fetishism by criticizing the conceptualization in psychiatry of fetishism as a pathology—a sexual perversion. The very phenomenon of fetishism itself, however, immediately begins to destabilize Freud's own concept of perversion. In general, we see inconsistencies between Freud's ideas about infantile sexuality and Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's developments in the fields of sexology and psychiatry. Another inconsistency lies in the connection between Freud's ideas on infantile sexuality and sexual perversions.

Freud encountered three specific problems with fetishism. First, Freud treats the aetiological theory of fetishism as an exception. Second, Freud acknowledges clearly the difficulty of classifying fetishism—according to the very criteria in the book—as a sexual deviation. Third, Freud admits that it is impossible to posit fetishism as the positive of neurosis; this occurs on Freud's first mention of neurosis as the negative of perversion.

In *Three Essays*, Freud's overarching strategy for theorizing on perversions relies on his review of the notion of a biological norm that presupposes an unbreakable bond between the sexual drive and its object (Nedoh 2019, 138; Van Haute and Westerink 2016, xxiv–xxv). Here, Freud engages in direct debate with existing medical thought on sexuality, its classifications, and its concepts. He starts with the notion of a sexual drive and focuses on the four main types of sexual perversion: sadism, masochism, fetishism, and inversion (homosexuality) (Freud 1905a, 2, 16, 20). Freud criticises the then-popular view that a biological norm binds the sexual drive and its object (1905a, 1–2). Given that Freud studies the human sexual drive in terms of its various sexual aims and objects, his conception of fetishism is essential to his argument. Further, Freud states that in most normal sexual processes one can detect elements that lead to perversions (Freud 1905a, 32).

In *Three Essays*, Freud elaborates on instances of fetishism to advance his criticism of perversions as pathological in origin. In the first essay, "The Sexual Aberrations", Freud (1905a, 1) begins by exploring the features of the sexual drive in sexual maturity, perversion, normal adult sexual life, and neurosis. In the second essay, "Infantile Sexuality", he characterizes infantile sexuality, arguing that it develops in a perverse way—that is, it is both polymorphous and perverse (1905a, 50). Freud also claims that infantile sexuality is objectless (1905a, 82). Finally, he discusses the role of the changing sexual drive during puberty (1905a, 61). Freud closes his first essay by summarizing the reasoning that links the sexual drive, normality, neurosis, perversion, and infantile sexuality in his theory. Here, Freud confesses that fetishism had already appealed to him as a specific element within his broader theoretical undertaking of 1905:

> *Thus, the extraordinarily wide distribution of the perversions impels us to suppose that the disposition to perversions is itself nothing rare and special, but it is bound to form a part of what passes for the normal condition. It is, as we have seen, debatable whether the perversions go back to innate conditions or if they arise as a result of chance experiences as Binet has shown for the case of fetishism. The conclusion now presents itself to us that there is indeed something innate lying at the basis of the perversions but that it is something innate in all human beings, though as a disposition it may vary in its intensity and may lie dormant, waiting to be brought to the fore by life experiences. It concerns the innate, constitutional roots of the sexual drive. (Freud 1905a, 32)*

What does this quote tell us? It reveals that Freud was referring to Binet's aetiological theory of fetishism as an exception; this contrasts with Freud's own explanation, which he bases on his exploration of sexuality and perversions.

Binet's idea that fetishism results from chance experiences (*zufällige Erlebnisse*) creates a problem for Freud in his first essay, in which he claims that perversions can originate from innate (*angeborene*) human sexual dispositions (Freud 1905a, 32). This conflicts with the model he favours: Binet's aetiology of fetishism, which implies that perversion must come from an outside impression, via a contingent event (Freud 1905a, 17).

In 1905, in the course of exploring the innate sexual disposition towards perversions, Freud discusses the constitutional roots of the sexual drive in terms of partial drives and erogenous zones and the part they play in perversion (1905a, 29).

Freud argues that the tendency towards perversion is connected to the pervasiveness of a particular erogenous zone or a partial drive. This connection hinges on the perverse disposition (*perversen Veranlagung*) of human sexuality (Freud, 1905a, 31). However, in the first edition of his *Three Essays*, Freud does not explain which infantile constitutional roots of the sexual drive, partial drive, or erogenous zone constitute the innate disposition that explains fetishism.

In his second essay, as he traces the development of the sexual drive, Freud turns to the sexual life of children to determine the origin of perversion and neurosis, as well as to explore what constitutes normal sex life in infant sexuality (Freud 1905a, 33). Freud describes the notions of partial drives and erogenous zones; he determines that the general human disposition towards perversions—to which he ascribes the human sexual drive—can be observed in childhood as non-functional sexuality and non-genital pleasure-seeking[49] . In this context, he writes:

> *It would then turn out that sexual excitation in children springs from a multiplicity of sources. Satisfaction arises first and foremost from the appropriate sensory excitation of what we have described as erogenous zones; any part of the skin and any sense organ could probably function as an erogenous zone […] The excitations from all these sources would not yet be combined at that stage, but it would seem that each follows its own separate aim, which is merely the attainment of a certain sort of pleasure. In childhood, therefore, the sexual drive is without an object, that is, autoerotic. (Freud 1905a, 82)*

This passage reveals another inconsistency with Binet's model of fetishism, which proposes that it results from chance events. Freud states that, in childhood, the sexual drive exists without an object; in contrast, Binet's (1888a, 8, 35) idea of childhood impressions is directly related to objects (hands, hair, eyes, feet, costumes, handkerchiefs, nightcaps, and boots). This inconsistency becomes increasingly evident as *Three Essays* progresses. Over the years, Freud repeatedly confronts Binet's aetiological model. In the following sections we will see how this led him to integrate Binet's model into the model of trauma, that is, the idea that a disturbing

[49] When Freud discusses how the excitation of bodily zones such as the skin or mucous membranes determines the sexual character of the drive, he uses the child's sensual sucking as a model of 'the manifestations of infantile sexuality'(Freud 1905a, 40). Using this model, he argues that the child's sucking is detached from the function of nutrition. This allows Freud to claim that the child's lips behave as an erogenous zone and that the sexual drive is autoerotic (without an object) because the child finds satisfaction from its own body (*er befriedigt sich am eigenen Körper*) (1905a, 42).

childhood experience gives rise to the development of neurotic symptoms in later life. Consequently, Freud distanced his theorization of fetishism from the idea of an innate polymorphous disposition. (This will be explored in greater details in the following sections and chapter.)

Notably, in *Three Essays* Freud does not focus on the formation of the fetish object. He addresses the object only in the third essay, when explaining the transformations of puberty (1905a, 61). Freud outlines his ideas concerning how, at the start of puberty, sexuality becomes directed towards an object in the psychological sphere (1905a, 73). Here, Freud broadly assumes that the oral autoerotic infantile sexual pleasure—once it becomes uncoupled from the act of ingesting food—prepares newly pubescent children to choose an object that may restore the original lost bliss. Freud does not explain how this works, however.

In the second essay, on infantile sexuality, Freud outlines the features of the sexual drive in childhood. He claims that a sexual disposition exists in infancy; he calls this the "polymorphously perverse disposition" (*polymorph perverse Anlage*) (Freud 1905a, 50). Freud assumes that children can experience sexual pleasure in the erogenous zones (1905a, 51, 82). This means that the polymorphous perverse aspect of infantile sexuality is a given disposition of the sexual drive (Freud 1905a, 38). Thus, according to Freud, the seeds of all perversions can be found in children. However, at this juncture Freud confronts another inconsistency: he has not established a link between the sexual deviance categorized in the book and infantile sexuality (Freud 1905a, 83). In what way is this inconsistent? In *Three Essays*, the presence of fetishism and other perversions does not constitute clear clinical evidence of perverse polymorphous infantile sexuality. After all, in 1905, Freud had not shown that something like infantile fetishism existed.

Another challenge arising from the concept of fetishism in Freud's *Three Essays* is how to show that fetishism is the opposite of neurosis. As his letters and drafts sent to Fließ reveal, Freud's overall model of perversions still depends on the non-repressed sexual content that stems from the erogenous zones (1985, 209–10, 280). In *Three Essays*, Freud claims that perversions result from the insufficient repression of the innate disposition, which is found in the innate constitutional roots of the sexual drive. Thus, in contrast to neurosis, perversion (including fetishism) is not seen as a neurotic repressed defensive structure. In general terms, perversions are due to fixations on specific kinds of pleasure (Freud 1905a, 17–8, 90). Freud also posits that

all variations on the perversions described in *Three Essays* are exhibited in the sexual drive of neurotics[50].

In *Three Essays*, Freud does *not* show how an erogenous zone or the unconscious aspect of neurosis can be related to fetishism, however. Accordingly, even when Freud was only starting out with his theory of perversion in 1905, fetishism defied the oppositional relationship between neurosis and perversion. In the following remark, we have clear evidence that the concept of fetishism challenged Freud's psychopathological equation: "Among the unconscious trains of thought found in neuroses, there is nothing corresponding to a tendency to fetishism" (Freud 1905a, 28).

The phenomenon of fetishism confronted Freud in 1905 with another question: what, exactly, is pathological about fetishism? Unlike neurosis, which causes the individual to suffer, the fetishist perversion does not induce suffering; this challenges the classification of fetishism as a pathology. As we will see in the next chapter, it is only after Freud's clinical experience with fetishist patients over the years that he addressed this issue.

3.1.1 Fetishism, the Sexual Drive, and its Object

In addition to the problems identified above, the phenomenon of fetishism also complicated Freud's attempt to categorize fetishist perversion. Freud introduces the technical terms "sexual object" and "sexual aim" to describe and conceptualize deviations with respect to "normal" human sexuality in his study of perversions in the *Three Essays* (1905a, 1, 12). What is Freud's strategy with these concepts? He writes: "(…) scientifically considered experience will show us numerous deviations in terms of both the sexual object and sexual aim whose relation to the accepted norm requires thorough investigation" (Freud 1905a, 1).

Freud's (1905a, 1) conceptualization of "sexual object" and "sexual aim" allows him to theorize that the sexual drive is a disposition that can bypass the aim of copulation, that is, it can reject the normative function of reproduction. Later, he states: "But even in the most normal sexual process, we may detect some elements whose development would lead to those aberrations that have been described as perversions" (1905a, 12-13). However, when Freud uses fetishism to prove his point,

[50] Freud's study on the development of the sexual drive supported the understanding of how the energy of this drive is linked to the constant endogenous excitement of neurosis. Freud had been searching for an answer to this question since 1895. Regarding how the energy of the sexual drive supplies neurosis, he concluded, "This contribution is the only constant and most important source of energy of the neurosis" (Freud 1905a, 24).

this phenomenon again conflicts with his strategy. Freud concludes by admitting that the concept of fetishism complicates the classifications delimited by these technical terms, raising the following question for Freud: can his theory of perversion allow human sexuality to be understood without reference to a sexual object?

Thus, Freud asserts that particular facts of normal sexuality show that initially, sexuality is not directed towards a specific object or an innate aim (1905a, 42). After he discusses deviations towards sexual objects[51], Freud concludes by refuting the existence of a close connection between the sexual drive and the sexual object. According to Freud, the regularity in normal sexual configurations, in which sexual drives are oriented around a specific object, is only an apparent correspondence (Freud 1905a, 12). But if the object is not essential to the sexual drive, we may ask, how can we discuss fetishist perversion—given that this perversion is intrinsically linked to an object?

In *Three Essays*, Freud introduces fetishism in a section titled "Unsuitable Substitutes for the Sexual Object – Fetishism". He characterizes the fetish as an object that is unable to satisfy directly the aim of reproduction—just as Binet had theorized. In his fundamental critique of the prevailing definition of normal sexuality, Freud's characterization of fetishism in 1905 confirms his view that the sexual drive does not have an innate functional principle—namely, the reproduction of the species (Freud 1905a, 12–3). This is because the objects that produce excitation and pleasure in fetishism are entirely unfit for such an aim. Therefore, Freud introduces fetishism in *Three Essays* as a deviation from both the sexual object and the sexual aim. Although Freud describes fetishism in the section on deviation from the sexual aim, he also states that it is as an unsuitable substitute for the sexual object. As clear evidence that Freud cannot categorize fetishism adequately within this framework, he concedes: "We should have done better to mention this most interesting group of aberrations of the sexual drive along with the deviations in respect of the sexual object" (Freud 1905a, 16). Nevertheless, Freud justifies his decision to classify fetishism as a deviation from the sexual aim thus: "We decided to postpone their mention until we could become acquainted with the factor of sexual overvaluation on which these phenomena depend, and which is connected with an abandonment of the sexual aim" (Freud 1905a, 16). Given that Freud endeavoured to study the sexual drive, rather than its object, he relates fetishism to the abandonment of the normal sexual aim. In fact, fetishism, as well as all the major perversions Freud discusses in 1905, are described as a departure from the normal sexual aim—and as directed towards an

[51] Here, Freud discussed homosexuality (inversion) as well as sexual immaturity and animals as sexual objects (Freud 1905a, 2, 11).

object. Assuming fetishism to be invariably dependent on an object, Freud considers the fetish to be a manifestation of the choice of sexual object (1905a, 17).

To demonstrate that the elements of fetishism and other perversions represent normal sexuality, Freud focuses on perverse pathologies. As previously discussed, both Binet and Krafft-Ebing had already assigned to fetishism precisely the same role in their study of normal sexuality. As we will see, Freud defines the factors of human sexuality that link fetishism to a normal adult sexual life, using the concepts of anatomical extensions and sexual overvaluation (1905a, 13–6). The very fact that human sexual interests are not restricted to another person's genitals supports Freud's interpretation of the role of fetishism.

3.1.2 Anatomical Extensions and Sexual Overvaluation

Scholars note that Freud's concept of "anatomical extensions" are key to his critique of normal sexuality in the *Three Essays* (Nedoh 2019, 139; Lantéri-Laura 2012, 91). Freud introduces the concepts of anatomical extensions and sexual overvaluation to support his argument that the human sexual drive is independent of the reproduction function.

Freud's account of fetishism in *Three Essays* is included in the section devoted to anatomical extensions. Freud's (1905a, 13) concept of anatomical extensions includes excitations and the activities of partial drives, which are not purely genital or copulative. Freud claims that anatomical extensions are used in all normal sexual foreplay. The introduction of fetishism follows Freud's discussion connecting elements found in perversions and those in a normal sexual life. Thus, Freud underlines elements of the normal sexual process that are developed in perversions as preliminary sexual aims. Examples of these aims include pleasurable activities such as touching, looking, and kissing. Freud notes that these pleasurable activities have a high sexual value in normal sexual life. In addition, the parts of the body involved in such normal sexual activities do not belong to the genital apparatus.

Seen from the perspective of anatomical extensions, perversions, according to Freud, are fragments of normal sexuality that are neither pathological nor transgressive (perversities) (Lantéri-Laura 2012, 91–5). Thereafter, Freud introduces the notion of anatomical extensions, which allows him to offer a more precise definition of perversions:

> *Here, then, are factors which link the perversions to normal sexual life, and which can also serve as a basis for their classification. The perversions are either (a) actions of extending anatomically beyond the regions of the body designed for genital union or (b) actions of lingering over the intermediate relations to the sexual object normally rapidly traversed on the path toward the final sexual aim. (Freud 1905a, 13)*

Because sexual interest extends beyond the genitals of the sexual object (person) and the actions that mediate the connection to the sexual object are both facts of a normal sexual life, Freud draws two conclusions. First, he states that the aim of the sexual drive is rarely limited to the genitals of the sexual object. This implies that the sexual drive can be extended across the entire body of the sexual object, including all accompanying sensations. Second, Freud claims that these facts produce a psychic overvaluation of the sexual object (Freud 1905a, 13).

Freud's deployment of the idea of fetishism in this discussion can be interpreted as a deepening of Binet's ideas. Binet had previously maintained that normal sexuality is an amalgam of various excitations; fetishism was his model for normal sexual life, which is characterized as an integration of different sexual excitements. The concept of anatomical extensions explains why, in the contexts of both perversions and normal sexuality, the individual can reach orgasm only through the use of parts of the body that are not, strictly speaking, the genital organs. Binet and Krafft-Ebing had focused on fetishism and its link to normal sexuality; this raises the question of the extent to which Freud actually breaks with the ideas of his predecessors in his theory of sexuality. Thus, in support of my argument on Freud's theorization on fetishism, we can ask whether Freud indeed develops a radical critique of his predecessors' theory of sexuality, or whether he merely extrapolates from Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's previous assumptions. Freud highlights the absence of exact boundaries between perversion and normal sexuality, writing: "No other variation of the sexual drive verging on the pathological is as clear to us in every respect as this one" (Freud 1905a, 16). Moreover, extending Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's connection of substitution and symbol to fetishism, Freud adds, "The substitute for the sexual object is some part of the body (such as the foot or hair) which is generally hardly appropriate for sexual purposes" (Freud 1905a, 16). Thus, fetishism in *Three Essays* is connected to the sexual interest in the use of body parts that have no genital significance—but still play a role in adult sexuality.

In this context, Freud's central argument enables a critique of the criteria for distinguishing between normal and pathological sexualities established by the sexological and psychiatric literature of the late-nineteenth century (Davidson 1987b, 266). Thus, as the sexual drive has no internal natural aim, deviations from the aim of genital intercourse lose their pathological status as genuine perversions (1987b, 270). Therefore, because Freud has emptied the conceptual space within which perversion functions (1987b, 271-5), there are no genuine perversions. With perversion no longer a legitimate concept, the role of fetishism itself in Freud's *Three Essays* can be challenged: how can Freud continue to argue that fetishism is a perversion in view of his own ideas as of 1905? Clearly, after publication of *Three Essays*, Freud needed a solution to this problem. Conversely, as will be discussed further on, the later reception of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic interest in this subject highlighted fetishism as a perverse construct par excellence.

In his 1905 work, Freud also developed his theory of disgust (1905a, 23; 1905b, 30–1). The "dam of disgust" was included among other barriers, and their transgression functions as a means to measure deviations from the normal—deviations that constitute perversion. Freud remarks that the limits of disgust are purely conventional. Disgust can be overcome by the libido to maintain the overvaluation of the sexual object: "The strength of the sexual drive loves actively overriding this sense of disgust" (Freud 1905a, 15). However, now that we have concluded that perversion—in its genuine form—is no longer a legitimate concept in *Three Essays*, Freud's theorization of reactions such as disgust and shame cannot provide an independent criterion for classifying certain sexual phenomena as perversions (Davidson 1987b, 271). As for fetishism as a perversion, Freud cannot include fetishism in his indexes of the repression that characterizes perversion. As Freud argued in his letters to Fließ (1985, 163–4)—and in his 1905 writings, the model of reaction formation appears to be an insufficient explanation for fetishism (1905a, 15). This is especially so because Freud sees fetishism on a continuum of normal sexuality connected to the concept of anatomical extensions—the normal cherishing of the objects that belong to a beloved person is neither disgusting nor shameful.

In *Three Essays*, Freud discusses the connection between fetishism and the overvaluation of the sexual object[52] (Freud 1905a, 16); he argues that sexual overvaluation is the psychological effect of the abandonment of the sexual aim. Again, this shows that the idea of perversions such as fetishism led to inconsistencies in Freud's theories. The same applies to Freud's ideas on infantile sexuality, which he characterizes as lacking an object. Freud cannot show that there is an overvaluation of an object in infantile sexuality if there is no object. Thus, the concept of sexual overvaluation problematizes the possibility of studying fetishist perversion exclusively as a deviation from the normal sexual aim—because there must be an object to be overvalued. As we will see, Freud tried to solve this problem in the years following the publication of *Three Essays*.

If, according to Freud in 1905, the bond between the drive and the object cannot be formed by a biological norm, how can the fetish object be explained? To address this problem, Freud takes up Binet's main aetiological thesis: "As Binet first claimed, and as was later confirmed by ample evidence, the choice of fetish reveals the continuing influence of a sexual impression mostly received in early childhood, comparable with the proverbial 'stickiness' of first love under normal circumstances (*on revient toujours à ses premiers amours*). […] It is a symbolic association of ideas, of which the person concerned is usually not conscious, that has led to the replacement of the object by a fetish" (Freud 1905a, 17).

Ultimately, Freud's discussion of fetishism in *Three Essays* questions the foundation of the sexological and psychiatric literature established by his predecessors. However, Freud's inclusion of fetishism in his theorization follows the categorization of perversions established in the very same literature he was challenging. Thus, the ambiguities and queries that fetishism introduced into Freud's theory of sexuality show that he was in some sense a prisoner of the conceptual space of the nineteenth-century sexological and psychiatric literature (Davidson 1990, 320) that he was trying to transcend. Not knowing how to integrate fetishism into his theories in the

[52] Because the sexual object is always held to have psychological value, sexual overvaluation extends into the psychological sphere. This leads to unrealistic judgements concerning the sexual object or through a strong submission to it (Freud 1905a, 13-4). Freud explains sexual overvaluation in light of the masochistic components of the sexual drive. Before Freud, Krafft-Ebing had engaged in a similar theorization that linked fetishist psychological valuation (*Werthschätzung*) to submissiveness and masochism; Krafft-Ebing had also shown great interest in the psychological value given by the fetishists to their fetishes. It was after Krafft-Ebing had studied patients he called shoe worshippers (*Schuhverehrer*) (1893a, 128) that he linked fetishistic overvaluation to masochism. In *Psychopathia Sexualis* Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 144) notes that submission to the beloved object is the most important source of masochism, together with heredity and dispositional factors. (1893a, 123–44).

years following the publication of *Three Essays*, Freud made an increasingly strong connection between fetishism and his own insights into neurosis.

In 1906, in *My Views on the Role of Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses*, Freud assesses the development of his aetiological thinking from the 1890s to 1906; he also affirms his confidence in the biological arguments presented in *Three Essays*. Freud claims that his exploration had revealed that the disturbances of the organism's sexual processes (*Störung der Sexualvorgänge im Organismus*) overlap with the aetiological importance of hereditary, constitutional, and accidental factors, thus forming the core of his aetiological thinking[53] (1906a, 279). However, the very next year, the topic of fetishism was to clash with his reasoning on the organic sexual processes: in 1907, hewing to Binet's thinking, Freud privileged accidental causes. As he turned to Binet, Freud began his attempt to solve the problems fetishism had left him with in *Three Essays*.

3.2 Freud Revisits the Subject of Fetishism in Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva (1907)

In his essay *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva* (henceforth referred to as Delusions and Dreams), published in 1907, Freud broached a central problem of fetishism: its connection to his theory of infantile sexuality. Here, Freud turns to childhood in an attempt to answer the question, Where does the fetish object originate? As we will see, this question reveals problems that forced Freud to change his views and generate new ideas. In service of the problematic of this dissertation, the above question addresses whether human sexuality can be understood independently of a sexual object in Freud's theorization of human sexuality.

What, then, are the consequences of Freud relating adult fetishism to childhood? In 1907, Freud re-engages with Binet's ground-breaking idea that the fetish object originates in childhood. Starting in 1907, Freud tries to deepen Binet's aetiology of fetishism through the theoretical models and clinical insights he had developed so far. Whereas Freud had previously stated that neurosis is the negative of perversion, he now tries to solve the origin of the fetishist perversion by relating it to this very same concept: neurosis.

[53] Although Freud framed perversions as disturbances in sexuality, he avoided connecting these disturbances to moral issues. In the same year, Freud was invited by the University of Vienna to discuss possible applications of psychoanalysis to the field of criminology. In his lecture, entitled "Psychoanalysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings", Freud made no mention of the concept of perversion. He emphasized that his aetiological ideas about sexuality were of no use to and should not be considered by the field of criminology (Freud 1906b, 112).

Interestingly, in *Delusions and Dreams*[54], Freud undertakes quite a different theoretical manoeuvre from previous years. Freud here begins shifting his focus away from the innate elements. Freud's ongoing adoption of Binet's idea that fetishism is explained by an external object makes it impossible to theorize about fetishism by deepening the topics of internal dispositions represented by the erogenous zones or the components of the sexual drive. In 1906 Freud assumes that the organic disturbances in sexual processes overlap with the aetiological importance of hereditary, constitutional, and accidental factors (1906a, 279). In 1907, however, by evolving Binet's ideas on the cause of fetishism, Freud privileges the influence of an external event (*Einfluß einer äußeren Einwirkung*) (1907a, 34)—or, in other words, a stimulus from the external world (*Reiz aus der Außenwelt*) (1907a, 56)—and the chance impression (*zufälliger Eindruck*) (Freud 1907a, 46). In contrast to 1906, Freud now does not explore fetishism from the point of view of disturbances in either the synthesis of the components of the sexual drive or in the perverse polymorphic infantile disposition (1906a, 277). In fact, in 1907 Freud regards an inquiry into the components of the sexual drive to be irrelevant (1907a, 54). Also in contrast to his 1905 attempt to de-pathologize perversion—and fetishism in particular—Freud (1907a, 41–5) in 1907 explores fetishism in a direct debate with the field of psychiatry. Instead of being part of normal sexuality, fetishism is now a phenomenon associated with psychosis, according to Freud.

Delusions and Dreams is an analysis of German writer Wilhelm Jensen's novel Gradiva. In his essay, Freud explores the question of how the same processes at the genesis of fetishism are capable of causing psychic manifestations such as delusions (*Wahn*), fantasies, and dreams (Freud 1907a, 34, 45).

What is the meaning of Freud's 1907 strategy of relating fetishism to these phenomena? Arguably these phenomena respond to sexual overvaluation, a concept Freud had strongly linked to fetishism in *Three Essays*. Therefore, discussing fetishism in 1907 as related to delusion and fantasy—phenomena of psychiatric interest par excellence—lead to a question left open in 1905: Where does the fetishist overvaluation originate? By taking adult fetishism back to childhood and linking it to delusion and fantasy, Freud (1907a, 11–2) tries to find the origin of the unreasonable judgement which the fetishist overvaluation sets on the sexual object.

[54] The secondary literature on Freud's theorization of fetishism in this work focuses less on the problems Freud is trying to solve, and more on questions such as the concept of representation and literary creation (Rey-Flaud 1994, 231; Assoun 1994, 103).

In 1907, Freud argues in favour of the power of the erotism that stems from childhood: the erotic impressions formed in childhood—as well as the forces of repression—are strong enough to produce fantasies, dreams, and delusions (Freud 1907a, 49). Freud clearly relates fetishism to his theory of neurosis. He draws an analogy between (fetishist) delusion and psychoneurotic disorders; in doing so, he thus emphasizes that the repression of the sexual drive is a precondition for both fetishist delusion and psychoneuroses (1907a, 89–90). Further, Freud states that the claim that a person's erotic feelings are attached to repressed childhood impressions—as in the case of fetishism—also applies to psychic consequences such as delusions, dreams, and fantasies (Freud 1907a, 48). Here, Freud links Binet's notion of childhood impressions to Freud's own concept of repression, therefore including fetishism among neurotic outcomes such as delusions, dreams, and fantasies. Such psychic consequences are products of modifying the forgotten memory of erotic childhood impressions (Freud 1907a, 34).

Freud's thinking in 1907 is therefore a departure from that of his letter dated 6 December 1896 (discussed in the previous chapter), in which he writes that perverse (fetishistic) behaviour of licking women's feet was conditioned by the complete absence of repression (defence) (1985, 209–10). Now, Freud clearly connects fetishism to repression. This is a significant change from his approach in *Three Essays:* Freud now applies to fetishism a mechanism that was developed to explain the origin of neuroses.

In *Delusions and Dreams*, Freud discusses Norbert Hanold, the main character in Jensen's novel. Hanold is intensely attracted to a sculpture of a walking female figure (Freud1907a, 11). Interestingly, the love of statues already played an important role in the taxonomy of sexual aberrations[55]. Krafft-Ebing had described phenomena such as individuals falling in love with and attaining lustful gratification from statues, as well as violating them (1893a, 396). Before Freud, Krafft-Ebing had found sexuality to be the basis of the delusion (*Wahn*) that motivates fetishism for artificial objects such as amulets and relics (1893a, 17).

[55] Before Krafft-Ebing, the pioneering work of the Austrian psychiatrist, Heinrich Kaan (1844, 78) entitled *Psychopathia Sexualis* —considered to be Krafft-Ebing's major theoretical underpinning (Kahan 2016, 2)—included lustful satisfaction with statues among the basic types of sexual aberrations. Kaan's theories of psychiatry belonged to the intellectual atmosphere of the University of Vienna where both Krafft-Ebing and Freud were associated (Kahan 2016, 5–8). Kaan's investigation of lustful satisfaction with statues became a cornerstone of the overall sexological literature that Freud relied upon (Kahan 2016, 7). According to Kaan, the satisfaction of lust with statues is an important expression of deviation of the genital drive (*Geschlechtstrieb*) (1844, 78).

In his essay, Freud directly associates the love for statues with fetishism: Hanold's interest in women's feet and gait represents a singular derivation of fetishism (*der Ableitung der merkwürdigen Erscheinung des Fetischismus*) (Freud 1907a, 46). Freud remarks that Hanold's attraction is expressed by delusions and fantasies derived from the repressed childhood memories of his youthful love, Zoe Bertgang (Freud 1907a, 34–5). In discussing Hanold's attachment to the sculpture—especially his preoccupation with the woman's feet and gait—Freud points out that Hanold's interest in real women has been displaced by his focus on the sculpture (Freud 1907a, 12).

Freud's strategy here is to adopt a psychiatric approach: "A psychiatrist would perhaps place Norbert Hanold's delusion in the great group of 'paranoia' and possibly describe it as 'fetishistic erotomania' because the most striking thing about it was his being in love with the piece of sculpture and because in the psychiatrist's view, with its tendency to coarsen everything, the young archaeologist's interest in feet and the postures of feet would be bound to suggest 'fetishism'" (Freud 1907a, 45).

In Jensen's novel, Freud finds an important insight to fill theoretical gaps on the relationship between childhood and the overvaluation of objects, that is, children's early propensity to fantasize. According to Freud, the protagonist's precondition for fetishism is explained by the need for erotic fantasies (Freud 1907a, 45–6). Before Freud, in his study of fetishism, Binet (1888, 11, 46) discussed cases in which, following sexual impression, five- and six-year-old children have already developed lustful ideas with a fetish object. Binet (1888, 52-3, 68-9, 76) systematically stressed the role of imagination and fantasy, including how imagination can lead to a "madness" (*folies*) for inert things (*corps inertes*).

Although the novel is not concerned with a disposition that explains the need for erotic fantasies, Freud states that (1907a, 46–7) Jensen recognized childhood erotism (*Erotik des Kinderlebens*) as a basis of fetishism. Freud acknowledges his agreement with Binet's ideas on fetishism and argues that Jensen's descriptions of Hanold are a remarkable, scientifically accurate example of this phenomenon:

> *… we cannot avoid tracing the interest back to the memory of his childhood playmate. For there can be no doubt that even in her childhood, the girl showed the same peculiarity of a graceful gait, with her toes almost perpendicularly raised as she stepped along; and it was because it represented that same gait that an ancient marble relief acquired such great importance for Norbert Hanold. Incidentally, we may add that in his*

> *derivation of the remarkable phenomenon of fetishism the author is in complete agreement with science. Ever since Binet, we have in fact tried to trace fetishism back to erotic impressions in childhood. (Freud 1907a, 46)*

This quote shows that, by connecting childhood and the fetish object, Freud links Binet's aetiological ideas to the formation of the delusion (1907a, 47). Freud states that the development of the delusion begins when a chance impression awakens the traces of forgotten childhood erotic experiences (Freud 1907a, 47). Also aligned with Binet's ideas, Freud develops his idea of children's ability to fantasize. Freud stresses that early-childhood impressions determine the products of one's imagination in the form of fantasy; he claims that fantasies are reverberations of forgotten childhood memories (Freud 1907a, 31).

As for the remaining question of the origins of fetishist sexual overvaluation, Freud underlines that Hanold's fantasies about the sculpture are an echo of the erotic value of Zoe Bertgang's foot posture, as it appears in his childhood recollection (1907a, 47). Rocha (2010, 292) points to a link between fetishism and Hanold's aesthetic pleasure and scientific curiosity for the sculpture. This link shows the reasoning behind Freud's (1905a, 18–9, 38–9) mechanism of sublimation as elaborated in *Three Essays* (Rocha 2010, 292). Freud claimed that parts of the body can be sublimated in art if the sexual interest for the genitals is shifted (Freud 1905a, 18–9). Sublimation implies a modification of the aim of the sexual drive that turns sexual satisfaction to other non-sexual purposes such as artistic creativity (Freud 1905a, 39, 87). In his 1907 essay, Freud (1907a, 79–80) underlines Hanold's submission to his intellectual activity and his dedication to science as being a fixed satisfaction. Bearing in mind his lack of interest in real women, Hanold avoids a psychic conflict related to sexually desirable—and immoral—women through the compromise between psychic currents. This means that, through fetishism, he can satisfy his eroticism by fantasizing about Gradiva as a woman endowed with moral and socially valued attributes (Rocha 2010, 292). As we will see in the following sections, Freud would try to explain fetishism through the concept of sublimation in order to solve the problem of the link between childhood and overvaluation of the object.

After discussing Norbert Hanold's need for erotic fantasies (1907a, 46) as well as the primacy of fantasy in delusion (1907a, 44), Freud argues that fantasies are the precursors of delusions. Moreover, he distinguishes fantasy from delusion, pointing out that in contrast to delusion, fantasy does not bar one's access to reality (Freud 1907a, 58). This idea would become fundamental to Freud's late theorization about the role of fantasy in fetishism. According to Freud (1907a, 44), Hanold's

fantasies turn into a belief, and then begin to influence his interests. Freud remarks on the fact that Jensen opted to describe Hanold's psychological experience as a fantasy; Freud, in turn, opts for the psychiatric term "delusion" in *Delusions and Dreams* (1907a, 41).

In his essay, Freud discusses the mechanism of repression to explain the resistance to the memories that spark fantasies[56]. Freud considers that Hanold's childhood experiences with Zoe Bertgang were erotic, and that the power of such erotism was unconsciously preserved. Hanold's childhood memories were altered, distorted, and censored through his resistance to erotism (*Widerstand gegen die Erotik*) (Freud 1907a, 48–49). However here, Freud does not explain why a child resists eroticism. In line with Binet's theories, Freud claims that Hanold's interest in the sculpture aroused his dormant infantile erotism: the influence of external events (*Einfluß einer äußeren Einwirkung*) activate the repressed material, producing psychic consequences in a modified, derivate way, such as delusions and dreams (Freud 1907a, 34). So far, we have seen Freud's first attempt (1905) to solve the problems that arise with fetishism as aimed at bringing together infantile sexuality and the fetish object by taking up Binet's ideas. In the following section, I will continue to problematize Freud's theorization of fetishism.

3.3 Sexual Fantasies and "Theories" in Childhood

In 1907, by attempting to relate adult fetishism to childhood, Freud tried to explain the origin of the object with delusion and fantasy. However, missing in 1907 was a concept of infantile "theories" and infantile fantasies. Freud's next step in 1908 was to develop the theoretical connection between childhood and fantasy. In 1908 Freud argued that children's elaborations (theories) have an essential function in the psychosexual constitution; this was similar to the function of the fantasy.

What exactly is the fundamental issue in Freud's work of 1908? At this juncture he began to theorize that there is already a (sexual) object in early childhood.

[56] In the same year, Freud (1907) argued on the formation of fantasies as the outcome of conflict in perversion. In the scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, dated January 23, 1907, after Alfred Meisl presented a paper on hunger and love, Freud referred to Krafft-Ebing's concepts to argue that a suspension of reality is a necessary condition for the formation of fantasies that are found in perversions such as in fetishism. Freud stated: "The differentiation between perverts-of-action (*Perverse der Tat*) and perverts-of-thought (*Perverse des Gedankens*) has been introduced by Krafft-Ebing. It is characteristic of persons to indulge in perverse fantasies that they are not only avers to, but actually incapable of carrying them out. The suspension (*Aufhebung*) of reality (as in the theatre) is in many of these cases a necessary condition formation of the fantasy" (1907b, 86). As I will discuss in the next section, in the next year, Freud explored the conflicts that led to the formation of fantasy in perversion (Freud 1908b, 1908c).

By returning to the vestigial problems from his thinking on fetishism in 1905, Freud changed his previous views: he no longer theorized that an object can only found in puberty—as articulated in Three Essays—but that this object can already be part of infantile sexual life. This theorization was a starting point for thinking about the overvaluation and idealization of the object to which Freud would connect fetishism in 1909.

Following his *Delusions and Dreams*, Freud extended the aetiological potential of fantasies in 1908. In his article titled *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming*, he explores the role of fantasy in the development of childhood imagination. Considering this and other work from 1908, we can see Freud's strategy for justifying the motives of infantile fantasies. In line with the argument of this dissertation, it is important to highlight the way in which Freud insists on this theoretical justification. Freud initiates a recovery of aetiological topics which he had discussed in his work from the 1890s, topics like defence of the ego and splitting. Following his 1907 discussion based on Binet's ideas, here Freud (1908d, 147-8) argues that during a child's development, fantasizing recalls an earlier infantile (erotic) experience. Fantasies, in his view, are the immediate mental precursors of symptoms and can act as conduits to pathologies such as neurosis and psychosis. Freud (1908d, 148) adds that fantasizing recalls the erotic infantile experience that needs to be fulfilled as a wish.

When Binet (1888, 79) explored the psychological developments of fantasy, he remarked in particular on the capacity of artistic imagination to modify observable facts and turn them into fantasy. Agreeing with Binet's line of reasoning, Freud makes an analogy between fantasy and the creative capacity of writers; Freud also posits the corrective function of fantasy as well as its ability to provide security. Heroes of romances can inspire a feeling of security in readers (Freud 1908d, 149–50). Invulnerability (*Unverletzlichkeit*) is a distinctive feature of the ego—that is, the psychic function of every daydream and of every story that has been written (Freud 1908, 150). Here, Freud's theorization is of interest to the problematic that I am developing: in subsequent years, Freud applied the theoretical framework of neuroses to the aetiology of fetishism, confronting the task of integrating his ideas about the corrective, and security-inducing function of fantasy, as well as the invulnerability of the ego. In 1908 Freud revisits the concept of splitting in his effort to explain the role of fantasy in supporting the feelings of invulnerability and security that characterize the ego (1908d, 150). As discussed in the previous chapter, Freud had relinquished the idea of splitting and his reference to Binet on this topic, instead boosting the aetiological role of sexuality in neurosis. Freud had originally adopted the concept of splitting in his early aetiological theory in the 1890s, when

he referred to Binet's ideas on the doubling of the ego. Freud now describes how fantasy supports the invulnerability of the ego in terms of a splitting of the ego. Freud considers fantasy in childhood development to be analogous to a writers' creative capacity: in order to create, the modern writer needs to split (*zu zerspalten*) his ego into many partial egos (*Partial-Ichs*). In this sense, writers personify the conflicting currents of their own mental life (Freud 1908d, 150). We saw in the first chapter that Binet had already discussed doubling as associated with contradictory currents (Binet 1892, 82-3, 100, 140). (In the next chapter, we will see how Freud relates fantasy and the splitting of the ego to fetishism.)

In his essay *Family Romances* (1908d), Freud returns to the discussion of the link between childhood and psychological overvaluation—initiated with fetishism in 1905 and followed up in 1907—by adding the idea that young children can overvalue prominent figures in their lives. This overvaluation is part of the child's psychosexual constitution and development. According to Freud, the influence of the most intense sexual impulses grounds a child's relationship with their parents (1908d, 237) and finds expression in fantasies (1908d, 239). Freud also argues that the child's fantasies are connected to an overvaluation of his parents (*Die kindliche Überschätzung der Eltern*). This non-sexual overvaluation later survives in the dreams of normal adults (Freud 1908d, 241).

In his work titled *On the Sexual Theories of Children*, also published in 1908, Freud introduces the notion of infantile sexual theories. (The word "theories" in this sense refers to fantasies and ideas children form, in this case about sexual matters and objects). Freud clearly had to change his view, expressed in, that infantile sexuality lacked an object. Thus, in 1908, Freud argues that children's typical elaborations, or theories, are necessary for the psychosexual constitution (Freud 1908b, 215). Freud identifies three infantile theories: the theory of the neglect of the differences between the sexes, the cloacal theory of birth, and the sadistic theory of coitus. Although these sexual theories which children believe are factually false, Freud considers them correct in respect to the components of the sexual drive[57], which have already begun to incubate in the infantile organism (Freud 1908b, 215). Freud claims that, in childhood, the components of the sexual drive are at the origin of children's elaborations about the enigmas of adult sexuality. This means that the organic sexual processes of childhood, such as autoerotism, coprophilic inclinations,

[57] It is worth noting that part of these concepts presented in 1908 were absent in Freud's theory of sexuality in 1905. Mainly the introduction of coprophilic inclinations and of anal erotism, allowed Freud to attempt to connect innate dispositions of the sexual drive to the aetiology of fetishism in 1909.

and anal erotism, involve the typical elaboration of the infantile understanding of sexuality. Here, we may again inquire into Freud's theoretical manoeuvre used to explain the reasons for infantile theories. Once again, Freud falls back on the arguments concerning defence, splitting, and the idea of modification of perceptions similar to that discussed by Binet in terms of doubling.

In 1908, Freud argues that defence is the reason for the genesis of infantile theories. In constructing their theories, children aim to prevent the onset of feared events (1908b, 213). He argues that the first occasion of a child's psychic conflict is the confrontation of his theories and fantasies based on sexual-drive preferences with the views of grown-ups. Freud also argues that this psychic conflict soon leads to a psychic splitting (*psychische Spaltung*) (Freud 1908b, 214). Here, Freud compares splitting to an idea discussed previously by Binet: doubling in the context of modifications of perceptions. In his late theory of psychopathology, Freud's idea of fetishism would become the phenomenon through which he connected splitting and the change in unwanted perceptions. Again, this supports my line of reasoning: Freud's final theory of fetishism extends to precisely this argument (I will discuss this in the next chapter).

The first infantile theory that Freud mentions in *On the Sexual Theories of Children* (1908b, 215–6) is the frequent attribution of a penis to all human beings, including females. Freud theorizes that children have fantasies about (sexual) objects, and he reasons that the penis's status as the main erogenous zone and the central autoerotic sexual organ results in the child's appreciation of it. Consequently, the child is unable to imagine a person who lacks a penis. This is evidence of a change in Freud's previous theory of human sexuality (and infantile sexuality). Previously, in Freud's 1905 theory of sexuality, the penis was not the child's leading erogenous zone: the genital zone was merely one erotogenic zone among others.

Thus, in 1908 Freud introduces a new problematic into his theory of infantile sexuality: the inability to accept the genital difference in childhood. Here, I will discuss how this idea relates to my argument in this dissertation. In Freud's interpretation of the concept of erogenous zones and autoeroticism, human sexuality (and infantile sexuality) exists in reference to a sexual object. Previously, in Freud's theory of infantile sexuality in *Three Essays*, with the finding of an object positioned in puberty, there was no place for an object, fantasy, or for the knowledge of sexual differences in childhood. In contrast, in *On the Sexual Theories of Children*, Freud argues that children's statements upon realizing that women lack a penis demonstrate that children already have a strong prejudgment that distorts their perception

(*um die Wahrnehmung zu beugen*) (Freud 1908b, 215–6). But how does this connect to the general problematization that I develop in this dissertation? It foreshadows an important idea for Freud's forthcoming solutions to the challenges with fetishism. As will be discussed in the next chapter, modifying the perception of the lack of a penis in the female would become a fundamental idea in Freud's ultimate theorization of fetishism. I will then argue that Freud explores these solutions via the discussion of doubling.

Once Freud connects the child's inability to accept the genital difference between the sexes to his view of the penis as the child's leading autoerotic zone, Freud introduces another idea in his theory of (infantile) sexuality: the threat of castration (*Kastrationsdrohung*) (1908b). Here, it appears as a prop in the description of a defensive operation in the child's economy of excitation[58]. Freud affirms that once a child is dominated by excitations in the penis, the effect of the castration threat is proportional to the value that is set upon the excitement. Nevertheless, Freud will later endow the idea of castration with greater aetiological relevance. This is also connected to the problematization of this chapter, given that Freud will later apply both these ideas—the infantile belief that the penis is an appendage of all human beings, and the subsequent threat of castration—in his theorization of fetishism. Below, I will also discuss further developments in Freud's thinking around the theoretical problems generated by fetishism.

In 1909 Freud presented clinical evidence for infantile fantasies (sexual theories), asserting that there is already an interest in objects in early childhood, and that these objects can be overvalued. In *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy*—better known as "Little Hans"—Freud (1909b, 113-135) focuses on a specific case history to explore the infantile psychosexual constitution and its connection to fantasies. Freud argues for the existence of thescotomize fantasy (theory) that leads children to presuppose a universally monosexual human anatomy (1909b, 87). Freud connects such infantile fantasies to how infantile sexuality grounds the child's love for his mother.

Rather than experiencing sexual pleasure in connection with sexual reproduction, Little Hans' pleasurable sensations of urinating and touching his penis are consequences of his auto-erotic sexual activity and the sexual constitution of the genital zone, according to Freud. Consequently, among his erotogenic zones,

[58] Freud also mentioned cultural and anthropological interest in the castration theme as the Castration complex (*Kastrationskomplex*), stating that legends and myths testify to the upheaval of a child's emotional life and the horror of castration (Freud 1908b, 217).

the genital zone was the one that provided him the most intense pleasure. Freud connects this fact to the sexual pleasure little Hans experienced when looking at his parents' genitals (sexual scopophilia) as well as exhibiting his own genitals (1909b, 106–7). This, too, supports the argument I am developing in this chapter—and this section. Specifically, through his discussions of this five-year-old boy's analysis, Freud finally shows that finding an object does not occur in puberty—as he had claimed in *Three Essays*. With Little Hans' special interest in "widdlers" (*Wiwimacher*)—Hans's word for penis—it becomes clear that children's interest in certain parts of the body can become overdeveloped. According to Freud's descriptions of little Hans' fantasies, everybody has a scotom, and therefore there is no sexual difference between boys and girls. Little Hans disregarded the fact that his sister had no penis and simply predicted that she would grow one. (1909b, 108–9).

I will now discuss another idea in the same case history that is relevant to the problematic of this dissertation: the fear of castration. Freud, in the case history of "Little Hans", begins to pay more attention to the issue of castration. Although Freud considered castration when exploring the formation of the patient's main symptom—a phobia of being bitten by a horse (1909b, 100)—little Hans disregards his mother's threat to cut off his "scotom" and responded without any sense of guilt (1909b, 7–8). Further, when little Hans saw his sister naked in the bath, he initially ignored the idea of castration and instead predicted the growth of her member. A mere fifteen months after his mother had threatened him with the possibility of castration, little Hans experienced a deferred effect: he intensified his fantasy that his mother possessed a penis, according to Freud. Further, he states that the increase in Hans' fantasies was protective and defensive in nature (Freud 1909b, 120).

Indeed, Freud's 1908 and 1909 works contain early evidence of ideas Freud would later apply to his theory of fetishism. The introduction of the neglect of sexual difference and the fear of castration were preconditions for him to approach fetishism as a defensive process. In the following sections and chapters we will explore how, by continuing to rely on Binet's ideas, Freud gives a specific meaning to the early impression in childhood according to Binet's aetiology of fetishism. By elaborating on Binet's theory, Freud will assume that random sexual impressions do not cause fetishism; among the early impressions, only that of sexual difference is responsible for fetishism. Consequently, Freud will turn Binet's idea of early impression in childhood into a traumatic sexual impression. Thus, in Freud's theorization, the meaning of fetishism must change: fetishism can no longer exist as a sexual fixation to an overvalued sexual object.

3.4 On the Genesis of Fetishism (1909)

During the scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on February 24, 1909, Freud presented a case history of fetishism in a paper entitled *On the Genesis of Fetishism* (1909a). This composite case history represents the first time Freud had ever systematically explored cases of perverse pathology. *On the Genesis of Fetishism* was published only in 1988 (Freud, 1909a), and was based on handwritten minutes[59]—thought to be lost—of the meeting. In attendance were psychoanalysts, medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and writers[60].

Freud's paper illustrates how fetishism continued to challenge his theoretical efforts. After his work of 1905 and 1907, Freud had still not worked out how to categorize fetishism according to his previous theory of perversion. Even so, Freud continued to relate fetishism to his own ideas on neurosis. As Freud tried to articulate his concepts on fetishism, new problems arose. *On the Genesis of Fetishism* is paradigmatic of the way Freud faced problems in trying to apply his own theoretical framework: he recognized—if not relied on—Binet's work and, to a lesser degree, Krafft-Ebing's work, as relevant literature[61] (*einschlagige Literatur*) (Freud 1909a, 150). Freud's presentation is a clear attempt to evolve ideas from both authors.

Freud begins his paper by expressing his hesitation about his theory of fetishism; he considers his attempt to be an exception (Freud 1909a, 150). Freud had previously acknowledged this uncertainty about fetishism in *Three Essays* (Freud 1905a, 16), and in *On the Genesis of Fetishism*. Freud attributes this uncertainty to an insufficient number of psychoanalytic clinical observations. In his paper, Freud (1909a, 150) insists that his efforts must not be considered a solution, and he presses the point that his theoretical attempts should not be applied in medical or psychoanalytic practice. Freud recommends that before accepting his ideas as a theory of fetishism,

59 According to Louis Rose (1988), the editor of Freud's On the Genesis of Fetishism (1909a), the original handwritten minutes of the scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, dated February 24, 1909, were first believed to have been lost. However, they came to be discovered among Otto Rank's notes and letters, which are now part of the Rank Collection at Columbia University. They provide the only record of this paper. Otto Rank joined the Vienna Society in 1906 and became its first recording secretary. He therefore kept minutes of the group's weekly meetings until November 1918.

60 The minutes of Freud's presentation provide the following list of attendees: Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Alfred Bass, Adolf Deutsch, Paul Federn, Hugo Heller, Eduard Hitschmann, Edwin Hollerung, Albert Joachim, Otto Rank, Isidor Sadger, Hugo Schwerdtner, Maxim Steiner, and Wilhelm Stekel (Freud, 1909a, 147).

61 Although Freud, on this occasion, evaluated the work of August Forel, and Iwan Bloch, Freud's preference for the work of Binet and Krafft-Ebing remained explicit. According to Freud's evaluation, Forel's work did not contribute to his knowledge of fetishism (1909a, 151). As for Bloch's work on fetishism, Freud though it was unclear and confusing (1909a, 151–3). However, when he discussed nose erotism in his presentation, he did consider Forel's work noteworthy (Freud 1909a, 157).

one should first wait until other psychoanalysts brought their own observations, so that his ideas could be supported or refuted (1909a, 150).

As I have argued throughout in this dissertation, Freud undertook his 1909 theorization of fetishism as an evolution of Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas. In his paper, Freud reverted to Binet's distinction between major and minor fetishism. For Freud, this was a useful way of distinguishing the normal prerequisites for love and reminiscences (memories) to certain fetishes that are not as striking as the pathological ones (Freud 1909a, 151). This is a clear development of Binet's insight contained in *Fetishism in Love*. Binet had connected his assertion that everyone is to some extent a fetishist (in normal sexuality) to his concepts of major and minor fetishism. (This mirrored Binet's reference to the concept of major and minor hysteria) (Binet 1888, 4).

In *On the Genesis of Fetishism*, Freud addresses a number of Krafft-Ebing's ideas (1909a, 151-2). Among them is the reasoning that fetishism is caused by psychic impotence in which the fetish is considered a sexual prerequisite (*Bedingung*). This implies that without the fetish, the fetishist individual's sexual potency fails (Freud 1909a, 152). Another of Krafft-Ebing's ideas that Freud notes concerns foot and shoe fetishism constituting a masochist symbol (1909a, 152, 164). In addition to expressing his approval of these observations, Freud points out that Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* rests on puzzling notions of sexual constitution and of nervousness in general. Thus, by clarifying the obscure points in Krafft-Ebing's book, Freud begins to address his own theoretical attempt to understand fetishism—and he proposes a specific mechanism for this phenomenon (1909a, 152).

In attempting to evolve Binet's idea in *Fetishism in Love* about minor and major fetishism, Freud adapted the model of reminiscence in hysteria and applied it to a large number of fetishism cases. Hysterical reminiscences are an outcome of a memory of psychic trauma (Freud and Breuer 1895, 221) and are related to representations that the patient intentionally wants to forget and thus has repressed (Freud and Breuer 1893, 10). Fetishes as direct reminiscences (*direkte Reminiszenzen*) are not unknown[62] to the patient (Freud 1909a, 153) and are not repressed. In contrast to the hysterical reminiscence that is connected to the affect of distress and fright (Freud and Breuer 1893, 84), in 1909, the fetish as a reminiscence is an outcome of the normal affects of love (Freud 1909a, 153). In service to the argumentation of

[62] The difference between the hysteric reminiscence and the fetish as a direct reminiscence is similar to the difference that Freud established in *Project for a Scientific Psychology* between the hysteric symbol and the fetish as a normal symbol (1895e, 349). In the case of a normal symbol, such as a piece of clothing, the person can think about who the piece of clothing is associated with, whereas in the case of the hysteric symbol, the person is unaware of the symbol's association.

this dissertation, here, it is important to note that there is no perversion in fetishism that makes it the positive of hysteria (neurosis). On the contrary, by adapting the model of reminiscence in hysteria in order to apply it to fetishism, the phenomenon of fetishism becomes linked to neurosis. In *On the Genesis of Fetishism*, Freud brings back the discussion of overvaluation in fetishism—though not in the context of delusions, fantasies, and dreams, as he had done in 1907. Freud argues that normal affects of love are the basis of fetishism as direct reminiscence and are connected to beloved people. He claims that this results in the fetish becoming a prerequisite for love (*Liebesbedingungen*). This claim corresponds with Krafft-Ebing's idea of the fetish as a sexual prerequisite. According to Freud, such prerequisites are included in what he called the maternal aetiology (*Mutterätiologie*) (1909a, 153). As stemming from normal affects of love for beloved persons, such as the mother, Freud highlights the infantile origin of the fetish as part of the intimate quality of mother-child love. We can conclude that Freud did not link the fetish to something disgusting or reproachable, which implies that it is not a (defensive) reaction formation. As problematized in *Three Essays*, when Freud theorized about fetishism in normal circumstances, in 1909 the fetish evolved even more forcefully as an aspect of a beloved person that was not considered disgusting or shameful; therefore, the fetish could no longer be considered a perversion.

The "maternal aetiology" linked to fetishism in 1909 was part of the overall evolution of Freud's work[63] (Freud 1907a, 36; 1908d, 238; 1909b, 97). In the context of *On the Genesis of Fetishism*, Freud claims that the roots of fetishism are in the child's love overvaluation for his parents. The concept of (sexual) overvaluation plays a central role in Freud's theorization of 1909. Freud then adapts the model of reminiscence in hysteria. He states: "A large number of cases prove to be reminiscences, along the model of the mechanism of hysteria––reminiscences of earlier, perhaps normal affects of love. (…). As 'fetishes', they are (…) direct reminiscences of beloved persons". (Freud 1909a, 153).

Freud admits that the model of the fetish as a reminiscence of the beloved person's characteristics cannot be applied in cases of genuinely perverse pathology: "It is otherwise in cases that genuinely deserve the name fetishism. We cannot suppose that they are reminiscences; neither can we account for them as a prerequisite for love.

[63] In 1907, he had already discussed the return of repressed erotic feelings from childhood connected to the love for the mother (Freud 1907a, 36). Later, in 1908, Freud had argued that the influence of sex in the child's life is more inclined towards the mother (1908d, 238). Furthermore, in *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy*, he emphasized that the intentions of the five-year-old boy (little Hans) were to enjoy the love of his mother alone. Here, Freud's remarks on the love of the child for the mother led him to describe little Hans as a 'little Oedipus' (1909b, 97).

The speaker would like now to attempt a clarification of these puzzling cases" (Freud 1909a, 153). In addressing these "puzzling cases", Freud, more than ever, carries out the methodological idea described by Binet in his *Fetishism in Love*, that is, drawing attention to childhood events to find the origin of the fetish. In 1909, insofar as Freud addresses problems in his theory of (infantile) sexuality left unresolved in *Three Essays*, here Freud assumes that the search for a sexual object takes place in childhood.

Freud then presented a case of a male[64] clothes-fetishist patient whose sexual interest in women was displaced (*verschoben*) onto female clothing (Freud 1909a, 154). Freud describes the patient's early sexual recollections of routinely watching his mother undress (1909a, 154). Here, Freud states that mother and son had begun to live in an atmosphere of physical intimacy, and thus, the mother fell in love with her son. Further, he points out that in this intimate setting of mother–son love, there was no oversight of the mother's behaviour, no one to reproach her (Freud 1909a, 154). Freud claims that the outcome of the child's interest (stemming from the scenes of his mother undressing) was voyeurism. After the groundwork for the patient's adult voyeuristic tendencies had been set in his childhood, his sexual inclination towards voyeurism—and towards his mother—were repressed. Thus, the fact that the patient became a clothes fetishist was a result of repression (Freud 1909a, 154).

Yet in view of the problematization that I am developing in this chapter, this shows, once again, that fetishism cannot be a perversion. On the contrary, given that fetishism results from the repression of a perverse tendency (voyeurism), Freud theorizes fetishism through the model of neurosis. This also shows that, in 1909, Freud does not connect the childhood memories that form the origin of the fetish

64 In *On the Genesis of Fetishism*, Freud (1909a) also discussed the role of clothing in female fetishism. He stated: "This explanation of clothes fetishism is actually no novelty. In the world of everyday experience, we can observe that half of humanity must be classed among the clothes fetishists. All women, that is, are clothes fetishists. Dress plays a puzzling role in them. It is a question again of the repression of the same drive, this time, however, in the passive form of allowing oneself to be seen, which is repressed by clothes, and on account of which, clothes are raised to a fetish. Only now we understand why even the most intelligent women behave defencelessly against the demands of fashion. For them, clothes take the place of parts of the body, and to wear the same clothes means only to be able to show what the others can show, means only that one can find in her everything that one can expect from women, an assurance which the woman can give only in this form. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible why many women, following the demands of fashion, also want to wear, and do wear, pieces of clothing which do not show them to their best advantage, which do not suit them" (Freud 1909a, 155–6).

to the infantile sexual theories (fantasies)[65] presented in 1908—the neglect of sexual difference and the fear of castration. In contrast, in 1909 Freud emphasizes that during the undressing scenes, it was the mother's nudity that interested the patient as a child. He adds that the moment when the mother's underpants fell was most interesting to the child, because of his interest in her nudity (Freud 1909a, 155). However, Freud does not explain in detail why, afterwards, there was a repression of inclination toward the mother's nudity. Here, he claims that the underpants somehow became the most important piece of clothing for the patient because of a displacement of his interest from the mother's nudity to the underpants (Freud 1909a, 154–5).

When Freud fails in his attempt to apply the model of reminiscence to understanding fetishism, what is his corrective strategy? We see Freud once again relating to fetishism another concept from his theory of neurosis. Thus, Freud attempted an explanation via the mechanism of repression of the drives (*Triebverdrängung*) (1909a, 155). Before 1909, in Freud's (1907a, 34) previous exploration of fetishism, the psychopathological relevance of the concept of repression was connected to the forgetting of childhood impressions. Conversely, at the scientific meeting in 1909, Freud applied the mechanism of repression to the development of the innate components of the sexual drive. Thus, by trying to find an explanation for fetishism, Freud's described a specific type of repression involving fetishism (Freud 1909a,155). As a child, the patient was interested in his mother's nakedness during her undressing scenes. However, repression came after childhood; the patlent repressed his sexual inclination towards his mother—as well as his drive to look (*Sehtrieb*) and the pleasure he once took in looking (*Schaulust*) (Freud 1909a, 155). As with other defensive neurotic symptoms, the mechanism of repression is responsible for the displacement of the patient's interest in his unclothed mother onto the clothes that fell to the floor in his remembered scenes of her undressing.

[65] After Freud's presentation, Stekel gave a report of a foot fetishist case and referred to his patients' phantasies. However, Freud (1909a, 158–9) did not comment on phantasies in his reply to Stekel. Also after Freud's presentation, Isidor Sadger asked if the pigtail could not perhaps have served as a penis symbol, being similar to fingers in the case of glove fetishism (Freud 1909a, 162). However, Freud did not comment on the matter. Only the following year of 1910, in Freud's essay, *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, Freud claimed that the fixation on the object that was once strongly desired, the woman's penis, leaves indelible traces on the mental life of the child (1910, 96). Here, Freud argued that the fetish-like worship (*fetischartige Verehrung*) of the feminine foot and shoe takes the foot as a substitutive symbol for the once worshiped (*verehrte*) penis of the woman (Freud 1910, 96).

Here, Freud again faced the question that lingered in *Three Essays*: how to explain sexual overvaluation in fetishism. He acknowledged that the patient's interest in the fetish object does not stem from normal love-affects for their parents. Considering the material that Freud had available on the patient's childhood memories, the model of reminiscence presented at the beginning of the scientific meeting cannot explain why the overvaluation was not suddenly or unexpectedly (*plötzlich*) (1909a, 155) directed at the parents (the mother), but was instead directed at artificial objects. In the context of my argument in this dissertation, we must ask ourselves: how does Freud attempt to answer this question? Here, Freud developed a specific mechanism of splitting involving the concepts of idealization and sublimation. Below, I will discuss the ways in which this demonstrates that Freud again employs the concept of splitting—evident in his early references to Binet—to engage in an understanding of fetishism.

According to Freud, as a consequence of repression, the individual places a high value (*Hochschatzung*) on the element that becomes the fetish. Freud adds that the displacement of this patient's interest in his unclothed mother onto her clothes explains why the patient worships (*verehrt*) clothes in adulthood (Freud 1909a,155). Consequently, Freud connects repression to the notion of splitting (*Spaltung*) (1909a, 155), asserting that repression was initiated through a splitting of particular elements of infantile sexuality. In this case, the patient's love for his mother and the elements in the undressing scenes with the mother became linked to childhood voyeurism.

According to Freud, the case history allows for the description of a type of repression through splitting in which parts of the elements from the childhood complex are repressed, while another part is idealized. Consequently, the idealized part rises to the status of a fetish (Freud 1909a,155). Freud states: "And we are aware that, here, a repression of instinct, which is already known to us from other cases, has happened––a type of repression which is instituted by the splitting of the complex. A portion is genuinely repressed, while the other portion is idealized––what, in our case, is specifically raised to a fetish". (Freud 1909a, 155).

Freud adds that this same patient exhibited yet a second perversion (1909a, 156)—he was also a boot fetishist. Here, Freud used the concept of sublimation to explain the fetish. He points out that the repression of the drives holds an intermediary position between complete repression and sublimation (1909a, 156). He further claims that 'perverse' impulses (*'perverse' Regungen*) play a major role in childhood as important sources of pleasure (Freud 1909a, 156). In this case history, Freud describes the patient as having had a childhood habit of digging between his toes, causing

them to emit a strong-smelling secretion. As a child, he also recollected experiences of anal erotism[66]. Specifically, Freud describes the patient as having worked his finger into his anus, after which he smelled his finger (1909a, 156). According to Freud, the case history shows that after childhood, through the mechanism of splitting, on component of anal erotism (the pleasure derived from odours) was suppressed, while an odourless object (the foot) was idealized. This was Freud's argument for the existence of a partial repression of the perverse impulse explained via the concepts of idealization and sublimation[67]. (1909a, 156).

Considering Freud's crucial argument of overvaluation in fetishism, in 1909 he expected that a theory of sublimation and idealization would yield an answer to the problem of fetishism. As discussed, Freud's concept of sublimation implies a modification of the aim of the sexual drive to other non-sexual purposes. This means that sublimation implies a process of desexualization. On the subject of idealization, scholars remark that in Freud's works, the idealization of the object denotes both an alteration of the object in terms of its aggrandizement and a reification of its image (Rocha 2010, 301–2; Spruiell 1979, 785). As in sublimation, the idealized modification of the object consequently leads to overvaluation, exaltation, and veneration, as a means of an inhibited sexual satisfaction from the object (Spruiell 1979, 779). Considering the desexualization process present in both concepts, it is arguable that sublimation is a form of idealization.

In 1909, to reinforce his claim, Freud linked the idealized consequence of the high valuation of the fetish to the religious term "worship", citing an example from Christianity[68]. He states: "One needs only to remember an instance of such repression in world history. As the Middle Ages began to repress sensuality and to degrade women, it was only possible to do so with the simultaneous idealization of the mother as the Virgin Mary". (Freud 1909a, 155). This prompts a follow-up question: Why does Freud believe that idealization and sublimation are helpful to understanding fetishism?

66 Here again, secondary literature highlights Freud's elaborations as the birth of his theory of partial repression and Freud's "anal theory of fetishism", but such studies do not aim at the context of Freud's attempts for solving theoretical issues nor his strong engagement with Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas aimed at such resolutions (Rey-Flaud 1994, 28).

67 In his work from the previous year, *Character and Anal Erotism*, Freud (1908g) already applied the concept of sublimation to vicissitudes in the development of anal erotism. Freud mostly explored the link between anal erotism and obsessional neurosis. According to Freud (1908g, 171), during the course of the development of anal erotism, only a part of it is present in sexual life while another part is sublimated—that is, deflected from sexual aims and directed towards other aims.

68 Here, it is noteworthy that the idea that sexuality plays a fundamental role in the development of human culture is a central idea in *Psychopathia Sexualis*, where Krafft-Ebing insisted that sexuality was the main natural drive responsible for cultural development, religion, and art (1893a, 6–12).

Arguably, Freud's explanation of fetishism in terms of the overvaluation of an object entails the object being elevated from the banal object to the more mysterious / religious, as in the case of the worship of the Virgin Mary. Freud also provides the example of a lower-level intellectual activity transforming into a higher-level intellectual process related to the object, as he explains in *Delusions and Dreams* (Rocha 2010, 292). I will further integrate this thinking in the context of this dissertation's problematic.

In discussing Freud's concepts and his works, Jacques Lacan theorized about the object of human desire by deploying Freud's ideas on sublimation, idealization, and drive, for example. According to Lacan's theory, the human subject is not attracted to the intrinsic qualities of the object itself. Rather, Lacan claims that, ultimately, human desire cannot be fully represented in any object. Lacan (1959-60, 83) argues that in satisfying the drive, human desire remains unrepresentable. Thus, the subject's desire depends on something that goes beyond the inherent properties of the object, what Lacan named, "the Thing" (la Chose) or Das Ding, in Freud's terminology. In this sense, in his Seminar VII, "The Ethics of Psychoanalysis", Lacan associates his ideas about the object of human desire with the concept of sublimation: "Thus, the most general formula that I can give you of sublimation is the following: it raises an object (. . .) to the dignity of the Thing" (Lacan 1959-60, 133). Here, Lacan argues that sublimation comprises the overvaluation of an object above its typical value. Through such elevation, the object reaches the level of the non-representative lack of human desire, that is, the object acquires the dignity of the Thing. Lacan scholars (Moyaert 2004, 56, 70; Rey-Flaud 1994, 95-100) posit a connection between Freud's elaborations on fetishism in On the Genesis of Fetishism and Lacan's formulations on sublimation. However, by undertaking a systematic study of fetishism in Freud's work, I propose that, in 1909, Freud uses sublimation to explain the origin of the fetish object and its overvaluation—not to explain the object of human desire. After 1909, Freud did not elaborate substantially on the concept of sublimation; as such, he did not relate sublimation to fetishism.

By arguing in 1909 that the concepts of idealization and sublimation (partial repression) imply desexualization—and that both concepts help to understand fetishism— Freud introduced a new problem into his evolving theory of fetishism. After all, fetishism is clearly a sexual activity. This is clear in the case history of clothes and boot fetishism that Freud presented at the scientific meeting. In fact, after presenting this case study, Freud proceeds to apply to other pathological cases of fetishism the same splitting mechanism of repression through sublimation and idealization.

First, Freud (1909a, 157) deploys his notion of partial repression by means of sublimation and idealization in examples of foot fetishism[69]. Here, Freud does not identify the pervert's relationship to the fetish object as anything other than sexual in nature. This makes it clear that his evolving idea of fetishism challenged Freud's theoretical framework: while the odourless foot is indeed idealized, the foot fetishist's overvaluation of the object is a sexual—rather than a desexualized—idealization. Subsequently, Freud (1909a, 157) applies the same notion of partial repression to a pathological case of hand-fetishism described by Krafft-Ebing. Again, the problem here is that instead of the hand being a desexualized object—the object of aesthetic appreciation or scientific curiosity, for example—the hand is the sexually overvalued object.

Later, Freud (1909a, 158) went on to affirm that the assumption he made in his characterization of partial repression confirms the positive aspect of fetishism in the perversions. This enabled Freud to show how, in line with Krafft-Ebing's idea, the perverse impulses manifest a graduation that is conditioned by the clinical index of disgust. Here, Freud gives an example of the kind of foot fetishist that prefers to lick prostitutes' dirty feet: "The chief confirmation of the description which has been given lies in the positive aspect of fetishism, in the perversions. Thus, for example, it [has been] long known from perverse foot fetishists that they prefer to single out for themselves a young prostitute with quite dirty feet, which they then lick. Here the suppressed drive of disgust is striking" (Freud 1909a, 158). Freud acknowledges the variability of foot fetishists being either disgusted or aroused by dirty feet or odourless feet. Freud also acknowledges that, in the act of overvaluing female feet, the foot fetish does not represent a deflected sexual aim, as implied by the concepts of sublimation and idealization; rather, the foot fetishist engages in an explicitly sexual activity.

As fetishism acquired the status of a neurotic symptom, Freud wondered whether fetishism could be understood without considering repression (Freud 1909a, 161). Furthermore, unlike his theory in Three Essays, Freud's central argument in 1909 was that in adult cases of fetishism, the infantile anal erotism was directed towards an object. In his presentation, Freud asked, "Does not repression belong to impotence, and is there also fetishism without repression? Or if the instinct to smell had not been directed toward an object which later was to be repressed, would

[69] Freud argues that, in childhood, adult foot fetishists derived enjoyment from foul-smelling foot secretions. Thus, in foot fetishism, via the mechanism of partial repression, the pleasure from odours is suppressed, while the odourless foot is idealized (Freud 1909a, 157). According to Freud, with the suppression of the pleasure derived from odours and the consequent idealization of the foot, the odour itself is no longer an issue, and it does not carry a negative charge. Freud was led to conclude that in foot fetishism, one finds a lost perverse pleasure; splitting serves to separate the direct object from the infantile drive of smelling secretions, giving rise to the fetish (Freud 1909a, 157).

there have been no precondition for a fetish?"[70] (Freud 1909a, 161). At the end of his presentation, Freud concludes that fetishism required him to rethink his own theory of repression—and to assume the existence of various types of repression in this context (Freud 1909a, 158). "After what has been said, it is probable that it is actually the solution to fetishism Insofar as it expresses itself in the pathological form to which we have called special attention: suppression of instinct, partial repression, and elevation of a portion of the repressed complex to an ideal." (Freud 1909a, 157–8).

So far in this chapter, we have seen that Freud was led to understand fetishism by applying the component concepts in his theory of neuroses. At this juncture, it is important to problematize Freud's other attempts to devise solutions to this conceptual problem.

Did the concepts of sublimation and / or idealization lead Freud to an explanation of fetishism? Arguably, these concepts remained loosely defined in Freud's writings (Spruiell 1979, 777–8, 790). After all, in his later texts, Freud hardly returned to the issues of either sublimation or idealization. Freud's *On the Genesis of Fetishism* is the only work in which he undertook such a theorization. Freud closed his 1909 presentation by stating that fetishism certainly posed an enigma (*das Rätsel des Fetischismus*) to be solved (1909a, 158). Freud states: "If five or six more similar observations of fetishism, reducible to infantile impulses in the way indicated, are brought forward, then we will have solved the riddle of fetishism". (Freud 1909a, 158). As we will see, fetishism remained a riddle for Freud; in his later work, neither sublimation nor idealization appear as mechanisms through which he can understand fetishism[71]. In the following section, I will continue to problematize Freud's challenges to his theory of fetishism.

[70] According to the minutes of his presentation in February 24, 1909, this statement was Freud's reply to Federn's comment that in all cases of fetishism, the individual in question always shows, along with it, the always complex psychoneurotic symptoms of repression (Freud 1909a, 161). In the same year of 1909, in his discussion of the case history in *Notes Upon A Case of Obsessional Neurosis*, Freud (1909c) made comments about anal erotism and its relationship to infantile coprophilic inclinations and the olfactory sense. When arguing on the topic of the role of the drives that are related to anal erotism in the lives of obsessional neurotics, Freud (1909c, 247) added a footnote, in which he connected this discussion to the role of pleasure derived from smells (*Riechlust*) and fetishism. Freud remarked that the patient was a renifleur (*Riecher*) during his childhood (1909c, 247). According to him, as a child, the patient developed strong coprophilic tendencies connected to his anal erotism (Freud 1909c, 247). Freud compared such a situation to fetishism, writing in a footnote: 'For instance, in certain forms of fetishism' (Freud 1909c, 247).

[71] Considering Freud's theoretical developments after *On the Genesis of Fetishism*, he added a footnote in the 1910 edition of *Three Essays* addressing the role of coprophilic pleasure at the basis of the choice of the fetish. However, here Freud made no mention of sublimation neither idealization. Despite having expressed his hesitation and uncertainty to confirm his developments in 1909, in the 1910 footnote Freud wrote that psychoanalysis had cleared up one of the remaining gaps in the understanding of fetishism. This solution was owed to his theory of the role of olfactory sensation in the choice of a fetish (Freud, 1905c, 155).

3.5 The Role of the Fetish in Totem and Taboo

In this section, I will discuss Freud's next problem in his investigation of fetishism: the role of religious fetishism in his book *Totem and Taboo*, published in 1913. Consistent with the problematic of this dissertation, my argument is that in 1913, the phenomenon of fetishism presents a theoretical challenge to Freud in his attempt to apply the Oedipus complex to religious fetishism. Since 1910, Freud had elaborated the concept of the Oedipus complex. This concerns a phase in childhood psychosexual development in which a child responds to the parents' affection with sexual excitation, subsequently experiencing parents as the objects of erotic wishes (Freud 1910b, 47). This phase of childhood psychosexual development also includes the child's hostile feelings towards the parents. In detailing the concept of the Oedipus complex, Freud assumes that the infant has an interest in objects (people). In reference to infantile sexual theories, Freud conceptualized the Castration complex as the infantile feeling of the threat of punishment in the form of the loss of one's penis. As previously discussed, this is experienced by the child after he observes the anatomical difference between the sexes. In the context of *Totem and Taboo*, the castration threat implies the child's partial renunciation of masturbation and the child's abandonment of his Oedipal desires (1913a, 130). This fact is central to my argument in this section: Freud's examination of the Oedipus complex—as well as the Castration complex—in *Totem and Taboo* positions human sexuality as being directed towards an object. In this context, I will now discuss Freud's theoretical obstacles of 1913 as a consequence of his ongoing effort to argue for the existence of the fetish object in childhood—after his initial idea, in *Three Essays*, that infantile sexuality lacks an object.

Arguably, however, Freud did not further develop his view of religious fetishism in *Totem and Taboo*; he simply could not formulate a theory of religious fetishism that was in line with that of fetishist perversion—a theory formulated as early as 1913. This implies that religious fetishism and sexual fetishism only appear to be similar, given that both categories of fetishist worship an object that is elevated, idealized, or overvalued[72]. Nor can religious fetishism be connected to two other tenets set out by Freud in *Totem and Taboo*: the substitution of the father within a patriarchal system (1913a, 141), and the Oedipal version of the role of the father in the pre-history of human culture (1913a, 128).

[72] In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1913a, 15, 88-9) employed the concept of sexual overvaluation (*Sexualüberschatzung*), but he did not connect this concept to objects. Instead, Freud employed sexual overvaluation to understand why and how both primitive people and neurotics attach a high valuation to psychical acts, and how the process of thinking is sexualized to a great extent (1913a, 15, 88-9). Here, without a detailed explanation, Freud claimed that the beliefs of primitive people and neurotics in the omnipotence of thoughts originates in sexual overvaluation. In both cases, overvaluation is also the source of unshakable confidence in the ability to control the world (Freud 1913a, 88-9).

One may ask, then, how Freud solves this problem in 1913. I maintain that in *Totem and Taboo*, Freud was careful not to focus on fetishism (1913a, 103). This stipulation about Freud's intention supports the idea—articulated by Freud himself—that fetishism posed a challenge to Freud's conceptual framework. Below, I explore why Freud chose not to elaborate on fetishism in *Totem and Taboo*. To do so, I will problematize Freud's belief in the impossibility of positing an Oedipal theory of fetishism in the context of the development of his psychoanalytic theory. in fact, in the specialized literature on which Freud relied in 1913, he found no evidence of a link between fetishism and (Oedipal) parental figures.

Placing the Oedipus and Castration complexes at the centre of his reasoning in *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1913a, 130) claims the two complexes form the core of all neuroses—and that these complexes comprise the foundation of culture and religion (Freud 1913a, 129–30). However, as of 1913, Freud had not devised an integrated theory of fetishism. The same holds true for his concept of the Oedipus complex. Thus, the passing reference that Freud makes to religious fetishism in *Totem and Taboo* supports the idea that by 1913, he still lacked an Oedipal theory of fetishism. As I will detail below, this is because: 1) here, Freud links the belief in objects to the replacement and overvaluation of people—and not to objects that qualify as fetishes, such as body parts or artificial objects; and 2) unlike Freud's previous theory, in which he understood fetishism to concern a sexual overvaluation of objects of the opposite sex, Freud's 1913 theorization posited a non-sexualized overvaluation of the father figure.

In contending that the Oedipus and Castration complexes ground the creation of culture and religion, Freud (1913a, 18) explores the anthropological notion of taboo. This entails the so-called primitive prohibitions imposed by an authority and directed against human desires. In *Totem and Taboo* Freud highlights the process of object-choice by advancing an anthropological and psychological theory that compares the primitive worship of inanimate objects to the mental life of neurotic patients. Freud (1913a, 109) points out that the taboo's peculiar magical power can be transmitted through an inanimate object; he also describes how so-called primitive groups endow inanimate objects with human characteristics[73] (Freud 1913a, 75).

[73] Here, Freud discussed how the protective formulas (*Schutzformeln*) of obsessional neuroses (Freud 1913a, 87) have their counterpart in the defensive measures (*Abwehrmaßregeln*) of the so-called "savages". These measures are manifested in their respect for the taboo's inanimate objects (Freud 1913a, 13, 28, 35.

In 1913, to articulate the Oedipus and Castration complexes as the basis of neurosis, culture, and religion, Freud considers the link between primitive beliefs in objects and a child's love towards his/her parents from a psychological and anthropological standpoint. Here, he argues that the child's love for their parents is an incestuous desire (Freud 1913a, 17). In this context, Freud asserts that the defence against incestuous desires is comparable to the taboo's power manifested in inanimate objects. According to Freud (1913a, 19), the taboo of inanimate objects protects unborn babies and young children against the consequences of certain actions as well as against harm, dangers, and the wrath or power of gods and spirits. Hence, incestuous desires dominate children's relationship with their parents—and form the backbone of neurosis. It is precisely here that Freud engages with the literature of religious studies and anthropology to discuss the cultural function of the father and the prohibition against incest (Freud 1913a, 5, 128-9).

In Freud's discussion of the anthropological literature in *Totem and Taboo* (1913a, 103), he mentions religious fetishism. He emphasizes that adoration of inanimate objects has historically been an aspect of a psychological theory and, as such, persists in modern life through superstitions, beliefs, speech, and philosophy. (Freud 1913a, 77). Before 1913 (as discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation), Freud first compares the worship of the "savage" and of the perverse fetishist in *Three Essays* with regard to sexual overvaluation in fetishism. Of the literature on this subject that Freud studied, the work of Max Müller (1878) appears to be his main reference for religious fetishism (Binet 1888a, 1; Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 12). On the one hand, Müller views fetishism as a primitive form of religion connected to an object; on the other hand, Müller contends that no religion consists of fetishism alone (1878, 216). As such, fetishism is not related to any patriarchal system or organized system of beliefs. Consequently, Müller doubts that fetishism could be seen as a form of religion (1878, 216).

Freud was likely aware of the debate addressed in Müller's work (via Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's references to fetishism). In the literature that Freud refers to in *Totem and Taboo*, however, religious fetishism is perceived as perhaps the most primitive form of religion (1913a, 47, 103). In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud distinguishes between totems and fetishes; in doing so, he draws on the work of the anthropologist James George Frazer. Freud (1913a, 103) asserts that the totem denotes an organized class of objects connected to animals or plants. The fetish, in contrast, involves individual

inanimate and artificial objects chosen in random and superstitious circumstances[74]. In his exploration of the anthropological role of the father in *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1913a, 132–9) also discusses William Robertson Smith's work; Freud delves into the totemic-meal thesis and the clan's replacement of the horde[75]. Smith (1889, 192–3) considers fetishism to be a lower kind of worship and a vague concept. As part of his anthropological examination of the father figure, Freud also refers to James Atkinson's work from 1903, *Primal Law*, which contains the idea that patriarchal systems end with the initial rebellion of offspring and the eventual devouring of the patriarch (Freud 1913a, 126, 142). Atkinson (1903, 148), too, characterized fetishism in opposition to totemism in a similar way to Frazer.

What can we conclude from Freud's review of the aforementioned literature? The theory of fetishism found in this literature does not include the idea that the fetish replaces the father, nor does it relate fetishism to a patriarchal system; rather, fetishism in this context is considered it to be an overvaluation of material objects. The literature Freud mentions in 1913 also considers the fetish object to be chosen on an individual basis. This choice is driven by individual superstitions, arbitrarily assigned to objects; there are neither rules nor classification systems. The individual selects the fetish object as an exception and overvalues it spontaneously, without explanation. Following the problematization in this section, one can now see that Freud fails to find in the literature any evidence for linking fetishism to parental (Oedipal) figures.

Freud, in his theory of human sexuality outlined in *Three Essays*, views the stages of polymorphous, perverse sexuality, and autoerotism as the primary stage of development; these stages are succeeded by a phase during which an object is chosen (1913a, 88). As the most primitive form of religion, religious fetishism can be aligned with the primary stage of psychosexual development. Quixotically, Freud did not point out this alignment in *Totem and Taboo*. Instead, Freud was more focused

74 In some examples given by Frazer of individual totems, he reaffirms his proposed distinction between different types of totems and fetishes. For instance, in describing a Central American tribe totem, he stated that "sometimes the okkis or manitoos […] are not totems but fetishes [fetishes], being not classes of objects but individual objects" (Frazer, 1887, 56). Furthermore, Frazer commented on the totem of a people from Mota in the Banks Islands called *tamaniu*. This totem is generally an animal but can sometimes be a stone. Again, Frazer made a distinction: "But as the *tamaniu* seems to be an individual object, it is a fetish rather than a totem" (1887, 56). He also showed that fetishes are isolated individually and represented by the circumstances that make the object seem superstitious (Frazer, 1887, 56).

75 Freud referred to Smith's *The Religion of the Semites*, originally published in 1889, in which Smith examined fetish worship when dealing with the matter of worshiping sacred stones. (1889, 192–3).

on the role of the father; accordingly, he introduced an Oedipal version of the pre-history of human culture. In this sense, in 1913 totemism—rather than fetishism—was more appropriate for Freud's theory of sexuality.

In 1913, Freud placed the Oedipus and Castration complexes at the centre of his reasoning, and he approached the totemic system in relation to the substitution of persons (1913a, 87): in *Totem and Taboo*, the totem replaces the father (Freud 1913a, 129–30). By comparing the role of the father in the so-called primitive beliefs to the mental lives of neurotic patients, Freud applied the framework of the Oedipus complex to the religious- studies literature on totemism. Given this, I argue that Freud could not use religious fetishism to claim that the fetish replaces the father. The first disqualifying fact concerns the father-son relationship in *Totem and Taboo*; this cannot be characterized as sexually fetishistic. As late as 1913, Freud had described cases of fetishism in which the sexual overvaluation is of an object of the opposite sex, that is, a male person who overvalues a female object (part of the female body or an object of clothing belonging to the woman). In contrast, in Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, the anthropological or religious elevation of the father to a totem does not concern merely a part of the father. In this sense, it doesn't fit the concept of fetishism. The second disqualifying fact also concerns the father-son relationship, which is based on fear and respect. The father functions as the prohibition against incest, therefore representing the fundamental symbolic pact and rules that constitute society (Freud 1913a, 5, 128-9). This overvaluation and elevation of the father to a totem is not a sexualization of an object. According to the religious-studies literature referenced by Freud in 1913, religious fetishism is not connected to the idea of a system of substitution. Thus, his previous thinking on fetishism did not align with his theoretical undertaking in this book.

In this section, I have discussed how, as early as 1913, fetishism presented a problem for Freud's overall psychoanalytic theory. In the following section, I pursue the next steps in my argument in this dissertation: the very next year, 1914, Freud once again turns to fetishism in attempting a new theorization. This clearly supports this dissertation's line of argument; we see that in order to solve these problems, Freud makes a definitive return to evolving Binet's ideas on fetishism.

3.6 Freud's Development of Binet's Theory of Childhood Trauma

On March 11, 1914, Freud presented another paper on fetishism to the scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society[76]. According to the minutes of the meeting, this was a shorter presentation compared to that of 1909. Freud elaborated on the case of his 47-year-old male patient who was a foot fetishist (Freud, 1914a, 243). This patient experienced "psychic [sexual] impotence" linked to his fetish. Freud had tried to treat the patient's fetishism for a short time, but to no avail[77].

The question remains: why did Freud decide to present yet another case of fetishism after 1909?

As I argued in the previous section, Freud, in *Totem and Taboo*, could not integrate religious fetishism into his evolving conceptualization of the Oedipus and the Castration complexes. In *A Case of Foot Fetishism*[78], Freud relies on Binet's theory as he begins to theorize about fetishism by deploying the Castration complex. In the scientific meeting of 1914, Freud evolves Binet's idea that fetishism is caused by a sexual impression. Freud argues that this is the impression of sexual difference; he develops Binet's idea of early impression in childhood into a traumatic sexual impression (Freud 1914a, 244). In his continuous shift from his theoretical framework first developed in the aetiology of neurosis to that of fetishism, *A Case of Foot Fetishism*

[76] The minutes of Freud's presentation provide the following list of attendees: Sigmund Freud, Paul Federn, Joseph Karl Friedjung, Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, Eduard Hitschmann, Ludwig Jekels, Karl Landauer, Richard Nepallek, Otto Rank, Hanns Sachs, Isidor Sadger, Herbert Silberer, Maxim Steiner, Victor Tausk, Edoardo Weiss, Karl Weiss, Paul Friedman, and Karl Kraus (1914a, 243).

[77] One year prior, in 1913, Freud addressed the topic of applying psychoanalytic treatment to perversion. In the scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, dated April 9, 1913, Freud made remarks about the therapy of perverts after Isidor Sadger had presented a case of perversion in the meeting and stated the following. "On the therapy of perverts—namely that it is not the true field of psychoanalytic work. It is only unhappy perverts (*unglücklichen Perversen*) who can be considered for analysis; the task of analysis can be performed in the undoing of the perversion. In the majority of cases, however, analysis has reconciled the individuals to their perversions (*mit ihrer Perversion zufrieden zu machen*): it is not the task of analysis to make people normal, but to make them harmonious and to solve their conflict" (Freud 1913b, 186). Here, his remarks are in service of the overall problematic of this dissertation in terms of his engagement with sexual perversions as distinguished from the attempt to moralize or criminalize sexual pathologies. Freud's emphasis on the task of psychoanalytic treatment concerning perversion as opposed to turning perversion to normality and aiming to make perverts happy with their perversion is clear evidence that Freud conceived perversion not as a moral category nor connected to moral or legal issues. I will indicate in the next chapter of this dissertation that Freud occupied himself with this topic in his later concerns with fetishism.

[78] In terms of where my argument can be positioned in the debate about Freud's theory on fetishism, the secondary literature on this topic does not discuss Freud's explicit reference to Binet in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, nor does it mention how Freud develops Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas in his paper (Rey-Flaud 1994, 204; Assoun 1994, 70-1).

depicts fetishism no longer as a matter of sublimation, nor of sexual overvaluation, but as a defensive structure. Up to this point in the narrative of my problematization, I have presented valid reasons to support the claim of this dissertation that fetishism did not suit Freud's theory of perversion. Bearing in mind that in his earlier psychoanalytic theory Freud saw neurosis and perversion as opposites, below I will discuss how, Freud came to understand fetishism as a defence—and no longer saw it as the opposite of neurosis—in his psychoanalytic theory.

In 1914, Freud shifted focus in exploring the precondition (*Bedingung*) of fetishism. Previously, in 1909, Freud adhered to Krafft-Ebing's idea that the fetish is a sexual precondition of the fetishist's sexual potency. However, in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, Freud focuses on the notion of precondition to clarify the constitutional and accidental facts of sexual development that are required for any culmination of perversion in adulthood. This context highlights Freud's commitment to evolving Binet's ideas: Freud asserts that the constitutional and accidental preconditions (*akzidentellen Bedingungen*) found in the case history provide the basis of Binet's aetiological ideas about fetishism. Thus, intending to argue that the early childhood sexual impressions at the origin of fetishism can be considered traumatic experiences, Freud (1914a, 244) coined the phrase "Binet's childhood trauma" (*Binetschen 'Kindheitstrauma'*). In this context, he states the following in his 1914 presentation: "The case in question is that of a 47-year-old foot fetishist with psychic impotence who was treated for a short time but without success. His peculiar traits made it possible to cast a new light onto the genesis of this perversion, and to point out the constitutional and accidental preconditions of this attitude. These are at the bottom of Binet's 'childhood trauma,' which shows the perversion already fixated" (Freud, 1914a, 224-225). This quote clearly demonstrates that, by adopting Binet's ideas, Freud is able to make an assumption not yet available to him when he articulated his theory in *Three Essays*—namely, he was able to assume the existence of fetishism in scotomizd.

Given that my argument references Freud's use of different clinical and theoretical models to explore fetishism, I will now detail the differences in Freud's approach to his psychoanalytic case histories of fetishism up to this point. Previously, Freud's (1909) case study aimed to investigate: (1) how fetishism is a result of sexual pleasure stemming from constituents of the anal perverse disposition of the sexual drive; and (2) how fetishism is linked to individual parts of the female body—or to specific pieces of female clothing. This case study also led Freud to examine the transition from the normal to the pathological in fetishism. Now, given the focus of this section, I will examine the changes in Freud's theorization in his 1914 psychoanalytic case history of fetishism.

In the 1914 case study, relying on his psychoanalytic investigations into the patient's sexual development, Freud establishes explanations for the origin of perversions in general, and for foot fetishism in particular. He articulates two major points with regards to sexual development: erotogenicity (*Erogenität*) and sexual intimidation (*Sexualeinschüchterung*) (Freud, 1914a, 244). First, Freud claims that the erotogenic aspect of the patient's sexual development is responsible for his selection of the foot as a sexual object (*den Fuss zum Objekt genommen*) (Freud, 1914a, 244). Freud argues that during the patient's childhood, the foot carried an excessive erotogenic charge. Freud applies his early aetiological ideas of sexual stimulation (seduction) and heredity, which he had developed in 1896 and 1897. In his letters to Fließ, Freud had already postulated—in an explicit reference to Krafft-Ebing's idea—that the experience of sexual stimulation in childhood could retain its erotogenic force. This led to perversions instead of neuroses (1895, 223, 279). In his 1914 paper, Freud claims that the patient had experienced early, abnormal sexual stimulation (*Sexualreizung*) from the mother, who was herself sexually abnormal (*der sexuell selbst stark abnormen Mutter*) (Freud, 1914a, 244). This fact supports my argument in this dissertation in two ways. First, in rehabilitating his earlier theory of seduction, Freud clearly reverts to his predecessors' ideas about the origin of perversion. Freud does so here in his ongoing effort to build his psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. Second, given the continual challenges presented by fetishism, Freud must renew his earlier conceptualization of the neuroses. I will address this below.

After discussing the erotogenic component, Freud addresses the issue of sexual intimidation, asserting that in childhood, sexual intimidation was responsible for disturbing the patient's sexual development by fixating his perversion (1914a, 244). Here, Freud describes sexual intimidation in the patient's childhood in terms of castration threats originating from his father, as well as from the sight of his sister's genitals. In this context, Freud references a particular scene in which the patient saw his sister's genitals: she was wearing leg splints because she was afflicted with rickets. According to Freud, this scene gave rise to the foot fetish and became an ideal source of excitation (1914a, 244). In the coming paragraphs, I will detail Freud's theoretical manoeuvre on the topic of sexual intimidation.

To apprehend the phenomenon of sexual intimidation, Freud interpreted Binet's ideas about fetishism and trauma theory by relating the concept of trauma to the notion of early- childhood impressions[79]. Freud (1914) highlights two traumatic scenes: one during the patient's childhood, and another during the patient's puberty. Freud uses the term "traumatic scene" (*traumatische Szene*) to denote the trauma as related to the events remembered by the patient (Freud, 1914a, 244). Freud interprets the traumatic scenes as terrifying experiences (*große Abschreckung*) (1914a, 244), noting that the first traumatic scene occurred when the patient was six years old. In this scene, Freud associates the notion of trauma with the patient's intense interest in his English governess's foot (Freud, 1914a, 244). In the minutes of *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, there is no detailed description of what happened in this scene. Nevertheless, according to Freud, this traumatic scene remained latent until puberty.

Continuing with his notion of "Binet's childhood trauma", Freud (1914a, 244) outlines the second traumatic scene, in which during sexual intercourse in puberty, the patient became extremely frightened upon seeing the female genitals.

How does Freud's development of Binet's idea serve to advance the theory of sexuality elaborated in *Three Essays*? Freud, in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, shows clinical evidence that enables a more convincing argument for castration theory as a vehicle for framing sexual difference[80]. According to Freud (1914a, 244), the sexual intimidation triggered by the traumatic scene of seeing his sister's genitals created a precondition for his patient's foot fetishism. In 1914, Freud also connects this frightening experience to the patient's experience of his father's threats. Freud claims that the patient's terror in the puberty scene was a re-experiencing (*Wiederbelebung*) of these threats (1914a, 244). Consequently, Freud demonstrates that the aetiology of fetishism is clearly a result of a defence mechanism. Further, as in a typical description of the development of a neurotic defensive symptom (1895e, 413), Freud affirms that the patient created a fetish by defending (verteidigen) his penis after the terrifying experience of seeing female genitalia

[79] Similar to *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (Emma case) model in 1895, where Freud concluded that traumas that result in hysteria are sexual in nature (1895e, 413), he approached the case using temporal reasoning in which the sequence of traumatic scenes is considered for aetiological appreciation (Freud 1895e, 411).

[80] Considering the context of Freud's *A Case of Foot Fetishism* in which the problematic of sexual difference becomes concrete in the problem of castration, the same can be found in Freud's (1918, 3) analysis of a case of neurosis treated by Freud during the years 1910-1914. In that case, published in 1918 and titled, "From the history of an infantile neurosis", Freud (1918, 45-6) also presents clinical evidence on the aetiological relevance of castration as connected to the problematic of sexual difference.

(Freud, 1914a, 245). Freud focuses on the genital erogenous zone to theorize about the fetish object as a defensive symptom; this formulation of Freud's supports my assertion that, from the time of *Three Essays* onwards, fetishism presents obstacles to Freud's psychoanalytic theory. This is because previously, in Freud's 1905 theory of sexuality, fetishism as a defensive pathology was inconceivable; at that early juncture, the genital zone was merely at the same level of importance as other erotogenic zones. Below, I will discuss the changes in Freud's theorization of fetishism up to this point.

In 1914, Freud also uses the concept of regression to understand the cause of the disturbance in the patient's sexual development; Freud considers regression to be a consequence of sexual intimidation during childhood. Freud in 1914 applies regression to understanding fetishism; this signals a shift in the theoretical framework that he had used in the aetiology of neurosis to that of perversion[81] . Freud employs the concept of regression quite specifically, positing that a "topical regression" or "geographical regression" took place in the sexual development (Freud, 1914a, 245) as the patient regressed to the circumstances of his early interest in feet[82]. I will now turn to a discussion of other arguments surrounding Freud's use of his theory of neuroses in explaining fetishism.

In 1914 Freud also addresses the symbolic meaning of the foot (*symbolische Bedeutung des Fußes*) as a substitute for the female's missing penis resulting from castration (1914a, 244). Freud links the symbolic content of the foot as fetish object to the outcome of the sight of his sister's genitals and the subsequent castration fears. According to Freud, as a result of the Castration complex, the foot works as symbol: it replaces the penis that is missing in the female body. His evidence for identifying the foot as a symbol was the fact that the patient dreamt his wife had a penis (Freud, 1914a, 244). Previously, in his essay, *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, Freud (1910a) had already linked the infantile fantasy to the symbolic content of the fetish object. However, at that juncture—1910—

81 Previously, in *Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1910b) and *Totem and Taboo* (1913), Freud discussed the genesis of neurotic illness by employing the concept of regression. Here, he claimed that a regression takes place in the course of the sexual development of neurotic individuals. This means a return of erotic needs and the libido to earlier phases of sexual development (Freud 1910b, 45, 49–50; 1913, 17, 90).

82 The fascination with feet occurred when, during childhood, he crawled on the floor and under the table to look at people's genitals from below (Freud, 1914a, 244). Thus, the regression activated his infantile drive to look (*Schautrieb*), and his early interest in seeing people's genitals from under the table returned to the topical circumstances of his childhood sexual curiosity—that is, the foot (Freud, 1914a, 244–5). As will become clear, the predominance of the drive to look will figure in Freud's final formulation of his 1914 theory of foot fetishism.

Freud had not added traumatic scenes of the female with a penis to his concept of the infantile fantasy; nor had Freud stipulated the symbolic content of the fetish object (Freud, 1914a, 244–5). In 1914, it was noteworthy to Freud that the child created a fetish to defend his penis while accepting the idea of castration. (Freud, 1914a, 245). Freud's formulation here contributes to my argument on Freud's psychoanalytic theory of fetishism: here, we see Freud reversing the fetishist model of substitution and symbolism, which he previously used to place fetishism as the opposite of the hysterical psychological defence (as we saw in the previous chapter), and which now serves Freud in building his theory of (fetishistic) defence. Continuing to construct my argument in this dissertation, I will discuss below how, despite the changes in Freud's theory of fetishism this far, he continues to evolve his predecessors' ideas on the relation between fetishism and masochism.

In his concluding remarks on foot fetishism in 1914, Freud theorizes about the origins of another perversion: masochism. According to Freud, the behaviour of the foot fetishist is grounded in the masochistic perversion. Freud postulates that early sexual intimidation could ultimately reveal not only the cause of foot fetishism but the cause of masochism, as well. In *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, Freud identifies the dual attitude of the child vis-à-vis the traumatic sexual intimidation as the most significant factor of the fetishist case. By becoming passive in his relationships with women, the child thereby reconciled himself to a female role (Freud, 1914a, 245).

As in 1909, Freud's 1914 theorization of foot fetishism and masochism was directly aligned with Krafft-Ebing's theory in *Psychopathia Sexualis*: Krafft-Ebing claims that during the psychical development that constitutes masochism, the masochist pervert attains a passive role in his relationships with women (1893a, 110, 148-149). To the extent that Freud, in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, discussed masochistic perversion according to Krafft-Ebing's claim about masochists' passive roles towards women, Freud's view of Binet's concept of early, traumatic sexual intimidation represents a development of Krafft-Ebing's theory of foot fetishism and masochism.

Echoing Binet's discussions on doubling, Freud examines the connection between fetishism and the child's dual attitude. To set the stage for this argument, he posits (1) a link between fetishism and masochism; and (2) a primary bisexual disposition (*bisexuellen Anlage*) in humans (Freud, 1914a, 245). Both of these concepts appear in Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis*. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, Krafft-Ebing emphasized that both foot and shoe fetishism are type of masochism (1893a, 123-144). Although Freud did not refer to Krafft-Ebing in 1914, Freud indeed

agreed with Krafft-Ebing (1893a, 123, 128–9) with respect to the idea that foot fetishism is a subcategory (*Unterart*) of masochism (Freud, 1914a, 245).

Freud argues that the bisexual disposition[83] in humans determinates whether the patient develops a neurosis or a perversion (1914a, 245). Regarding the origins of foot fetishism, Freud asserts that the decisive factor in an individual's bisexual disposition veering towards a passive (masochistic) stance in his relationships is the instance of sexual (traumatic) intimidation during childhood. Freud concludes that a person who, at an early age, has been intimidated by a man, develops a tendency to be masochistic in relation to women (Freud, 1914a, 245)[84]. Finally, in 1914, Freud formulates a synoptic understanding of this behaviour: "The briefest formula for the foot fetishist would be: a masochistic secret voyeur" (Freud, 1914a, 245). Later, Freud went on to evolve more of Binet's ideas, aiming to theorize on the libido's propensity for fixation depending on external accidental factors[85].

Thirty years earlier, Binet had shown a similar interest in pointing to the fixation of erotic ideas as linked to fetishes in the development of fetishistic perversion (1888a, 20–1, 40, 58). Acknowledging this, Freud explains that before the existence of psychoanalytic research, Binet explored whether the libido in perverts remains

83 The minutes of the 1914 meeting do not offer much detail on Freud's discussion of bisexuality. In fact, throughout his work, Freud makes only occasional, cursory references to the subject (1908c).

84 Freud's developments of 1914 can be understood as a continual evolution of Binet's ideas, with Freud applying his own theoretical framework of neurosis to fetishism. One year after Freud delivered *A Case of Foot Fetishism* to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, he added a footnote in the 1915 edition of *Three Essays*. The footnote included the role of early sexual intimidation as a precondition for the deviation from the normal sexual aim; also included is the idea that geographical regression leads to substitution of the sexual object (1905c, 153–4). Also in Freud's 1915 essay *Repression*, he again took up the subject of the origin of the fetish to show that the original drive representative can be split into two parts (*in zwei Stücke zerlegt*) (Freud 1915, 150). Again, he stated that one part of the original drive undergoes repression, while the remainder undergoes idealization.

85 In Freud's lecture entitled *Some Thoughts on Development and Regression* – Aetiology, Freud (1916–17) references Binet in arguing for a connection between the properties of the libido and the aetiology of both neurosis and perversion. Freud (1916–17, 346) postulates that sexual-drive impulses are extraordinarily plastic. Just as Binet (1888a, 8, 23) assumes that fetishism is evidence of the plasticity of love, Freud claims that the human libido is characterized by plasticity (*Plastizität*) (Freud 1916–17, 346). This means that, on the one hand, the libido freely shifts the focus of its object—as well as its means of reaching gratification. Freud also claims that, on the other hand, the tenacity with which the libido can be fixated on particular trends and objects is based on its "adhesiveness" (Freud 1916–17, 348). To argue that premature fixation of the libido is indispensable to explaining the cause of neurosis as well as the cause of perversion, Freud briefly described the origin of libidinal fixation in another case of foot fetishism, in which the patient first remembered sexual experience relating to the fetish occurred the age of six. (1916–17, 348–9). This is evidence of Freud's growing experience with fetishist patients.

attached to an object or trend throughout their lives due to very early impressions (Freud 1916–17, 348). In the next section, I will discuss how, in the course of his inquiry into the origin of all perversions, Freud again refers to Binet's "accidental causes" as the primary triggers of perversions (1919, 181). As we have seen in this section, as of 1917, Freud was still unable to theoretically link fetishism and the Oedipus complex. In 1919, he once again tried to solve this conceptual problem. This will be examined in the section below.

3.7 The Oedipus Complex and the Aetiology of Perversions

In this dissertation, I argue that Freud's continuing reworking of his ideas on fetishism can be contextualized with his larger theoretical contributions. I also contend that Freud found it difficult to integrate fetishism into his own theoretical framework. As such, in this section I discuss Freud's attempt to apply his concept of the Oedipus complex to fetishism. In 1919, Freud tried to formulate a general theory of the causes of perversions. He expressed these ideas in the work, *A Child is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions*. Since 1913, Freud had avoided theorizing about fetishism in connection to the Oedipus complex; in his 1919 work, however, he positions the concept of the Oedipus complex as key to understanding fetishism.

In *A Child is Being Beaten*, one of Freud's goals is to advance Binet's founding ideas on fetishism; Freud also aims to elaborate on these ideas in service to explaining the cause of all sexual perversions. Freud's contribution to Binet's argument is to promote the main cause of neuroses—the Oedipus complex—as the source of sexual perversions in mature stages of life (Freud 1919, 204). However, while initially Freud in 1919 had the ambition to discuss the Oedipus complex as a cause of all sexual perversions, he instead focuses on the masochistic perversion[86] (1919, 191). What follows is a discussion of how this adds to the problematic developed in this dissertation.

[86] Freud believes masochistic perversion to have originated in early-childhood impressions of being beaten (1919, 181–2; 192–3). Freud also considered this fantasy to be a primary characteristic of perversion (Freud 1919, 181). Decades before Freud's attempt to theorize on masochism as a means to argue for the role of beating phantasies in the primacy of genital pleasure, both phantasies of the same nature and genitality were fundamental to Krafft-Ebing's definition of masochism in *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Here, he defined masochism as a perversion of the genital drive (*Geschlechtstriebs*) that is determined by the influence of phantasies (*Phantasien*) of beating, mastery, humiliation, and abuse (Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 89–152). Krafft-Ebing highlighted several childhood beating and spanking memories of patients that culminated in their early masochistic infantile excitations (1893a, 105, 107, 114, 126).

In tracking Freud's thinking on masochism, we see Freud advancing an important debate around the riddle of fetishism. As discussed in Chapter 1, Freud's efforts in 1919 were not unprecedented. For example, Krafft-Ebing's introduction of the concept masochism hinged on Binet's concept of fetishism, including Binet's aetiological ideas concerning Rousseau's particular case of fetishism (Krafft-Ebing 1890b, 5–7). Further, Binet's (1888a, 49) accounts of Rousseau's early-childhood memories of sexual arousal when being punished by his caregiver—and Rousseau's subsequent development of a "fetishist" obsession for repeating such occasions—precedes Freud's 1919 writing on the subject.

Here, in a direct reference to Binet's assumptions, Freud writes: "long before the days of psycho-analysis, observers like Binet were able to trace the strange sexual aberrations of maturity back to similar impressions and to precisely the same period of childhood, namely, the fifth or sixth year". (Freud 1919, 181–2). Given the problematic of this dissertation, this quotation provides sufficient support for my argument that Binet's *Fetishim in Love* had been a rich source for Freud throughout the decades since the initial reference to Binet's ideas in Freud's *Three Essays*. Binet's thinking provided Freud with a model for bolstering his claim that the decisive pathogenic impression at the root of perversions occurs in the period before the age of six (Freud 1919, 192). Consequently, Freud assumes that patients' actual experiences with perversions, recalled in the clinical setting, could be considered manifestations of the Oedipus complex (Freud 1919, 193).

Interestingly, Freud's stance in this context is rather tentative: to claim the Oedipus complex as the source of all perversions would require additional investigation, he tells us; and such a claim could not be made on the basis of Freud's work alone (Freud 1919, 192). Freud also admits to an opaqueness in the connection between the aetiological theory of perversions and the Oedipus complex (1919, 193). Below, I return to my argument about the challenges that fetishism poses to Freud's psychoanalytic theory.

Why was Freud so tentative about his conclusions in *A Child is Being Beaten*? In the course of this work, Freud points out that masochism as well as fetishism demonstrate that the Oedipus complex is a determining factor in perversions (1919, 192). However, Freud does not provide a detailed explanation how this occurs

in fetishism—arguably, Freud (1919, 186) could not explain how the fetish object is connected to the love of parents as the object of erotic wishes[87].

As I have argued throughout this dissertation thus far, from 1905 until 1920[88] , Freud was strikingly systematic and persistent in hewing to Binet's idea that (psycho) pathologies can be explained by indelible sexual impressions that occurred in childhood. Binet's ideas on fetishism prompted Freud to confront the contradictions, inconsistencies, and other problems in his own theories and ideas, including trauma, infantile sexuality, and psychosexual development, for example. More specifically, I have so far asserted that, by reviewing Binet's ideas of *Fetishism in Love*, Freud was led to revise his idea in *Three Essays* that infantile sexuality lacks an object—and to go on to formulate a theory in which the fetish object already originates in infancy.

In the following chapter, I will proceed to the steps by which I structure my argument in this dissertation. I will argue that, after 1920, Binet's influence on Freud is still evident. Freud's continued attempt to solve the riddle of fetishism in the 1920s and 1930s led him to revive another of Binet's long-standing, widely known tenets: the concept of splitting.

87 In *A Child is Being Beaten*, Freud (1919, 185-6) focuses on cases of women and their Oedipal relationship with their fathers. Conversely, in his ongoing examination of fetishism, Freud (1907a, 1909a, 1914a) had always discussed male cases connected with the relationship between the boy and his mother. Ten years before writing *A Child is Being Beaten*, Freud (1909a) admitted his failure to understand pathological fetishism as linked to the memories of normal loving affection for the mother. Freud also refrained from pursuing his explanation of pathological fetishism as related to desexualizing processes (sublimation and idealization). Later, as Freud (1914a) applied his castration theory to fetishism by turning the fetish into a defence of the penis—and a defence against the trauma of sexual difference—fetishism no longer was seen as the outcome of normal Oedipal psychosexual development; to the contrary, Freud cast the mother as responsible for seducing the child—and affecting adversely his sexual development.

88 As part of Freud's continuous application of his ideas on neurosis to fetishism, Freud added a footnote to the 1920 edition of *Three Essays* employing the concept of screen memory as formulated in his work from 1899. He affirmed that the fetish is constituted like a screen memory. As already indicated, before Freud, both Binet and Krafft-Ebing had already theorized about normal fetishism for material objects in reference to memory. However, in terms of screen memory, in his footnote, Freud claimed that behind the first recollection of the impression of the fetish lies a submerged and forgotten phase of sexual development (1905c, 154–5). As for Binet, although he did not detail specific stages of sexual development in *Fetishism in Love*, he remarked on the forgetfulness of the decisive childhood sexual impressions that form fetishes. Thus, before Freud, Binet observed that the memory of early impressions are usually erased by time. More specifically, according to Binet (1888a, 45–6), many patients do not remember the exact decisive circumstances and do not attach much significance to facts considered accidental.

3

Chapter 4

Freud's Late Works on Fetishism

Following the structure of my argument in this dissertation, in this chapter I will apply my main argument to Sigmund Freud's theorization of fetishism in his work of the 1920s and 1930s. In the previous chapter, I discussed how, since 1905, fetishism began to destabilize Freud's theory. I explored how this led Freud to stipulate an aetiology of fetishism in the form of a debate with Binet's ideas in the following years. Now, I will advance this argument by analysing how, in his late works, Freud, returned to Binet's ideas on doubling, ultimately placing the concept of splitting at the centre of his theory of psychopathology. I will discuss that Freud did so by exploring splitting as applied to fetishism—the same phenomenon that induced him to engage in a protracted debate with Binet's ideas.

Freud's thinking about fetishism during the 1920s and 1930s was remarkably different from the ideas he formulated initially, in 1905. Freud's earlier attempts to evolve Binet's aetiological ideas served Freud in terms of developing his own theory of neurosis as well as formulating a suitable explanation of fetishism over the decades; in contrast, his late discussion of fetishism was no longer motivated by his search for the cause of fetishism. Instead of seeing it as riddle, Freud turned fetishism into a solution for solving other problems that arose in his development of a theory of psychopathology. In further structuring my argument in this dissertation, I will explore in this chapter how fetishism became part of a larger theoretical development that mainly explored neurotic and psychotic disturbances, in the process of which Freud revisited the discussion on splitting. By treating fetishism as a solution rather than a challenge, what comes into play is once again the influence of Binet's ideas on Freud's theorizing similar to his approach in the 1890s. Before discussing this in detail, I will first outline the differences between Freud's late approach to fetishism and his general psychoanalytic theory of the 1920s and 1930s.

In his late work, Freud confirms the occurrence of fetishism in infancy, and he argues that even in early childhood the child defends itself against the dangerous and distressing conditions imposed by the external world. By having directly engaged with many cases of fetishism in his practice and research, Freud by this time had acquired considerable experience with fetishist patients. Based on his knowledge, Freud concluded that fetishism is devoid of therapeutic significance. He also reconsidered the idea that the choice of the fetish as a sexual object was intransigent. In support of my argument regarding Freud's theorization of fetishism in his late works, below I will further deconstruct the relevant differences between Freud's early attempts at theorizing fetishism and those of the period I am contextualizing here.

Another aspect in which Freud's late theory of fetishism differs from his earlier approach is how the examination of the drives[89] gives way to his discussion of affects. Further, unlike the examination of the internal demands of the drives, Freud now focuses on fetishism to theorize about the role of perceptions of the external world. In this sense, Freud's approach to fetishism is—once again—linked to Binet's ideas on doubling, specifically, Binet's theory on the fetish object as a double-sided or a dual-character phenomenon and Binet's conceptualization of the doubling of the ego. I will consider this in detail in the sections to come. For now, it is worth noting that the link to Binet's ideas on doubling evident in Freud's late theory of fetishism supports my assertion about the changes in Freud's theorization. This will be further explored below.

The main feature of Freud's approach to fetishism in this period is his consideration of fetishism as a convenient phenomenon to which he could apply concepts from his earlier theoretical developments about neurosis, as well as a subject through which he could continue his debates about psychic mechanisms. Toward the end of the 1920s and in the 1930s, after removing fetishism from his initial theory of perversion, Freud's conceptual framework (used in the aetiology of neurosis to explore fetishism) became clearer. This was the case from 1926 onwards, specifically with regard to Freud's re-engaging with his early theoretical framework of defence. In fact, this was the same framework with which Freud had evolved Binet's ideas about doubling. Thus, Freud's study of fetishism aimed to further develop his ideas on splitting and his theoretical framework of defences. In the service of the overall problematic of this dissertation, in the following sections I interpret what these changes in the psychoanalytic theorization of fetishism mean for Freud. Specifically, in Freud's late works, fetishism fundamentally undermined his previous idea that neurosis is the negative of the perversion. Now, this idea is no longer valid; Freud now sees fetishism

[89] In the 1920s, we see Freud take a different direction in his investigations, particularly in terms of his approach to the sexual drive and its perverse polymorphous components. For example, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud conceptualizes Eros as a drive towards unity that is termed as the Ego drive. The Ego drive is linked to narcissistic and self-preserving functions (Freud 1920, 52). Freud's theorization on sexuality here differs from his critique of the function of sexuality aimed at the reproduction of the species, as presented in *Three Essays*; in this work, he characterized infantile sexuality as autoerotic, with non-functional pleasures. As Freud's idea of infantile autoerotic perversion progressively wanes, his concept of Eros becomes oriented toward objects in a process where the child brings objects into unity with each other. Similarly, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud describes the overall structure of the mental apparatus, establishing the concept of 'Id' (*Es*) as a set of general psychic contents related to the drives and to the unconscious (Freud 1923a, 23–4). As I will discuss in the next chapter, these changes are fundamental to understanding the differences between Freud's and Lacan's approaches to fetishism. Indeed, Lacan grounds his discussion of fetishism in these works of Freud.

as a defensive phenomenon. This applies to the core of my argument: as soon as Freud theorizes fetishism as a defence, he places it on the same level as the neuroses, that is, as the negative of perversion. In doing so, Freud eclipses entirely his early conceptualization of perversion.

In exploring Freud's work on fetishism I will focus on *Fetishism* (1927a); *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940a); and *The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence* (1940b). Before discussing in detail Freud's works on fetishism in the 1920s and 1930s, I will contextualize the background of his theoretical interests in this period.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Freud had used fetishism to theorize about sexual difference, castration, and the centrality of the genitals in his theory of sexuality; in the 1920s these topics became a key focus in his work[90]. Freud claims that during the development of infantile sexuality, the child's interest in the genitals and in their activity takes on a determinative significance that lasts until sexual maturity. This subsequently leads to the "primacy of the genitals" (*Primat der Genitalien*)[91] (1923b, 142). This consideration relates to the argument of this chapter as follows: having resumed his evolution of Binet's ideas on doubling in the 1920s and 1930s, Freud endeavours to examine psychic mechanisms that serve to solve psychic conflicts caused by representations of events experienced as unbearable. Here, the centrality of the genitals becomes the basis of Freud's argument; he places the perception of the lack of a penis in the female as fundamentally unbearable—and as linked to the Castration complex (the threat of the loss of one's penis). Continuing

[90] Freud's 1923 work entitled *The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido: An Interpolation into the Theory of Sexuality* is clear evidence of this. Freud wrote this paper to update his earlier work on infantile sexual development published in his *Three Essays* (1923b, 141).

[91] Freud connects this to the specific stage in which the development of the libido in both boys and girls is organized around the genital zones. This stage is marked by the "primacy of the phallus" (*Primat des Phallus*) (Freud 1923b, 142). To the extent that Freud argued in the aforementioned work that the infantile phantasy that all human beings have a penis belongs to the primacy of the genital pleasure developmental stage, he regarded the lack of a penis in the female body as the result of the Castration complex of both boys and girls. Thus, Freud stressed the significance of this complex as part of the origin of the phase of phallic primacy (Freud 1923b, 144). Later, in 1925, in his work entitled *Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes*, Freud reviewed his claims about the phallic phase of development and provided a more detailed account of the normative stages of sexual maturation of girls. Consequently, Freud shed light on how the threat of castration relates to phallic genital organization and the Oedipus complex concerning the psychosexual development of girls. By doing so, Freud progressively considered the consequences for girls when they discovered their clitoris as a genital zone (1925b, 254–5). Freud later included his considerations of the female clitoris as linked to the phallic genital organization of development in his 1927 essay, *Fetishism*. Moreover, this work also clearly reflects how the problem of sexual difference gained prominence throughout Freud's theorizing on sexuality.

to contextualize Freud's late approach to fetishism, below I present another topic that illustrates Freud's interest in fetishism in his late theorization.

In 1924, Freud had developed a more effective characterization of the mechanisms by which the ego detaches itself from the external world as a means to solve such psychic conflicts. To explore these mechanisms, Freud distinguished between two major clinical conditions: neurosis and psychosis. This distinction corresponds to a conceptual differentiation between the two main psychic mechanisms[92]. Freud then stipulates the existence of a specific mechanism, similar to repression in the case of psychosis, in which the ego detaches itself from the external world (1924c, 152). This question prompted Freud to investigate how the ego could find a way to avoid a break with reality. Although perversion was not central to this discussion, Freud did include it as a phenomenon that called for further investigation of these mechanisms for resolving psychic conflicts. What makes this investigation pivotal to the argument in this chapter? It is in the course of Freud's investigation of psychic mechanisms that we see why fetishism and splitting captured his attention in the 1920s: this phenomenon was, in his mind, ideal for exploring these underlying mechanisms. This supports my argument in this chapter that in this context, Freud's early conceptualization of perversion—as opposed to neurosis—is no longer operative. As we saw in the previous chapters, splitting—as opposed to perversion—was part of Freud's theorization of neurosis (defence). In the following paragraphs, I describe how Freud initiates this connection between splitting and various phenomena classified as perversion.

Freud posits sexual perversions as a possible mechanism through which individuals avoid repression at the expense of the disintegration of the ego. In sexual perversions, he suggests, such a process can take place by means of cleavage (*zerklüftet*) or division (*zerteilt*) of the ego (Freud 1924c, 152–3). Given that Freud is not specific, we may ask which sexual perversion(s) he is referring to in this case. Freud had only just resumed the idea of splitting as linked to perversion. As discussed in the previous chapters, Binet's work is the main source through which Freud explores the connection between these two topics. In pursuing my argument, in the next section I will show that later, in 1927, Freud also featured fetishism in his theorizations of the splitting of the ego. Likewise, in forthcoming sections I will show that, in the 1930s, Freud evolved this initial insight by

92 In *Neurosis and Psychosis*, Freud states that both categories of pathologies reflect a failure in the functioning of the ego that originates in the ego's conflicts with the various ruling agencies of the psyche (1924c, 152). Freud supported his previous theory that in the case of neurosis, the ego defends itself through the mechanism of repression, subsequently creating a symptom (1924c, 152). In contrast, in psychosis, the production of delusions and hallucinations represents a fissure (*Einriß*) in the relationship between the ego and the external world (Freud 1924c, 149, 151).

placing fetishism and the splitting of the ego at the heart of his psychological theory. As I will discuss below, once Freud saw the link between splitting and perversion as a possible solution to understanding how the ego can avoid a break with reality, his theorization of the following year (1925) grows similar to that of Binet.

In the context of my overall argument, it is important to note that as late as 1924, Freud was still conceiving of perversions as fragments of normal sexuality rather than transgressive perversities. He likened perversions to acceptable eccentricities (*Verschrobenheiten*), follies (*Narrheiten*), or mere inconsistencies (*Inkonsequenzen*) in human nature: "In this way the inconsistencies, eccentricities and follies of people would appear in a similar light to their sexual perversions, through the acceptance of which they spare themselves repressions" (Freud 1924c, 153). Freud's perspective on fetishism in 1927 highlights fetishism as displaced from a therapeutic concern, that is, not as an abnormality to be experienced as suffering. This is of interest to the overall problematic of this dissertation, particularly in the next chapter, in which I will discuss Lacan's theorization of fetishism as a model for conceptualizing perversion as a structure. Yet linked to this, Lacan's conceptualization of fetishism can be read as advancing theories of perversity. This supports my overall problematization in this dissertation concerning the differences between Freud and Lacan's theorization of fetishism.

In terms of the conceptual questions to be addressed in this chapter, Freud argues that, in neurosis and psychosis, the mechanisms for dealing with psychic conflict affect the experience of reality in different ways[93]. The mechanism of the psychotic reaction in facing a conflict is disavowal (*verleugnen*) of reality (1924d, 184) and results in an attempt to replace or reconstruct it (1924b, 185-6). In neurosis, the mechanism responsible for solving the psychic conflict is the repression of the drives' demands (Freud 1924d, 183). But how does this relate to Freud's interest in fetishism in the 1920s? Later, when Freud selected fetishism as the ideal phenomenon through which to reopen the discussion around the relevance of disavowal as a mechanism, he referred to precisely the idea he established in 1924. This demonstrates the kinds of problems Freud was trying to solve when he addressed fetishism in his late work. It also indicates how Freud re-established splitting—just as Binet had done when he discussed fetishism.

Directly after Freud had this insight, his line of thinking began to resemble even more closely that of Binet; Freud continued his work on differentiating the various

[93] Freud elaborates on this in a paper written after *Neurosis and Psychosis*, entitled *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis* (1924).

mechanisms in 1925[94]. Here, Freud presents ideas similar to those of Binet's (1890c) regarding the investigation of mental processes that can be modified through psychic mechanisms of negation (as described in Chapter 1). Freud examines how the intellectual function can separate itself from the affective process, so that only part of the repressed content is recovered. According to Freud, this is possible by using the "symbol of negation" (Freud 1925a, 235–6). In line with Binet's (1890c, 137, 140, 146, 154-155) research and ideas on negation, Freud suggests the possibility of examining representations of reality in relation to the interests of the ego. He examines the way in which representations in the ego can be reprised in the perception of reality (Freud 1925a, 236–7). Freud concludes that the reproduction of perception in representation can be modified by omissions and altered by fusions of various elements (1925a, 238). Having established in this chapter further definitive evidence of Freud reverting to Binet's ideas on splitting, we can now turn our attention to Freud's reliance on other topics included in Binet's work, namely, the ego-related psychic mechanisms of defence. Freud's interest in this topic signals his turn to his 1890s conceptualization, when his debate with Binet began. Accordingly, below I will discuss Freud's resumption of his conceptual framework of defence, along with his interest in Binet's most consecrated subject in sexology: fetishism.

4.1 Freud's Resumption of Fetishism and Defence

In view of my discussion in this chapter of how Freud decisively turned fetishism into a defensive phenomenon in his late works, we see that his arguments establish the link between fetishism and splitting of the ego begins to surface in 1926, a year

[94] This is seen in Freud's paper entitled *Negation*, initially entitled *Negation and Disavowal* (Grubrich-Simitis 1997, 207). Similarl to Binet's theory of the fetish object, in *Negation*, Freud claimed that the proof of reality on the good qualities of the object of satisfaction (*Befriedigungsobjekt*) in the psychic representation is not found in actual object perception, but in the conviction (*überzeugen*) that the satisfactory object is present (Freud 1925a, 237).

before his essay on fetishism[95]. Freud (1926, 88) highlights disturbances (*Störungen*) of a fetishist nature (*fetischistischer Natur*) as a model to investigate how disturbances of the sexual function are linked to disturbances of the ego. He also revisits various issues originally discussed in the 1890s in connection with Binet's notions of doubling, namely, the concept of defence and its link to external perceptions and modifications of the ego (1926, 157, 163). Freud discusses how the ego avoids danger by both withdrawing from dangerous perceptions and by refusing to perceive danger (Freud 1926, 92). This topic, as discussed in Chapter 1, is clearly articulated in Binet's investigations on doubling (1892, 257). Freud's interest in fetishism as linked to ego disturbances runs parallel to his discussion of psychic mechanisms. Specifically in 1926 Freud also initiates a debate with the French psychoanalyst René Laforgue

[95] Freud's book *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* published in 1926 contains theoretical elaborations applied to fetishism in his subsequent essay on the topic, in 1927. Freud discusses several major themes that would converge in his essay on fetishism in the following year: the theoretical link between the affect of anxiety and the Castration complex (1926, 122); and the conceptualization of protective objects (1926, 167-8). Freud's theorization here can be read as an overall extension of the theoretical basis with which he addressed "Binet's childhood trauma" when theorizing fetishism (1914a, 244). This is because in 1926, Freud focused on inquiring about the origin of anxiety and affect in general as precipitates of primaeval traumatic experiences that have become incorporated into the psyche (Freud 1926, 93). Freud concluded that castration anxiety is the only motive force of defence mechanisms (1926, 122-3). According to Freud (1926, 154), this explains the value of objects that protect the child against danger and ensure comfort. Freud asserted that during the development of the child, the object serves as a protection (*das Objekt als Schutz*) against every situation of psychical helplessness, including traumatic and dangerous situations (1926, 167). He concluded that one cannot afford to be without a protecting object (*schützendes Objekt*) (Freud 1926, 168). In the subsequent year, in 1927, Freud applied his concept of protecting objects to the fetish object as a defence against castration anxiety.

about psychic mechanisms; this debate culminated in the essay on fetishism in the following year[96].

4.2 Fetishism (1927)

In this section, in which I analyse Freud's 1927 discussion of fetishism, I posit that Freud once again turns to Binet's ideas. Now, however, his motive is no longer to find an explanation for fetishism; rather, Freud's intention is to re-conceptualize splitting. In this sense, I will discuss how, in 1927, Freud formulated fetishism differently from the way he had in previous decades. Freud's essay entitled *Fetishism*, published in 1927, represents his first published work that focuses exclusively on this subject. In this essay, Freud presents a theory of fetishism that, arguably, diverges entirely from the one he had developed in 1905. As we saw in the previous chapter, Freud in 1927 again rooted fetishism in early childhood. This had been unthinkable in 1905. In addition, since 1914, Freud saw fetishism as originating in childhood as a defence against the fear of castration and the trauma of sexual difference. Thus, as of 1927, the idea exists that a young child can be a fetishist. Now, more than ever, we can observe the crucial flaws in Freud's initial concept of perversion as applied to fetishism. Indeed, it is remarkable that in Freud's 1927 essay, there is no mention of the term perversion, a fact I will discuss in the following paragraphs.

[96] Freud's debate with the ideas of René Laforgue adds to the contextualization of the reasons why Freud addressed fetishism the following year. Laforgue was developing ideas in line with Freud's efforts in his works of 1924 regarding the definition of the psychic mechanism in psychosis. Both Freud and Laforgue were simultaneously discussing the same topics exchanging letters from 1923 until 1926. In Laforgue's works entitled, *Repression and Scotomization* and *On Scotomisation in Schizophrenia*, he intended to distinguish terminologies that describe mechanisms underlying psychotic disorders (1926a, 54) and to conceptualize the indifferences of schizophrenics concerning reality. Laforgue (1926a, 59) proposed to limit the term 'repression' as coined by Freud on the employment of normal processes and adopt 'scotomization' for pathological processes. Considering a division of the psyche into two parts (*Zweiteilung der Psyche*) as the fundamental disturbance of schizophrenia, Laforgue claimed that schizophrenics present an inability to recognize reality in terms of indifference (Laforgue 1926a, 57-8). Then, Laforgue employed the term 'disavowal' that Freud had defined as the central mechanism of psychosis in 1924. Thus, the individual disavows (*verleugnen*) everything that is contrary to his or her ego with the aim of getting around situations of failure that are perceived as castration (Laforgue 1926b, 451). At the origins of schizophrenia, the child, with a view to avoid castration, disavowed (*verleugnet*) the mother by becoming indifferent to her (Laforgue 1926b, 454). As a result, schizophrenics register only perceptions of reality that are in conformity with their libidinal interests. In Freud's 1927 essay on fetishism in the following year, Freud designated fetishism as a circumstance to discuss the mechanism of disavowal of reality in continued contrast with Laforgue's notion of scotomization.

Before setting out to write *Fetishism* in 1927, Freud had examined the existing psychoanalytic landscape in publications devoted to the subject[97]. In this paper, Freud presented what he called a simple solution (*einfache Lösung*) to the subject (Freud quoted in Timms 1995, 126). However, in line with the argument of this chapter, I propose a different perspective on the contested aspects of Freud's 1927 essay[98]. After all, as we will see in this section, the solution that Freud published in 1927 had already been presented, perhaps most fully in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*, and in several other publications, as well as in footnotes added to various editions of *Three Essays*. My analysis of Freud's 1927 essay points to his interest in fetishism as a suitable subject for pursuing the broader theories he was developing during the 1920s. Freud's 1927 essay solves some key theoretical problems he faced by taking up once again—in accordance with Binet's development—the idea of splitting. And rather than re-engaging with Binet's focus on the origin of fetishism, Freud (1927a, 152) stated explicitly his preference *not* to show how accidental circumstances contributed to the choice of fetish. This favours the top-line argument that Freud's Fetishism reflects how, in the late 1920s and 1930s, the phenomenon of fetishism continued to guide Freud in reformulating his theory.

Fetishism (1927) demonstrates that despite his interest in the relevance of disturbances and mechanisms of defence, Freud nonetheless views fetishism as he did in 1924—as an "eccentric," yet acceptable, part of human sexuality. Freud (1927a, 152) states that in the last years of his clinical practice, he had the opportunity to analyse cases of male patients whose object choice was dominated by a fetish: in most cases, patients were quite content with their fetish—even when they perceived

[97] The correspondence between Freud and the Austrian psychoanalyst Fritz Wittels points to the fact that, before publishing his essay, Freud asked Wittels in late July 1927to assist him in a bibliographic research in psychoanalytic publications to see if any authors had already solved the topic. After Wittels had fulfilled the 'literary favour' that Freud had requested, Freud summed up his surprisingly simple solution to Wittels by writing: '(…) the fetish is not anything tenfold but something very simple, namely, the equivalent for the once imagined and so highly valued penis of the woman (mother's) and therefore a product of defiance against castration and defence against homosexuality' (Freud quoted in Timms 1995, 126–67). Contrariwise, as seen in this dissertation, these assumptions were already presented in *Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* and in *A Case of Foot Fetishism*.

[98] This helps clarify the question of where my argument stands in the debate about Freud's theorization of fetishism. Unlike my argument, the secondary literature—biased in favour of Lacan's theories—recognizes Freud's 1927 essay as a conclusive link between fetishism and perversion (Rey-Flaud 1994, 99; Assoun 1994, 61). In this sense, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Lacan and authors of the post-Freudian tradition with whom he debates, consider Freud's 1927 essay on fetishism to be the milestone of Freud's thinking on the topic. In the next chapter, I will discuss this position as partial evidence that Lacan does not consider Freud's challenges to his conceptualization of perversion.

it as an abnormality. In Freud's (1927a, 152) clinical experience, it was not the fetish that motivated his patients to seek psychoanalytic treatment. Rather, the fetish was an incidental discovery in the course of the treatment. Patients rarely perceived their fetish as a symptom that causes suffering; in fact, they appreciated the relief (*Erleichterungnen*) that the fetish brought to their love lives (Freud 1927a, 152).

In my view, this clinical appraisal of the fetish is relevant to Freud's re-introduction of splitting. This aligns with the arguments in this chapter: 1) By positing the fetish as a welcome abnormality (e.g., it provided relief from sexual tension)—and as peripheral to the clinical reasons for treatment—Freud sidestepped the need to integrate the fetish into any major nosological class; therefore, 2) the fetish became for Freud a suitably isolated vehicle for discussing specific psychological mechanisms via splitting. In the following sections, I will discuss how, during the 1930s, Freud would carry forward this strategy by placing splitting more definitively at the centre of his theorizing. It is via the concept of the fetish that Freud, in the 1930s, outlined the ways in which the synthetic functioning of the ego is vulnerable to various disorders. At this juncture, I will undertake to discuss how, in the context of his 1927 essay, Freud employs fetishism as an appropriate means by which to start the exploration of splitting. In supporting this argument, I will review in the next section Freud's clinical reasons for the suitability of fetishism in his discussion of splitting. The argument here is that in this context, fetishism is aligned with Freud's thinking on neurosis.

4.2.1 Fetishism Defies Freud's Early Clinical Criterion of Perversion

According to evidence, while Freud did not express clinical concern about the patients in his therapy practice, the riddle of how to contextualize fetishes did remain. This becomes clear from Freud bringing up a case of nose fetishism in his essay. (Supplementary information on this case was provided by the American-Hungarian psychoanalyst Franz Alexander[99] who took over the patient. This supplementary information is relevant in that it supports my argument that, in this context, it is no

[99] Freud sent the nose fetishist patient to Alexander after two years of treatment, where he was treated for another two years. The two psychoanalysts discussed this case several times (Alexander 1954, 16). When Alexander described developments in this case, he suggested that Freud was aware of developments that took in his analysis of the patient (1954, 12). The source of the additional information about the nose fetishist case was interviews conducted by Kurt Robert Eissler with Franz Alexander over the course of 1953–4. Kurt Robert Eissler was an Austrian psychoanalyst and a close associate and follower of Sigmund Freud. The transcripts of these interviews are digitally available at the Library of Congress of the United States. During the interviews, Eissler and Alexander discussed and analysed Alexander's correspondence with Freud regarding the 1927 case. In this case, sexual seduction had been enacted by a woman who was suspected of forcing the patient in his childhood to stimulate her genitals using the tongue or lips (cunnilingus) (Alexander 1954, 14–5).

longer possible to view fetishism as opposed to neurosis according to Freud's early psychopathological formulation.)

In contrast to Freud's 1927 assertion that fetishists tended to be content with their fetishes, this case suggests otherwise, framing the fetish as a serious symptom that caused suffering. This unnamed patient's primary reason for seeking treatment was to rid himself of this fetishist perversion (Alexander 1954, 12, 17). Fetishism, in this case, also presented Freud with a contrast between the aetiological factors of perversion such as seduction (Alexander 1954, 14–5), which diverge from those he presented in 1927—namely, defence against castration and sexual difference. Another problem that emerges here is the insufficiency of disgust as an effective marker for distinguishing the pathological degree of (fetishist) perversion, given that both pathological perversion and a strong sense of disgust coexisted[100] (Alexander 1954, 15). This is essential to my argument in this chapter, in which we have seen clear evidence that in the case of fetishism, Freud's initial conceptualization of perversion is no longer applicable in the 1920s. On the one hand, this contrasting case is evidence of the challenge to Freud's theorization on fetishes as well as to his clinical practice. In particular, this indicates Freud's awareness of at least one fetish as a symptom of major pathological significance. On the other hand, as Freud has confirmation that fetishism is aligned with the presence of disgust, this supports my argument that Freud does discuss fetishism to theorize on perversion; neither does he aim to integrate the fetish into any major nosological class. Freud privileges his search on psychic mechanisms initiated in the 1920s. For this reason, in the following section I examine the absence of any genuinely new ideas concerning the aetiology of fetishism in Freud's 1927 essay.

4.2.2 Freud's Solution for Fetishism in 1927

In 1927, citing as an example the nose-fetishist case, Freud stated that for all cases of fetishism, the psychoanalytic method provided the same answer to the meaning and purpose of the fetish. Freud (1927a, 153) linked his theoretical solution to his ideas

[100] Challenged by this case, Freud insisted that the patient abandon his fetishist practice and try instead to engage in sexual intercourse (Alexander 1954, 12, 17). Nevertheless, the patient's perversion was apparently unaffected by his treatment, according to Alexander (1954, 16). Contrary to Freud's belief in fetishist patients as content, this individual complained of being disgusted by particular sexual rituals dictated by his fetishism. According to Alexander (1954, 15), the only sexually satisfactory kind of nose that for the patient was one that had a shine—similar to his grandmother's nose (the patient's fetish was rooted in this relationship). As such, the patient sought out prostitutes with whom to perform these sexual rituals, in which he would "snap" the prostitute's nose: he sat atop her, pushed her nose up, released the nose, and then repeated the ritual (Alexander 1954, 15). Overwhelmed by his incurable perversion, the patient eventually committed suicide (1954, 13).

expressed in 1923 about the primacy of the phallus: "When now I announce that the fetish is a substitute for the penis, […] I hasten to add that it is not a substitute for any chance penis, but for a particular and quite special penis that had been extremely important in early childhood but had later been lost. […] To put it more plainly: the fetish is a substitute for the woman's (the mother's) phallus that the little boy once believed in and – for reasons familiar to us – does not want to give up" (Freud 1927a, 152–3). One can see here that, in 1927, Freud's theory of fetishism diverges from that of 1905. Here, the child does *not* fantasize the way Little Hans had, by imagining what he called the "scotom". Now, the child fantasizes about the phallus. In addition, Freud relates this fantasy to the trauma of sexual difference.

In this experience, Freud argues, following the child's observation of a woman, the (fetishist) child experienced a conflict between the weight of the unwanted perception (the absence of the penis) and the force of the contrary desire (the female phallus). Even so, the child continued to believe in the woman's phallus through the formation of a compromise—that is, a substitute for the female phallus: the fetish (Freud 1927a, 154). Comparable to Binet's (1890c, 146) discussions about different forms of denial of unwanted perceptions—including the substitution of memories—Freud justifies the disavowal of the perception of female genitals by affirming that the fetish functions as a substitute created by the horror of castration. Freud claims that the permanence of the fetish is due to its function as a protection against (*Schutz gegen*) the threat of castration[101] (1927a, 154). According to Freud, in the formation of the fetish, a process correlated with the blocking of memory in traumatic amnesia takes place: the fetish becomes a substitute that retains the last impression from the time before the traumatic sighting of the female genitals[102] (Freud 1927a, 155). While Freud discusses the fetish's retainer function as a defence against the trauma of sexual difference, Jacques Lacan, as we will see in the next chapter, elaborates

[101] The fetish also prevents the fetishist from becoming a homosexual, because it endows women with the characteristic through which they become bearable as a sexual object (Freud 1927a, 154). Freud admits that it was not possible to explain why some men embrace homosexuality as an effect of this impression of female genitals, while others defend themselves against it by developing a fetish.

[102] Other evidence that the trauma of sexual difference gains importance in Freud's ideas is that in 1927 he links the moments responsible for forming the fetishes, as he previously highlighted in the case histories presented at the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Freud 1909a, 1914a), to the problematic of the sexual difference. In this sense, Freud recovered examples in which the elements in the moment of a woman's undressing or those of the circumstances within which a child spies on the woman from below, are linked to the last moment in which the woman could still be considered phallic. According to Freud, this is the reason why feet, shoes, velvet, and underwear are chosen as fetishes (1927a, 154).

on the capacity of the fetish to interrupt the traumatic perception as crucial to his theory of perversion.

Consistent with his main argument in 1926—that castration is the only motive of defence—Freud in 1927 stresses that, most likely, no men are spared the fear of castration (*Kastrationsschreck*) when confronted with female genitals (1927a, 154). He concludes that the investigation of fetishism is hard evidence of the existence of the Castration complex—and that the fright of seeing female genitals stems from the fear of castration (and not from other causes) (Freud 1927a, 155).

Strictly speaking, Freud's abovementioned solution is not new. In fact, in 1927, Freud himself mentions his earlier presentation of these very claims, in his 1910 study of Leonardo da Vinci (Freud 1927a, 153). This favours the argument in this chapter that Freud wrote his 1927 work on fetishism to accommodate his theoretical developments of the 1920s—specifically, his inquiries into the mechanisms of the rejection of perceptions, as they applied to fetishism. This is the argument I will set up in the next section.

4.2.3 Freud on Disavowal, Scotomization, and Splitting in Fetishism

Freud's 1927 essay can be seen as a developmental milestone in his effort to use fetishism to reorganize his concepts; it is also from this point forward that Freud begins to revive the notion of splitting. To accomplish this, Freud first revives his debate on mechanisms of rejection of perceptions.

In 1927, Freud claims that the preservation of the infantile belief that women have a phallus occurs because the boy "refused" (*sich geweigert hat*) his perception that women do not possess a penis (1927a, 153). Here, Freud re-engages with Laforgue's ideas. Again, contradicting Laforgue, Freud objects to claiming that the boy "scotomizes"[103] the perception of the lack of penis in the woman: "Laforgue would say in this case that the boy 'scotomizes' his perception of the woman's lack of a penis" (Freud 1927a, 153). Instead, he asserts that the existing psychoanalytic term "repression" already refers to this pathological process (Freud 1927a, 153).

Before 1927, the concept of repression mainly referred to processes relating to the drive. However, in *Fetishism*, Freud employs the concept of repression in relation to affects. This is in line with his approach the previous year in which Freud associates

[103] Even though Freud systematically argued against the use of the term "scotomization" as proposed by Laforgue, in his 1927 essay, Freud himself used the term to build his own arguments (1927a, 153, 156).

the affect of anxiety with the notion of castration, integrating it with his recently revived theoretical framework of defence (which he revived from the 1890s). At this point, Freud also brings back another key element of this early framework: splitting.

Freud justifies the inadequacy of Laforgue's term scotomization by pointing out that it evokes the idea that the perception has been erased entirely[104]. Nor does the term repression work in this context, as Freud reserves it for the destiny of affect. He therefore proposes an alternative to Laforgue's "scotomization"—"disavowal" (*Verleugnung*)—to describe the fate of the representation of the feared perceived reality[105] (Freud 1927a, 153–4). Below, I will investigate how Freud's claim relates to my argument in this chapter.

In postulating an alternative to the concept of scotomization, Freud reveals himself as under the influence of Binet. Consistent with Binet's conceptualization of doubling, Freud claims that in fetishism, the perception of the absence of a penis in the female genitalia in fact persists. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the 1890s Binet (1892, 257, 269-70) explained that in doubling, the subject, aiming to defend himself, split his own perception of an unacceptable object through suppression. The subject can then modify the perceived object. For his part, Freud in 1927 describes that a very energetic action is undertaken to disavow the perceived reality of the absence of a penis in the female genitalia (1927a, 154).

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[104] Insofar as Freud justified the inadequacy of scotomization by claiming that such a term induces the understanding that the perception has been completely removed, such a justification is not in agreement with Laforgue's theory. As discussed in the previous section, Laforgue's conceptualization of scotomization in 1926 aimed to understand the indifference of the schizophrenic concerning their perceptions as connected to a decrease in their affective spheres. In this respect, however, Freud corrected himself in 1927, inserting a footnote in the passage when he diverged from Laforgue in the essay Fetishism. Here, he stated that Laforgue did not say that the child 'scotomizes' his perception of the woman's lack of a penis. Freud (1927a, 153) stressed that, according to Laforgue's explanation, the term "scotomization" does not apply to neurosis, but comes from the description of dementia praecox (schizophrenia).

[105] Insofar as Freud's decision to employ disavowal for the unwelcome element of reality as an alternative to scotomization, such an alternative is different from the one he presented in 1926. In *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, Freud contrasted Laforgue's "scotomization" with the mechanism of a counter-investment (1926, 157).

(1892, 257, 269-70) explained that in doubling, the subject, aiming to defend himself, split his own perception of an unacceptable object through suppression. The subject can then modify the perceived object. For his part, Freud in 1927 describes that a very energetic action is undertaken to disavow the perceived reality of the absence of a penis in the female genitalia (1927a, 154).

Subsequently, Freud brings up another theoretical interest in his study of the fetish: the renewed discussion about the essential difference between neurosis and psychosis—a discussion he had begun in 1924. Here Freud (1927a, 155) expresses his wish to re-evaluate his earlier proposition: that psychosis is characterized by the disengagement of the ego from a part of reality, in contrast to neurosis, in which the ego represses a part of the id in the service of reality. Freud's 1927 reassessment makes clear that, having engaged with the concept of fetishism since 1905, he has now found a suitable way to rework his theory. This new solution was to prove fundamental for Freud in continuing to discuss fetishism until the 1930s.

Freud came to his re-evaluation in 1924, soon after his publications on neurosis and psychosis. In *Fetishism*, he describes an analysis he undertook with two brothers, aged two and ten. The children had "scotomized" (*skotomisiert*) the death of their father, without developing psychoses, however. According to Freud, just as the ego of the fetishist disavows the unpleasant fact of women's castration, the ego of the two boys disavowed (*verleugnet*) an important part of reality. He writes: "It turned out that the two young men had no more 'scotomized' their father's death than a fetishist does the castration of women" (1927a, 156). Freud adds that he came to note that similar events in childhood were recurrent. He concludes that this convinced him of his error in characterizing neurosis and psychosis. Freud now had to find an alternative explanation to solve this problem. In the scotomization of the two boys, so Freud continues, only one "current" in their psychic lives did not recognize the father's death. However, another "current" in their psychic lives was fully aware of the father's death. Freud claims that it was through splitting (*Spaltung*) that the coexistence of both currents, one linked to desire and another linked to reality, could be explained (Freud 1927a, 156). But how, exactly, does splitting play a role in Freud's thinking in this context?

In 1927, Freud's employment of splitting also offered a conceptual alternative to the study of the mechanism of disavowal (as well as scotomization). He explored disavowal as linked to splitting—not to reference a detachment from a part of reality, but to imply the coexistence of two currents in the psyche. Freud (1927a, 156) adds that in the case of one of the children, splitting became the basis (*Grundlage*) of

moderate obsessive neurosis. Here, Freud's assumption is already similar to Binet's (1892, VIII, 2; Binet and Simon 1910, 119–20) claim that doubling underlies various pathologies[106]. After observing the splitting into the two currents in this obsessional neurosis, Freud maintains his expectation that, if this were a case of psychosis, the current linked to reality would actually disappear (Freud 1927a, 156). This nuanced observation suggests that Freud was reflecting on the existence of two psychic currents in psychosis—namely, the splitting in psychosis. Then, in developing his argument, Freud returns to the topic of fetishism to discuss the bifurcated position of the fetishist in relation to the issue of castration in women (1927a, 156). What we see here is that after decades of being challenged by the task of theorizing about Binet's aetiological ideas on fetishism, Freud still finds recourse in Binet's (1888a, 62) model of the fetish object as a double-sided or dual-character phenomenon. Crucial to my argument in this chapter are the similarities between Freud's elaboration on splitting and Binet's model of the fetish object as a double-sided phenomenon. I will therefore present this comparison below.

4.2.4 Freud's Development of Binet's Concept of the Fetish as Double-Sided

Freud's (1927) assessment of the fetishist's attitude as divided into two parts harmonizes with Binet's (1888a, 62–3) idea of the fetish object as capable of doubly incorporating opposites and contradictory elements; despite this similarity, Freud did not refer to Binet in 1927. According to Freud, the fetish itself (*der Fetisch selbst*) is the structure (*Aufbau*) that simultaneously gathers the disavowal (*Verleugnung*) of reality and the affirmation of castration (1927a, 156). At this juncture, 1927, Freud conceives of the fetish as in Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, namely, as doubly linked with opposites (*Gegensätzen doppelt geknüpft*) (Freud 1927a, 157). To describe how the fetish object can encompass double opposites, he refers to a case in which the patient's fetish was an athletic support belt (*Schamgürtel*) (Freud 1927a, 156). Here, again, a closer look at Freud's clinical view of fetishism cases will contribute to supporting my argument in this chapter.

[106] According to Freud (1927a, 156), in all situations in this boy's life, he oscillated between the two assumptions. One assumption was about the presence of a living father, which prevented certain activities in his life. The other assumption was the death of his father, in which case the boy demanded the right to be his successor.

Specifically, the supplementary information about this case[107] enables us to argue that although Freud discussed the disavowal of reality and the coexistence of two contradictory currents in the fetish, the specific fetish was found in the treatment of a case of schizophrenia (psychosis)[108] (Freud 1963, 101, 106, 108). This fetish is particularly suitable to Freud's debate with Laforgue on scotomization, given that schizophrenia was the main pathology Laforgue used systematically to discuss scotomization. Arguably, in this case Freud had reason enough to recognize the disengagement of the ego from the part of reality that characterizes psychosis in such cases. However, with a fetish that disavows and affirms unpleasant facts of reality, this case presumably led Freud to problematize the error in his proposition as he did in 1927, stating that psychosis is characterized by the disengagement of the ego from a part of reality. In this sense, the case adds to Freud's argument on reintroducing splitting. Nevertheless, in *Fetishism*, Freud maintains that, in the scotomization or disavowal in psychosis, the current associated with reality would actually disappear. Considering the supplementary information on the treatment of the case and the developments in Freud's 1927 essay, it is arguable that Freud's focus was actually on the particularities of the fetish itself (Freud 1963, 106, 108). In the context of my argument, this means that Freud's aim in isolating the fetish object was not to integrate the fetish into a nosological class, but rather—and along the lines of Binet's notion of the fetish as a double-sided phenomenon—to explore the propensity of the fetish to gather opposing elements and employ the concept of splitting.

[107] In this context, Lynn's (1993) work shows evidence that Swiss psychoanalyst, Oskar Pfister, who treated the patient in 1924, initially sent him to Swiss psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler, for a consultation due to the presence of psychotic symptoms. Bleuler then diagnosed him with schizophrenia (Lynn 1993, 65). Thereafter, Pfister arranged for the patient's psychoanalytic treatment with Freud in Vienna.

[108] Between 1926 and 1927, Freud identified increasing paranoid dementia and delusions in this case, finally concluding with the diagnosis of schizophrenia (1963, 101, 106, 108). Due to little progress with this patient, he preferred to set aside the question of diagnosis and work with the living material of the patient (Freud 1963, 106, 108). As part of the living material of the patient, Freud's work in this case evidenced that the discovery of the fetish was a subsidiary finding of the treatment (Lynn 1993, 72–3). Thus, in a letter written to Pfister dated April 11, 1927, Freud reported that he tried to convince the patient to resist his fetishist masturbation. According to Freud, the patient opposed his recommendation, disagreeing that such abstinence would be essential for the progress of treatment (Freud 1963, 108). No further data on the case has been found in the correspondence between Freud and Pfister. David J. Lynn investigated further details in documents about this case regarding the subsequent period of the treatment of this patient with Freud. In the information highlighted by Lynn, the patient believed that the shock of the discovery that the woman did not have a penis was the aetiological element that triggered his illness. (Lynn 1993, 71-2).

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As I will discuss in the next chapter, Lacan did not consider this nosological displacement made by Freud. On the contrary, Lacan aligned disavowal with splitting in formulating a general classification for perversions in terms of perverse structure—starting with fetishism.

4.2.5 Freud's Final Remarks in Fetishism

Returning to the topic of the fetishist's divided attitudes, Freud mentions that, in other cases, the contradictory bifurcation (*Zwiespältigkeit*) manifests itself in what the fetishist worships (*verehrt*)—his fetish in reality or in fantasy (Freud 1927a, 157). Freud adds to this another way of reflecting on the simultaneous disavowal of reality and the recognition of castration. According to him, tenderness and hostility can merge in the treatment of the fetish, and this corresponds to the disavowal of reality and the recognition of castration (Freud 1927a, 157). Freud's approach once again coincides with Binet's developments on doubling and the dual nature of the fetish object. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, Binet discussed doubling in order to explain how subjects can have coexistent and contradictory attitudes in facing unacceptable perceptions of objects (1892, 257, 270). Moreover, in Fetishism in Love, Binet also highlighted how the fetish itself represents the synthesis of two contrary feelings (Binet 1888a, 62–3). The next sections will discuss how Freud, in the late 1930s, came to adopt precisely these developments in order to modify his entire theory of psychopathology.

Supported by Binet's ideas, Freud was now finally able to solve the problem he had been left with in 1919: linking the Oedipus Complex to fetishism. To discuss how two opposing feelings—tenderness and hostility—co-exist in the treatment of the fetish, Freud used the example of a particular kind of fetishism, that of braid-cutters (*Zopfabschneider*)[109]. Freud interprets the act of cutting a woman's braids as the enactment of castration, but without the fetishist recognizing the braid as a substitute for the female penis. Here, Freud applies the theoretical relationship between the Oedipus Complex and the Castration Complex. According to Freud, the combination of tenderness and hostility towards the fetish takes place particularly when a patient has developed a strong identification with the father. This is because the child has ascribed to the father the role of castrating the woman. Thus, Freud finds a way to theoretically reconcile the Oedipus Complex and the Castration Complex, just as the braid-cutter reconciles the two contrary propositions, "the woman still has a penis" and "my father has castrated the woman"[110] (Freud 1927a, 157).

4.3 Fetishism in Freud's Works in the Late 1930s

Freud continued his theoretical developments on fetishism in two works written and published in the 1930s, namely, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1938) and *The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence*[111] (1938). Freud wrote these works between 1937 and 1938, but they were left unfinished due to Freud's worsening health that led to his death. Both works were published posthumously in 1940. Having already been confronted by fetishism for more than thirty years, at the end of his life Freud acknowledged something astonishing: because of fetishism, he could now present a new psychopathological perspective on mental disorders

[109] Both Binet and Krafft-Ebing discussed hair fetishist cases that involved cutting women's braids (Binet 1888a, 4–5; Krafft-Ebing 1893a, 163–5).

[110] Freud's second example to discuss the simultaneous combination of two contrary feelings and attitudes was related to Chinese culture. Freud stated that this example taken from the field of folk psychology is a parallel variant of fetishism. Here, he addressed female foot fetish in Chinese culture and mentioned that it involves first mutilating and then venerating (*verehren*) the feet. According to Freud, this cultural attitude reveals that Chinese men wish to thank women for submitting to castration (1927a, 157). Freud concludes his essay according to the same line of thinking first development in the 1920s, referencing the consequences for girls when they discover their clitoris as a genital zone. Freud states that, whereas the prototype of fetishes is a man's penis, such a prototype in the female case is the woman's "small penis"—the clitoris (1927a, 157).

[111] Unlike my perspective—that Freud sees fetishism in the late 1930s as only a privileged phenomenon for studying ego- splitting—the existing secondary research argues that, in his final works, Freud sees the splitting of the ego against the backdrop of the relationship between fetishism and perversion. As such, the secondary literature does little to explore the implications of the significance Freud ascribes to his conceptualization of ego-splitting. The existing secondary research also understands ego-splitting in Freud's final works as part of the basis for his concept of disavowal (Rey-Flaud 1994, 18, 73, 163, 326; Assoun 1994, 61, 87).

(1940b, 202). Below, I contextualize the concerns that led Freud to resume his discussion of fetishism and splitting in the late 1930s, as well as to present his new perspective on psychopathology.

One topic that contextualizes Freud's continuing interest in fetishism in the 1930s is his ongoing exploration of the consequences of the child's discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes—particularly in regard to the psychosexual development of girls[112] (Freud 1931, 232-3; 241-2; 1933, 113; 116). Later, he stressed the relevance of this topic by showing that the consequences of the distinction between the sexes are tied to the limitations of the therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis (Freud 1933, 250). In this sense, it is precisely the traumatic effect caused by the child's discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes that led Freud, in the late 1930s, to assume that the synthetic function of the ego is responsible for a large number of disturbances. (Freud 1940a, 275-6). Then, he presents a new theory of psychopathology by arguing this point via the example of fetishism.

It was in his final works that Freud found the confidence to link the concept of splitting to the consequences of the child's discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes. Freud's reintroduction of splitting in 1927—supported by Binet's conceptualization of fetish objects as being double-sided and dual-character phenomena— enabled Freud to understand how the ego detaches itself from the external world in neurosis and psychosis. Consequently, in his final works of the late 1930s, Freud re-established more decisively the concept of splitting. From this point forward, I will put forward arguments related to the final part of my conceptual framework, in which I problematize Freud's theorization of fetishism over the decades. I will argue how, after evolving Binet's ideas on fetishism, Freud returns to Binet's conceptualization of doubling—and relates it to fetishism. This results in Freud's central argument of his late theory of psychopathology. Having contextualized Freud's theoretical concerns in the 1930s, below I will focus on Freud's actual discussion on splitting of the ego and fetishism in his final works.

4.3.1 Fetishism, Splitting of the Ego, and Defence

Despite admitting his hesitations, Freud claims he is presenting a new theoretical development in his last works (1940a, 275). Given the evidence presented in this dissertation, I believe it is safe to assert that the title and content of Freud's short

[112] In 1914 and 1927, this topic had provided Freud with a solution to the riddle of fetishism; Freud's emphasis on the differences between the sexes in his 1931 essay, Female Sexuality (1931, 232-3; 241-2), and in his 1933 lecture, *Femininity*, enabled the theoretical exploration of what he called, "the riddle of femininity" (*das Rätsel der Weiblichkeit*) (Freud 1933, 113; 116).

paper, *The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence*, expresses a return to his earlier framework of splitting and defence, based on Binet's ideas about doubling from the 1890s. Given my argument in this dissertation that Binet's ideas grounded Freud's late theory of psychopathology, a further exploration of this point follows.

In the late 1930s, we can observe Freud moving even closer to Binet's conceptualization, a move that was catalysed by Freud's theorizing of fetishism. In his paper, Freud is once again evolving the idea originally developed by Binet—even though Freud does not refer to Binet. In my view, this is clear from the fact that Freud selects fetishism following Binet's conceptualization in *Fetishism in Love*; it is also clear that the theoretical similarities between what Freud called "splitting of the ego" and what Binet had coined as "doubling of the ego" are prominent in Freud's works written in the late 1930s. Acknowledging and detailing these similarities is crucial to my argument in this dissertation. Accordingly, below I will discuss these similarities, referencing Freud's short paper on ego-splitting, defence, and fetishism.

Freud's paper presents another important theoretical parallel between his and Binet's theories—in addition to the similarities discussed earlier in this dissertation. In Binet's (1892, 82-4) conceptualization of doubling of the ego, he points out that the subjects engage in particular attitudes of ignoring and becoming insensitive to certain perceptions and facts, subsequently experiencing the simultaneous presence of two contrary consciousnesses, wills, attitudes, characters, and sensitivities. Binet (82) stressed these attitudes as the most frequent conditions for the doubling of the ego. Freud in turn describes the child's attitude of disavowing reality while simultaneously recognizing danger in reality (Freud 1940, 275). This results in the formation of two opposing reactions to the conflict—which is the essence of the splitting of the ego[113] (*Ichspaltung*).

4.3.2 Fetishism and Splitting in Freud's Final Theory of Psychopathology

In his book *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Freud strove to collect the important theses of psychoanalytic theory and method in a more concise format (1940b, 144).

[113] To support his argument for the splitting of the ego, Freud turns to the traumatic effect caused by the child's discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes. He presents a brief clinical vignette describing his late aetiology of fetishism in which a boy between three and four years of age became acquainted with female genitalia through seduction by an older girl. Through the creation of a fetish, the boy disavowed (*verleugnet*) reality, but saved his own penis (Freud 1940a, 277). The fetishist boy undertook a "displacement of value" by transferring the importance of the penis to another part of the woman's body, with the aid of the regression mechanism (Freud 1940a, 277). Even so, the boy developed an intense anxiety that his father would punish him for the fetish. According to Freud, this symptom proves that the boy recognized the danger of castration after all (1940, 277).

However, Freud's elaborations on fetishism in this work clearly reflect the outcomes of discussions begun in the 1920s. Again, deeming fetishism an appropriate subject, Freud reflects on the process of how, via the psychopathological perspective of the splitting of the ego in mental illness, the ego detaches itself from the external world.

n arguing for the central role of ego-splitting in mental illness, Freud reaffirms that the pathological states of the ego were founded on a suspension or loosening of the relation between the ego and the external world. In light of this assertion of Freud's, we must ask ourselves: what, precisely, changes in his thinking during the 1930s? In contrast to the 1920s, when Freud theorized ego states as distinct psychic mechanisms, Freud in 1938 changed his perspective. Arguably, Freud's theorization first articulated in his 1927 essay *Fetishism*, about splitting in fetishist disavowal, in 1938 changed his perspective on psychosis. Freud assumes that ego disorders always derive from general psychic splitting. Thus, Freud (1940b, 202) includes psychosis as a pathology that entails splitting. In fact, he clearly admits that various cases of fetishism he had encountered served to convince him of this new point of view (Freud 1940b, 202). This admission clearly supports the argument of this dissertation: that fetishism continually leads Freud to restate his approach to this phenomenon—and ultimately, the concept of fetishism impels Freud to revise his general ideas on psychopathology.

Convinced by his various cases of fetishism, and now incorporating psychosis into his new thinking, Freud now deduces that the psychic splitting of the ego (*psychische Spaltung*) occurs in all cases of pathological states of the ego (1940b, 202). This conclusion took into account that psychic splitting occurs in all disorders: "We may probably take it as being generally true that what occurs in all these cases is a psychical split. Two psychical attitudes have been formed instead of a single one—one, the normal one, which takes account of reality, and another which under the influence of the drives detaches the ego from reality. The two exist alongside of each other" (Freud 1940b, 202). According to the argumentation in this chapter, the above quote illustrates how Freud conceptualizes splitting by referencing coexisting currents—in a manner similar to Binet's elaboration of his ideas on doubling. The quote above also affirms the fact that Freud (1940b, 202) at this juncture applies splitting to all cases (*in all solchen Fällen*). This is clearly similar to the conclusion Binet gradually arrived at: that doubling underlies different pathologies (Binet 1892, VIII, 2; Binet and Simon 1910, 119–20).

The argument in this chapter is that after years of debating Binet's theories on fetishism, Freud returns to Binet's ideas, now intending to formulate a psychoanalytic

understanding of splitting. At his stage, we can examine what, exactly, Freud makes of Binet's theory that doubling underlies various pathologies. As I will explain below, the fact that Binet's concept of doubling entails two psychic currents or attitudes contributes to Freud's theoretical interest in the idea.

According to Freud's arguments of 1938, pathologies were no longer distinguished in terms of specific psychic mechanisms that categorize major nosological classes, as in the 1920s. In contrast, Freud in 1938 presented a model that distinguishes pathologies by the difference in strength of each of the two coexisting psychic attitudes in psychic splitting. In psychosis, Freud asserts, the condition for such pathologies relies on the greater strength of the psychic current detached from reality. Thus, Freud's aim in presenting the concept of the splitting of the ego was to describe this new psychopathological viewpoint (*Gesichtspunkt*) (1940b, 202). Freud states that the coexistence of two opposing and independent attitudes in the splitting of the ego is due to the fact that the ego's defence—either through the disavowal of the external world or the rejection of the demand of the drive from the inner world—is never completely successful. Thus, the ego's attempt at defence always results in the splitting of the ego, in which the weaker attitude leads to psychic complications[114] (1940b, 204). Clearly, Freud was aware of Binet's claim of more than 40 years prior: that doubling of the ego is the source of a considerable number of disturbances and phenomena in mental life (Binet 1892, I, VIII). As such, Freud (1940b, 204) in 1938 assures us that his new viewpoint is pertinent. After all, his viewpoint is predicated on the idea that the concept of ego-splitting is compatible with that of neuroses—and is verifiable in different neurosis-like states.

Highlighting these similarities allows me to advance to the next step in laying out the problematic of this dissertation, namely, identifying the differences between Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytic theories of fetishism. As I will explain in the next chapter, Freud relies on specific models already formulated in Binet's studies. This is essential to my argument for two reasons: 1) Lacan, too, engages with Binet's thinking on doubling; Lacan's version of doubling in psychoanalysis entails a summary interpretation of Freud's discussion of splitting; and 2) In theorizing about fetishism, Freud refers to one set of Binet's models, while Lacan explores—and further develops—another model of doubling introduced by Binet.

[114] Freud remarks that his new theory of ego-splitting in fetishism led him to reaffirm the importance of the defence theory; Freud argues for the use of psychoanalysis to explore other yet unknown defensive processes (1940b, 204).

Drawing on his experience with fetishist patients, Freud in 1938 addresses his clinical assessment of the relationship of the fetishist with the fetish object, which he had initiated in the 1920s. First, Freud claims that the disavowed perception of fetishism does not remain entirely without influence, as would be expected in the psychotic separation from reality. As Freud emphasizes the strength of the psychic current linked to reality in the case of the splitting of the ego in fetishism, in his late clinical assessment on fetishism, Freud recognized that, although the fetishist creates the fetish to avoid castration anxiety (1940b, 203), fetishists can develop the same castration anxiety as non-fetishists. In addition, Freud revises his 1927 categorization of fetishism as a type of object choice. This supports the idea that, again, Freud was led to reconsider fetishism clinically, even in his final work. In line with the problematization of this dissertation, Freud was led to rethink whether fetishism could actually be fully developed—or even categorized as a sole object choice. Freud claims that the circumstance of a stronger psychic current linked to reality allows the assumption that fetishism is often only partially developed. In this sense, Freud (1940b, 203) admits that fetishism cannot be an exclusive dominating object choice. Instead, he argues along the lines of Binet's and Krafft-Ebing's ideas on gradual transitions of fetishism from minor to major. Fetishism, Freud asserts, can give way to normal sexual behaviour to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, the fetish can even be restricted to a modest role in sexual behaviour: the individual may merely allude to the fetish. Freud concludes that in the case of fetishism, the detachment of the ego from the external world is never entirely successful (1940b, 203). Again, this consideration corresponds to Freud's gradually developing characterization of perversions and fetishism—particularly in the 1920s—as a lesser abnormality.

Consistent with the argument in this chapter, Freud did not frame his interest in fetishism as a means to explore the concept of perversion, but rather as a suitable object to study (*günstiges Studienobjekt*): "It must not be thought that fetishism presents an exceptional case as regards a splitting of the ego; it is merely a particularly favorable subject for studying the question" (Freud 1940b, 203). This quote also serves as a starting point for exploring the next step in the problematic in the following chapter of this dissertation: how Freud's and Lacan's psychoanalytic theories of fetishism differ. I will assert that in his final theory, Freud does not see fetishism as a means of arguing for any specifics of perversion; rather, Freud sees fetishism as a vehicle for defending his general theory of splitting. In contrast, I will analyse how, by referencing Freud's late works, Lacan frames the relationship between splitting and fetishism as a theory of perverse structure.

As discussed in this chapter, Freud's extension of splitting to the understanding of other pathologies is consistent with the ideas of Binet (1892, I, VIII; Binet and Simon 1910, 119-20). In this sense, I venture to argue that, in his final works, Freud aligned his theory of psychopathology with Binet and Simon's (1910, 68) critique of Freud's sexual aetiological theory. As previously discussed, in 1910, Binet and Simon posited splitting as constituting the aetiological foundation of disorders. In contrast, Freud distanced himself from the concept of perversion and its aetiological and nosological applications as sexuality became less central to his theory of psychopathology. Over the decades, Freud's approach to fetishism illuminates this change. Fetishism, initially understood by Freud as a central model of sexual deviance—according to the relevant literature on the topic—became the basis for Freud's theory of psychopathology—replete with the vulnerability of the ego-synthesizing function. In the late 1930s, after placing splitting at the core of his late theory of psychopathology, Freud returned to the neuropathological and psychological bases that made up his initial aetiological theory in the 1890s; he discussed splitting against the background of his debate with Binet's conceptualization of doubling.

In the next chapter, I will return to these late works of Freud's, exploring the role they played in Lacan's formulation of his psychoanalytic theory. I will contrast Freud's thinking in the 1920s and 1930s—when he no longer referred to Binet's doubling when discussing splitting—with Lacan's theory from the 1930s until the 1960s; we will see how Lacan uses Binet's concept of doubling as a point of departure in discussing the theory of splitting in Freud's later works.

4

Chapter 5

"Fetishism" in Jacques Lacan's Work

Now that I have discussed and problematized Sigmund Freud's theorization of fetishism in the preceding chapters, in this chapter I will evaluate the ideas of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and determine the differences between the two theorizations of fetishism. Investigating Lacan's ideas supports the discussion in this dissertation for several reasons. First, Lacan delves into the concept of perversion and the relationship between fetishism and the pathologization of perversions. Second, Lacan theorizes about fetishism in his development of the concept of doubling. And third, Lacan's discussions of fetishism relate directly to his development of a theory on subjectivity and on the object of human desire.

In this chapter, I argue that Lacan's discussion of these topics stems from motivations other than those that impelled Freud to grapple with fetishism. Lacan approaches the phenomenon of fetishism from a conceptual perspective that differs from Freud's. I further argue that the essence of these differences lies in Lacan's evolution of concepts and insights originating in other theoretical traditions. These concepts are 1) not psychoanalytic in nature; and 2) not strictly reliant on Freud's work (in cases when Lacan employs these concepts in his debate with psycho-analytic thinking). To problematize Lacan's theorization of fetishism I follow Lacan's approach to fetishism, which was initially aimed at developing an explanatory model of forensic psychiatric phenomena. His approach entails conceptualizing fetishism as a personality-linked phenomenon characterized by interactive patterns of relating to other individuals. In pursuing this approach, Lacan encounters obstacles to establishing how the fetish object—the key feature of fetishism—is connected to personality; Lacan engages with psychoanalytic theories on fetishism that came after Freud's, specifically, the psychoanalytic interpretation of object-relation. This engagement subsequently resulted in Lacan's conceptualization of perversion in terms of "perverse structure" and "fetishist structure". However, Lacan gradually shifted the focus of his theorization to fetishism as a paradigm of perversion. Consequently, he turned to a theorization of the fetish object as a model for his reasoning on human desire.

To organize my argument about the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories in the sections ahead, I follow Lacan's theorization of fetishism in chronological order. First, I will discuss Lacan's development of his psychiatric ideas on fetishism; second, I will analyse his engagement with the psychoanalytic tradition of object-relation. By disentangling Lacan's interactions with the broader theoretical tradition from those with Freud's psychoanalytic work, I will problematize the divergent motivations for Freud and Lacan to approach the phenomenon of fetishism and the various issues related to splitting and doubling. Later, I will discuss how ideas on fetishism in the psychiatric landscape influenced Lacan's psychoanalytic theory on this topic.

To lay the foundation for this chapter, we need to return briefly to Freud's early conceptualization of—and subsequent thinking on—perversion, which differed from the contemporary view of perversity. French psychiatric traditions, such as the tradition to which Lacan subscribed, have linked fetishism to the notion of perversity—in contrast to Freud's view. This line of forensic psychiatric thinking operationalized fetishism to explain criminal acts. At the outset of his theorization, Lacan evolved this link between fetishism and forensic explanations by seeking recourse in Freud's theories. However, as I will discuss, the psychoanalytic ideas on which Lacan relied are markedly different from those Freud mobilized to theorize fetishism.

In his initial discussion of fetishism, Lacan (1956-7, 52) provides an overview of what he considers to be Freud's predominant works on fetishism. In doing so, Lacan points out that Freud reworked his *Three Essays* over a period of several years after publication, making revisions and adding notes in subsequent editions. When commenting on Freud's ideas on sexuality and fetishism in *Three Essays*, Lacan defends Freud's addition of ideas on Ego-Libido (narcissism) to the book. Given my discussion of Freud's thinking on fetishism in this dissertation, I will argue that Lacan's interpretation of Freud's *Three Essays* shows that Lacan sees fetishism differently from Freud: Lacan's interpretation reflects his alignment with his previous psychiatric ideas and with the psychoanalytic perspective of the object-relation. This shows that Lacan theorizes fetishism and perversion *without* considering the questions that confronted Freud in his approach to fetishism. This supports my decision to discuss Lacan's thinking on fetishism in detail in the following sections.

To further contextualize the argument in this chapter, I will now discuss how Lacan, in his psychiatric explorations, approached Binet's conceptualization of doubling. In previous chapters, I reviewed the conceptualization of doubling initiated by Binet and his scientific cohort at the Salpêtrière in Paris, and how this was adopted by Freud in his theory of psychopathology. Below, I will discuss how Lacan also built on Binet's conceptualization of doubling in his theories. This will provide a basis from which to understand Lacan's thinking on Freud's theorization of splitting and fetishism.

5.1 Doubling, Personality, and Perversity in Lacan's Theorization of Fetishism

Scholars claim that Lacan's works published between 1932 and 1953 represent his first interactions with Freud's ideas—rather than Lacan's own psychoanalytic ideas *per se* (Julien, 2016, 18). Here, I will demonstrate that, during this period, Lacan already shows theoretical interest in fetishism. This is crucial to my argument: from the outset of his engagement with psychoanalysis, Lacan theorizes about fetishism as a phenomenon to be understood via the concepts of doubling of personality and perversity. Freud, in contrast, did not mobilize the concepts of personality or perversity when discussing fetishism[115]. I argue that even Lacan's more detailed psychoanalytic theory of fetishism in the 1950s can be seen as a deepening of his initial model, which arose from his explorations of forensic psychiatry. Consistent with this argument, I aim to clarify how the psychiatric landscape in which Lacan operated determined his early interest in fetishism. I will also define how this interest resulted in a theoretical framing of this phenomenon that was different from Freud's.

A crucial point to note is Lacan's attention and reference to Binet's ideas, particularly during the period from the 1930s to the 1950s[116]. Considering the recurrence of Lacan's employment of doubling in his written work and his seminars, it can be argued that Binet's concept of doubling shaped Lacan's theories even before he developed his psychoanalytic ideas. To clarify this argument, it is key to discuss the ways in which Lacan's approach to fetishism relies on his theoretical engagement with the concept of doubling. This perspective adds to the problematization developed in the previous chapters regarding the place of Binet's ideas on doubling in the evolution of both Freud's and Lacan's psychoanalytic ideas.

In his doctoral thesis, "Paranoid psychosis and its relation to the personality", published in 1932, Lacan (1932, 35) explored the concept of personality as a suitable vehicle for his psychiatric investigation. In fact, Lacan problematizes psychosis

[115] Works that cover the development of Lacan's ideas about fetishism do not address this early period (Bonny and Maleval, 2015; Assoun, 1994; Rey-Flaud, 1994). Predominantly, these studies address Lacan's theory of fetishism from the perspective of Lacan's theory of language (Assoun 1994, 118-20; Rey-Flaud 1994, 95-174). Here, one loses sight of a major model in which Lacan elaborated on fetishism in a psychoanalytical context from the 1930s until the 1950s. Exploration of this point in existing studies is limited. These references reveal that Lacan was aware of Binet's developments in *Fetishism in Love*, Binet's works on language acquisition in children, and especially Binet's concept of doubling.

[116] Exploration of this point in existing studies is limited. These references reveal that Lacan was aware of Binet's developments in *Fetishism in Love*, Binet's works on language acquisition in children, and especially Binet's concept of doubling.

(paranoia in particular) as psychogenic[117], that is, as linked to the function of the personality of the subject (Lacan 1932, 43, 54). He adds that perversions could also be explained via this psychogenic approach (47). Lacan then applies his psychogenic ideas to fetishism, although he does not go into detail on the topic of perversions.

In his search for a suitable conceptualization of personality in his psychiatric explorations in the 1930s, Lacan's discussions are similar to Binet's on this topic. This means that Lacan did not see personality as the individual conscious psychological unit, nor did he accept the concept of personal synthesis. Lacan (1932, 43) found support in the notion of the doubling of personality (*dédoublement de la personnalité*), acknowledging first of all Binet's works on the topic, followed by those of Janet and Freud. Staking his claim to a position among the traditions in psychology that define personality scientifically, Lacan writes in a footnote: "In the deliberate aim of 'protesting against the belief in the metaphysical reality and substantial unity of the soul' (…) it remains from now on inscribed in expressions that have made a fortune such as: doubling of personality. (…) (cf. the works of Binet, Janet, Freud)" (1932, 43).

What does Lacan's early use of the concept of doubling tell us? In my opinion, 1) Lacan acknowledges Freud's ideas as constituting an evolution of the concept of doubling; and 2) before his systematic exploration of Freud's works, Lacan's employment of doubling expresses an affinity with the conceptualization of the French neuropathological tradition (the Salpêtrière school[118]). Despite the fact that in his thesis, Lacan reserved a footnote to affirm his adherence to Binet's concept

[117] By not exploring Lacan's ideas initiated in the 1930s, existing research ends up considering Lacan's classical theory of psychosis as that developed in the 1950s (Redmond 2013, 60). In this sense these studies claim that Lacan never endorsed a psychogenic view (Redmond 2013, 58). By contrast, in his thesis, the importance that Lacan (1932, 44-8) gives to the discussion on the psychogenic aetiology of psychosis (paranoia) and in the field of psychopathology is clear. In fact, Lacan (47) devotes a separate section to the "Fertility of psychogenic research". Lacan's aetiological theory of paranoia, fetishism, and perversions by means of his conceptualization of the doubling of personality introduced in the 1930s and applied as far as the 1950s demonstrates the relevance of the psychogenic model in his thinking. Moreover, even if Lacan came to criticize psychogenetic theses aimed at his psychoanalytic theory, it is arguable that over the decades, in order to further develop his psychoanalytic ideas, Lacan increasingly aligned himself with ideas that he considered to be the most advanced of the psychogenetic (1946, 168; 1966, 65). I will discuss this topic in more detail in the following sections debating Lacan's further theorization on fetishism as aligned with French psychiatric thought.

[118] In "Paranoid psychosis and its relation to personality", Lacan's references to Janet's ideas are as many as Lacan's references to Freud's.

of doubling of personality[119], I will further argue that doubling played a major role in Lacan's theorizing in the 1930s—as well as in subsequent decades— when he discussed Freud's ideas on fetishism.

To further develop my argument, I will analyse Lacan's discussion on paranoia and personality in the context of his psychiatric training. Lacan's doctoral thesis is the result of his work in the field of forensic psychiatry. From 1927 to 1931, Lacan worked in the Special Infirmary of the Paris Police Headquarters, where people considered to be dangerous were brought in for emergency treatment (Roudinesco, 1997, 17). In the course of this work, Lacan was influenced by the ideas of his predecessors at the Special Infirmary, the French psychiatrists Ernest Dupré and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault[120]. Both Dupré and de Clérambault adopted aetiological views of theoretical doctrines concerning perversity, fetishism, and paranoia (Gumpper and Haustgen 2012a, 227). Lacan, in his thesis, refers to these ideas and aims, through his psychogenic aetiology of paranoia, to solve difficulties in constitutional theories of psychopathology (Lacan 1932, 25, 74). Here, Lacan directly debates the ideas initiated by Dupré.

Lacan's engagement with these theories is important. Scholars have noted that the differences between Freud's and Lacan's thinking on perversion are linked to the historical background of the psychiatric appropriation of the perversions referred to by Lacan (Lantéri-Laura, 2012). Moreover, contemporary debate on this topic problematizes how Lacan's theory of the perverse structure is strongly related to the influence of Dupré's ideas and inevitably induces moral regard for perversions (Lantéri-Laura 2012, 185; Mazaleigue-Labaste 2014, 290; Van Haute 2016, 275). Examining Lacan's engagement in this debate is relevant to my argument in this chapter for three reasons: 1) It clarifies Lacan's view of fetishism in his early theorizing about paranoia in the 1930s, and as such, it allows us to problematize his psychoanalytic theorization of fetishism in the 1950s; and 2) It elucidates Lacan's theoretical recourse to the concepts of personality and doubling; and 3) It explains precisely how Freud's ideas on sexuality provide solutions to Lacan's psychiatric thinking. This discussion ensues below.

[119] Together with embracing the Salpêtrière's tradition, Lacan's affiliation to French psychiatry is also seen in this footnote as he (Lacan 1932, 43) employs "scissions of the ego" (*scissions du moi*). Lacan's association with French psychiatry will be further discussed.

[120] Like Freud and others, Clérambault also trained at the Salpêtrière hospital in 1897 (Gumpper and Haustgen 2012a, 225). Clérambault studied the theory of doubling and of transformations of personality (226), interacting directly with Binet and Simon (Clérambault, 1910).

Contrary to Freud's interest in fetishism—in support of a strategy to regard perversion as a universal human sexual condition—Dupré's constitutional assumptions presuppose that sexual perversions such as fetishism and other disorders, such as paranoia, stem from the same disposition, that is, a perversion of the instincts (Dupré 1912, 405-6). Such perverted instincts operate as psychological character traits. Dupré claims that these dispositions become manifest in fetishists (and in paranoiacs) as moral perversity, that is, vain, malignant, and antisocial tendencies. This usually happens in a state of impetuous excitement and reckless anger, psychiatrically labelled as paroxysm. This would explain episodes of stealing seen in fetishists, as well as the hostility and anger during spells of paranoia (Dupré 1912, 372, 390, 405-6). This fits in with the problematization I develop in this chapter, when we consider that Dupré's assumptions are fundamentally different from Freud's efforts to distinguish immoral acts (perversity) from sexual perversions. In his turn, Lacan—who adheres to Dupré's perspective rather than Freud's—sees fetishism as a key component to developing a psychoanalytic theory of paroxysms in fetishism and perversion, framed in psychiatric terms as *passage à l'acte* (passage to the act). I therefore argue that, in his theory of fetishism, Lacan specifically applies Freud's ideas on sexuality to explain the premises previously established by Dupré. In the following sections I will discuss in detail how, unlike Freud, Lacan explored fetishism from a psychoanalytic perspective in the 1950s by drawing a parallel between fetishism and delinquent acts. First, I will now detail how Lacan interpreted Dupré's concept of perversion.

Dupré postulated that a perverse constitution becomes apparent in childhood when, independent of external influences, a series of traits manifest themselves in aggressive behaviour and bad intentions (Sauvagnat and Chaillou 2016, 211). Whereas Dupré assumed these traits to be innate and hereditary (Lacan 1932, 25, 51), Lacan (74) argued that such constitutional assumptions where difficult to prove. Lacan's (1932, 51, 62, 98) psychogenic aetiological theory aims to understand paranoia (and fetishism) as an outcome of the development of personality[121] . It is precisely here that Lacan initiates his exploration of Freud's (and Binet's) ideas. In his ensuing arguments, Lacan does not choose Freud's ideas as a starting point for discussing the perverse constitution of the sexual drive. Instead, Lacan explores psychoanalytic ideas on the formation of the ego to develop a theory on the formation of personality—more precisely, a theory of doubling personality.

[121] Lacan describes this in terms of atypical ideo-affective processes involving ideal images that form the ego (Lacan 1932, 98).

Previously, I discussed the path of Freud's theoretical challenges that led him to theorize about fetishism by gradually adopting a view of human sexuality as dependent on a sexual object. In this chapter, I argue that, confronted with theoretical challenges in psychiatry, Lacan aims to evolve Durpé's premise that perverted instincts operate as psychological traits in fetishism (and paranoia). Lacan (1931, 37-42, 345) refers to psychoanalytic ideas about sexuality in view of a theoretical approach of the topic of objectification of images. Specifically, Lacan sees fetishism as an appropriate vehicle for discussing issues related to a lack in this objectification. (I will discuss this in the following sections). Thus, he focuses on works by Freud in which the theory of the sexual drive and its polymorphous-perverse components underwent changes as Freud turned the idea of infantile autoerotic perversion toward the unification of objects. Bearing in mind that I have shown in this dissertation that Freud *did not* theorize about fetishism in service of a theory on the formation of personality (the ego), this supports the argument I make in the following sections: that Lacan's psychoanalytic theorizing of fetishism differs from Freud's.

Despite the fact that Lacan in the 1930s presented a psychogenic theory of personality as an alternative to Dupré's constitutional views, and despite the fact that Lacan employed psychoanalytic ideas in formulating this theory, I argue that Lacan's attitude toward the concept of personality belongs to the very tradition of French forensic psychiatric thinking, of which Dupré was a part. This argument is supported by scholars who claim (Sauvagnat and Chaillou 2016, 211) that, in as far as Dupré's constitutional ideas presupposed the individual's dangerous intent, such an assumption was already implied by the concept of personality. Here, Lacan's recourse to Binet's doubling of personality comes into play: as Lacan theorizes on fetishism as a phenomenon related to (double) personality throughout his psychoanalytic theorization, he is evolving forensic psychiatry's ideas about fetishism as linked to a moral and criminal issue.

Some scholars (Sauvagnat and Chaillou 2016, 223, 229) acknowledge that this criminalization of fetishism, seen even in late-twentieth-century as well as twenty-first-century thought, continues to derive theoretical support in the link between personality and perversity. Similarly, this link applies to Lacan's psychoanalytic ideas of regarding fetishism as a disorder in the formation of the ego and object relations (222). The resulting phenomena of personality that lead the individual to criminal acts are then understood as resolutions to inner conflict. Furthermore, these scholars (Sauvagnat and Chaillou 2016, 220-1, 229) remark that Lacan's concepts of perverse structure and fetishism are debated contemporaneously as moral and even criminal

concerns. In the upcoming sections, I will discuss how Lacan includes fetishism in his early forensic psychiatric thinking by electing this phenomenon as a paradigm for his concept of perverse structure in the 1950s. How Lacan's choice for psychoanalytic ideas on the formation of the ego in the 1930s corresponds to his exploration of the doubling of personality will be discussed below.

5.1.1 Binet's Ideas on Paranoia as Doubling of Personality in Lacan's Explorations

Having placed Lacan's views of fetishism and perversity in the context of the relevant psychiatric tradition, I will now discuss how Lacan evolves Binet's ideas. In his thesis, Lacan refers to the study in which Binet and Simon criticized Freud's aetiological ideas on hysteria, and in which they argued for the concept of doubling. A closer look at Binet's ideas on (the doubling of) personality and paranoia will clarify why Lacan chose the concept of the doubling of personality to develop his psychiatric and psychoanalytic ideas. Binet and Simon (1910, 142) discussed paranoia as insanity with conscience (*folie avec conscience*) and as systematised insanity (*folie systématisée*) (216-29). They (226) argued that paranoid subjects are not detached from external reality and that certain forms of paranoia are nothing more than a decreased level of ability to adapt to reality (1910, 142-3). As further discussed, Lacan defines paranoia (and consequently fetishism) as a maladaptation to reality. Paranoia, Binet and Simon claimed (1910, 119-20), implies that the subject presents a doubling of personality (*dédoublement de la personnalité*). They (119-20) explain that paranoiacs are "doubled" (*dédoublés*) subjects because they are in conflict with a force that is unfamiliar to them. Binet and Simon explain that these subjects can speak about their doubling (*dédoublement*). Particularly, they can recognize the other (*autre*) within themselves (Binet and Simon, 1910, 120). I will discuss in the following section how this supports my problematization in this chapter.

Whereas Freud was engaged in reshaping Binet's foundational ideas on doubling, Lacan did not follow Freud in considering it as linked to the phenomena of consciousness in hysteria nor to the double unconscious perception of objects or double-faced objects. Also, in contrast to Freud, Lacan did not link doubling to the simultaneity of attitudes in the doubling of the ego. When Lacan centres his psychoanalytic discussion on fetishism in the 1950s, he is aware that Freud targeted his concept of splitting the ego as related to the fetish object (Lacan 1956-7, 156). Nonetheless, as I will discuss later, Lacan insists on framing fetishism as a problem of the objectification of the subject's body image. Therefore, as I am problematizing, Lacan's theory of fetishism can be read as a further development of his initial psychiatric conceptualization. It can therefore be argued that Lacan's study of the

relationship between personality, paranoia (and consequently fetishism) in the 1930s evolved from Binet and Simon's conceptualization of paranoia as a doubling of personality.

Other similarities can be found between Binet and Simon's ideas and Lacan's[122]. In the model of (paranoid) doubling discussed by Binet and Simon (1910, 255-60), the subject, endowed with self-love and egocentrism, develops assumptions as a doubled subject[123] . Concerning the origin of paranoia and the role of individual characteristics (personality), Binet and Simon (1910, 223-6, 260) presumed that these systematizations might be found in childhood, more specifically, in the individual's ambient reality[124]. This is important to understand Lacan's line of thought on doubling and personality as linked to fetishism. As Lacan believes Binet's doubling is an appropriate vehicle for discussing personality, fetishism, and paroxysmal acts, he draws on aetiological ideas aligned with Binet and Simon's assumption on the childhood origin of this type of personality. Lacan considers that these stem from the reality of the subject's early environment.

122 As a doubling of personality, Binet and Simon (1910, 223-4) defend paranoia as a model that underlies the explanation of systematized insanity and delusions. In his psychiatric thesis, Lacan (1932, 76) also refers to Binet's considerations in this regard.

123 Through paranoid systematization, Binet and Simon highlight how the subject speaks about his doubling by recognizing a persecutory other. Therefore, the logic in the subject's systematization progressively presupposes someone else as a threatening enemy and imagines the reasons for the mysterious processes that lie behind his enemies' motives (Binet and Simon 1910, 227-8).

124 Binet and Simon's assumptions led them to describe a typical "personality of the persecuted" (*personnalité du persécuté*) (1910, 230). This personality is characterized by behaviour through which the subject adapts to the delusion while retaining his personality traits. To study this type of personality, Binet and Simon (1910, 231) discuss cases of individuals who were interrogated during incarceration because, in moments of paroxysms (244, 264), their uncontrollable impulsive rage had led them to commit criminal acts motivated by ideas of persecution that implied imaginary enemies. In the context of psychiatric investigation in the 1930s, Lacan undertakes the same strategy as Binet and Simon. Lacan draws on the discussion of a case history of a thirty-eight-year-old paranoid woman, Aimée, whom Lacan interviewed at the Special Infirmary of Police in Paris (Lacan 1932, 230-1, 242). Aimée had been arrested for attempted murder during an apparent paroxysmal episode. Lacan justifies his interest in Aimée's case particularly due to the daily difficulties medicolegal experts experience with paranoia (1932, 14). Lacan assumed that Aimée's paranoid personality defended itself against the undertaking of its persecutory counterpart (Lacan 1932, 232, 227). He claims that (1932, 226), Aimeé's paranoid personality opposes itself against its enemies like an inverted image in the mirror. Lacan aimed at examining the paranoid delusion that developed in Aimée's attempted murder to free herself from the persecution suffered by her double imaginary enemy. This formulation is relevant to Lacan's later interests in fetishism in the 1950s. Lacan theorizes about the implication of the double image in fetishism. He characterizes it with a fetishist paroxysm in terms of aggressive actions.

Lacan connects doubling to the stages of development culminating in the complexity of personality, which includes the consequences of the subject's (social) interactions with other individuals (1932, 132-3, 270). Lacan (1932, 165, 233, 252) notes that the subject's persecuting enemies are duplicates (*doublets*) of familiar prototypes of the subject. This fact leads Lacan (296) to suggest that this doubling of personality stems from the subject's early iterative identifications (*identification iterative*) with family members[125]. This idea will gradually shape Lacan's approach to fetishism, as I will discuss later. I argue that Freud's ideas on fetishism led Lacan to conclude that the subject's iterative identification with the mother image proves that the subject deals with duplicate images in the initial stages of the formation of his personality. Considering that these assumptions mark the beginning of Lacan's interaction with Freud's ideas, we should first ask the question: What would have been the role of Freud's theory here?

In line with Binet and Simon, Lacan debates the origin of pre-personal anomalies as a maladaptation of the subject in the synthesis of internal and external realities (Lacan 1932, 243). In this sense, according to Lacan (1932, 255), Freud's theory of the evolution of the libido offers an organic explanation that corresponds to the understanding of this maladaptation in the "contact with reality" (257) at the origin of doubled (paranoid) personality. Thus, Lacan (1932, 257) interprets Freud's ideas on infantile sexuality from the perspective of the development of the libido in terms of successive projections of the libido onto external objects. As Lacan postulates the origin of anomalies in the pre-personal organizing stages of development, he justifies his interest in Freud's theory of infantile sexuality by taking into account that these libidinal projections onto external objects mostly occur at a very early stage in life (Lacan 1932, 257). Freud *did not* apply these ideas to his theory of fetishism. In contrast, Lacan at this point identified fetishism as a phenomenon to be understood through the link between the pre-personal maladaptation of the libidinal projection onto external objects and the contact with reality. Below I will further discuss Lacan's considerations of fetishism in this context.

[125] Lacan (1932, 340) assumes that the study of psychoses can reveal that the initial socialized reactions of the subject interfere in the individual organizational stages of his vital drives generating pre-personal anomalies (*anomalies prépersonnelles*). He considers these anomalies archaic elements in the genesis and structure of the personality. This is because the development of the subject's personality depends on his identification with his "doubles" so that he recognizes his own image. Thus, while dependent on another individual, the constitution of the subject's personality is always structured by a doubling. Subsequently, this lends support to my argument that Freud did not discuss these ideas to theorize about fetishism.

5.1.2 Lacan's Initial Approach to Fetishism

How does Lacan view fetishism in the context of his psychiatric investigation? He associates sexual perversions with his forensic psychiatric explorations. Furthermore, he claims that in addition to the murderous intent in the paranoiacs' aggression towards their enemies, paranoiacs engage in other immoral acts, such as robbery and slander; these behaviours represent episodic manifestations of sexual perversions (Lacan 1932, 275). But let's assess Lacan's link between sexual perversion and immoral or criminal acts. Such a link is evidence of not only the influence of his training in the field of forensic psychiatry, but also of Lacan's willingness to apply his idea of maladaptive synthesis of personality to the understanding of the paroxysms of perversions and fetishism. It is here that Lacan draws on Freud's ideas. Consistent with my argument in this chapter on what distinguishes Freud's and Lacan's theorizations of fetishism, it is worth recalling that Freud did not address the topic of aggressiveness in fetishism. To better understand how Lacan includes fetishism in this reasoning by drawing on psychoanalytic thinking, I will first explain his theoretical manoeuvre that links his psychiatric ideas to those of Freud.

To substantiate this link between aggressiveness and perversion, and his model of the anomaly of personality, Lacan (1932, 341, 355) relies on Freud's theories on the drive and psychosexual development, and on his explanation for how the aggressive drives are socialized. Finding recourse in psychoanalytic ideas, Lacan claims that interruptions occur in the psychic development that he conceptualized as narcissistic pre-personal fixations[126] (358). Insofar as the formation of the human self is structurally dependent on a relationship with a double, Lacan (1932, 313) understands that this can result in an aggressive relational modality of the personality. This modality presents a discordant synthesis related to images that shape such a double, that is, images of the subject's family. It is important to highlight this formulation here, given that Lacan develops his psychoanalytic ideas and attempts to theorize fetishism in the same framework. To explore how the paranoid ego is structurally reliant on a relationship with a double,

[126] Lacan (1932, 356) states that the sexual sphere is where the synthesis of organic and social factors that shape personality takes place. He argues that the paranoid anomaly of personality is the result of interruptions in the evolution of infantile stages when the assimilation of the image of the child's parents and siblings to his own personality (the ego) normally occurs. These interruptions fixate the subject's ego affectively (355). In paranoia, Lacan (356) argues, such interruptions correspond to a fixation of the child in his anal erotism occurring in this same stage of the assimilation of the image of the parents. This explains a fixation on sado-masochistic and homosexual tendencies during the subject's initial socialization with individuals of his family.

Lacan (1932, 39, 324-5) turns to Freud's ideas about the formation of the Ego ideal[127] (*Idéal du Moi*). However, Lacan does not explain how fetishism and perversions result from a maladaptation in the projection of perverse components of the drives (libido) onto reality. In the 1930s, as Lacan tries to fit fetishism into his theory, it becomes evident that his ideas on objectification refer to images of people—and not to the kind of fetish objects Freud investigated (feet, nose, hair, underwear, shoe, boot, support-belt). Additionally, though Lacan considers his theory to include fetishism, he does not make clear how the fetish object—an essential characteristic of fetishism—can explain a personality-related phenomenon. This argument supports the problem I develop in this chapter, given my view that, over the decades, Lacan gradually shifts the focus of his theorization of fetishism.

Lacan's gradual approach to fetishism in the late 1930s is a clear consequence of his ongoing theorization of the link between doubling and the formation of personality. In the late 1930s, Lacan built on his theorization on these topics through Freud's psychoanalytic ideas on sexual difference. Lacan (1938, 45) places fetishism as an outcome of the same discordant ego-identifications he theorized on in his psychiatric thesis, that is, as a fixation on atypical identification forms of the narcissistic phase. According to Lacan, when the maturation of the child's genital drive happens before the subject achieves a full objectification of the image of his parents, this invariably implies a lack (*défaut, carence*) in the ego's ability to synthesize and unify images (1938, 28, 75). Thus, Lacan explains that the subject's initial relations with the images

[127] Lacan was notably exploring a type of idealization that was not the one that Freud developed for fetishism. Different from theorizing about the overvaluation of objects as Freud did on fetishism, the idealization in Lacan's theorization relates to the image of people. This is why Lacan's exploration of Freud's notion of the ideal ego is crucial to thinking about personality-related pathologies. In subsequent stages, the subject starts idealizing the images of individuals in his family due to the anomaly of their personalities. Lacan (1932, 39, 324-5) argues that a failure of objectification takes place here. Thus, the subject cannot differentiate the image of these idealized individuals as distinct from his own ego. This leads Lacan (1932, 253) to clarify the characterization of doubling in the case history of Aimée. In the systematization of her persecutory ideas, the same images that represent her ideals also objectify her hatred. Thus, Aimée's persecutory characters, once symmetrical to her Ego ideal, symbolize Aimée's repressed homosexuality and aggressiveness (Lacan 1932, 263, 273, 301). Finally, in her subsequent paroxysmal attempt of murder, Aimée achieves in her victim her externalized ideal. Lacan (1932, 356) maintains that these sadomasochistic and homosexual tendencies structure the persecutory themes in paranoic delusion and potentiate aggressive impulses. By focusing on the aggressive drive, Lacan clarifies how in paranoid psychosis the persecutory delirium of the subject demonstrates the modality of the relation with the double, leading the subject to commit a whole range of different crimes (Lacan, 1932, 384-5). Finally, Lacan (1932, 342) concludes that the paranoid delusion is the intentional equivalent of an aggressive drive that is insufficiently socialized and that this explains homicidal acts (358) as well as any crimes that Lacan (307) called "crimes of the Id".

of other individuals in his family are dominated by fantasies and constitute the image of the ego. Lacan further (45) affirms that the fantasy of the phallic mother is evidence of the primordial image of the double (*imago primordiale du double*) that forms the ego function and shapes how the subject relates to other objects (28). When the early pressure of sexuality confronts the subject with the lack in the objectification of images, the subject can form his ego by identifying with the fantasized form of the phallic mother (1938, 45). Lacan claims that this process can result in sexual fetishism (*fétichisme sexuel*). He writes, "(…) this identification of the narcissistic phase can be observed either to generate the formal demands of homosexuality or of a sexual fetishism, or, in the system of the paranoiac ego, to become objective as an external or internal persecutory agent" (Lacan 1938, 45).

This quote shows Lacan's ongoing link between fetishism and the model of paranoia that he had developed in the 1930s. While developmental problems with the anal drive lead to an idealized objectification in paranoia generating the double image of persecutory persons, Lacan presupposes similar problems in the development of the genital drive. This may lead to an idealized (fantasized) objectification in fetishism, thus, generating the double image of the (phallic) mother. In view of the problematization of this chapter, we can pose several questions: What, exactly, is Lacan's conceptualization of fetishism? What does Lacan mean when he discusses fetishism as a discordant ego-identification in relation to a double image? What is the meaning of "lack" in the objectification of images in fetishism? And, bearing in mind that fetishism is a phenomenon characterized exclusively as linked to an object, what would then be the role of the fetish object in an anomaly of personality? What kind of iterative identification would a fetishist ego entail? In the late 1930s, Lacan still refrains from further developing fetishism; he leaves these questions unanswered. It can therefore be argued that Lacan's evolving link between fetishism and the model of paranoic disturbance of personality reflects that Lacan is still trying to develop an alternative to Dupré's theory according to which fetishism, sexual perversions, and paranoia are considered moral perversities stemming from predispositions of personality and character. He clearly was not, at this point, looking for a deeper exploration of Freud's ideas on fetishism.

In the previous chapters, I discussed Freud's difficulties in theorizing fetishism as isolated from its object. Confronted with these challenges, Freud turned to the fetish object by evolving Binet's initial ideas on this topic, and by formulating an aetiology of fetishism from the perspective of the fetish object—and its origin. We now see that Lacan, approaching fetishism from the standpoint of forensic psychiatry, frames this phenomenon as linked to disturbances in personality and in patterns of relating

to other individuals. This, in a sense, corresponds to Freud's initial theorizing about fetishism: Lacan, too, tries to approach the phenomenon of fetishism as separate from the fetish object. However, given that fetishism is a phenomenon characterized by its link to an object that is not a person (but usually an article of clothing or part of the body), one can argue that Lacan did *not* succeed in establishing a theoretical link between the fetish object and a type of personality phenomenon or specific patterns of interaction with other individuals.

As previously observed, Lacan followed Binet and Simon, who theorized about paranoia as a doubling of personality—though not fetishism as a doubling of personality. Lacan, although interested in fetishism, does not offer a clear explanation of how it can be described in terms of doubling. Lacan closely links fetishism to paranoia through the concept of doubling (*dédoublement*) (1938, 45): in the late 1930s, he considers fetishism as a solution for the lack in the objectification of the maternal image during the subject's development, before the Oedipus Complex sets in (1938, 28). The specific problem Lacan encounters is that his model of paranoia developed in 1932 implies an anal, aggressive drive, as well as sadomasochistic and homosexual tendencies. In 1938, Lacan did not have a theory to explain fetishism as the result of a synthetic anomaly at play in the relationship between the genital drive and the double image of the mother. As I will discuss further, it is only through the ideas of the psychoanalytic tradition of object-relation that Lacan attempted to argue for the lack of objectification in fetishism. Nonetheless, in the 1940s and 1950s, Lacan carried out his psychoanalytic conceptualization of doubling. In the section below, I will discuss how Lacan applied his own development of Binet's conceptualization of doubling to his theoretical engagement with psychoanalysis.

5.1.3 Lacan's Psychoanalytic Model of Doubling

In pursuing his exploration of doubling and personality, Lacan evolved the theorization of doubling, discussing the imaginary constitution of the ego. Lacan's choice to theorize problems in the objectification of the ego is crucial in differentiating between Lacan's theoretical challenges with fetishism from those challenges faced by Freud. This is in line with the problematization of this chapter insofar as Lacan's approach to objectification does not refer to sexual objects like those that characterize fetish objects. Rather, it refers to the objectification of the

image of the ego and the image of persons[128]. I will now advance my argument by exploring how Lacan evolved Binet's concept of doubling and applied it to psychoanalysis.

At the outset of Lacan's psychoanalytic thinking in the 1950s[129], he generalizes the psychoanalytic relevance of this doubling in the subject's personal synthesis. He does so by building on his psychiatric theory of the 1930s, that is, by connecting doubling to Freud's ideas on the role of libido and aggressive drives in the formation of the ego (narcissism). In the 1950s, Lacan includes neurosis in his theoretical exploration (1953b, 294-6): a corresponding model that argues for narcissistic problems during psychosexual development, leading to doubling.

Lacan (1953b, 304) elaborates on the doubling of the subject (*dédoublement du sujet*). He (304) claims that insofar as the Oedipus Complex is at the heart of every psychoanalytic experience, it can be assumed that, in neurosis, too, there is always a doubling (*dédoublement*) in the subject's function. In neurosis, Lacan (300) states, the subject, despite striving to avoid the internal division of his ego, in the close (narcissistic) relation with his sexual partner, the neurotic's beloved person (love object) doubles (*dédouble*). This doubling occurs because the relationship between the neurotic subject and his or her love partner is established due to a narcissistic identification. Thus, besides being amorous to his beloved, the narcissistic identification with his sexual partner is also a mortal one. Lacan states: "In this very special form of narcissistic doubling lies the drama of the neurotic[130] ." (Lacan 1953b, 300). Therefore, I argue that Binet's concept of doubling (of personality) provided a foundation for Lacan's theorization, from the time of his initial interaction with Freud's ideas. This concept later evolved into Lacan's concept of narcissistic doubling; later still—during the 1950s—the concept shaped Lacan's discussion of Freud's splitting.

128 This is clear in Lacan's theoretical efforts in the 1930s (Roudinesco, 1997, 111) until the late 1950s in developing the concept of the mirror stage. Lacan (1946, 165, 172) continued to employ doubling as an argument to oppose the idea of personal synthesis and argued that the constitution of the subjects' ego depends on a double imaginary (double-mirror) recognition (Lacan, 1949, 96). Lacan's final version of this conceptualization was presented in 1949 in a paper entitled "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function". Although secondary literature (Gallop, 1982; Muller, 1982) acknowledges Lacan's originality in his concept of the "Mirror Stage", little is said about the role of the concept of doubling in his theoretical efforts. Specifically, Lacan focuses on problems in the objectification of the human full body form that culminates in the manifestation of double (Lacan 1949, 95) and aggressiveness (98, 100) when the subject attempts to organize the mental permanence of the ego.

129 This period was named by Lacan as "the return to Freud's texts" (1953a, 3).

130 Evidently, we see at the heart of Lacan's 'return to Freud', neurosis theorized through the same overall formulation initiated in the 1930s to account for paranoid psychosis and fetishism, that is: neurosis has also explained a problem in the synthesis of aggressive drives during the relational formation of the ego, namely, a narcissistic doubling (*dédoublement narcissique*).

In his writings and seminars, Lacan (1954-5, 312) turns to the discussion of Freud's ideas about splitting as a form of doubling of the ego (*dédoublement du Moi*) in psychoanalysis (1955, 338, 343). Lacan (1955, 342-3) asserts the psychoanalytic relevance of his theorizations by claiming that the imaginary function of the human ego is diverted to narcissistic relations. This fact, Lacan states, has consequences for human subjectivity, conceptualized as an internal doubling (*dédoublement interne*) of existence[131] . My discussion in this section demonstrates how the reinvestigation I previously developed supports my argument that Lacan sees fetishism differently from Freud's conceptualization of this phenomenon. In the previous chapters, I discussed Freud's efforts to explain the origin (aetiology) of the fetish object by exploring Binet's initial ideas on the topic. In this chapter, I have discussed how Lacan, in contrast to Freud, views fetishism as a personality-linked phenomenon characterized by specific patterns of relating to other individuals. Understanding fetishism from this perspective, Lacan found no reason to discuss the role of the fetish object in his theorization. Thus, until 1950, Lacan was still unable to elaborate a theory that linked the existence of the fetish object to something that could be a fetishist disturbance of personality—or to the specificity of fetishist patterns of interaction with other individuals.

5.2 Lacan's Debate on Fetishism with Object-relation Theory

In this section, I will discuss how Lacan in 1956 finally attempts to solve the problem created by fetishism in his theory, by further developing the psychoanalytic approach of the object-relation. I also argue that, in doing so, Lacan falls back on his previous (psychiatric) ideas, in which he had conceptualized perversion as a perversity.

During 1956 and 1957, in his Seminar IV, entitled "The object-relation", Lacan (1956-7, 11-3, 77) took up the subject of fetishism, aiming to conceptualize this phenomenon as one of the "Freudian structures". He did so in the context of developing a structural theory, mainly by contributing to the psychoanalytic

[131] Aiming at his own psychoanalytic theory on subjectivity in the 1950s and 1960s, Lacan (1958, 752-7; 1960-1, 250; 1965-6, 243) kept insisting that Freud's conceptualisation of splitting (*Spaltung*) belongs to and was initiated by the conceptualization of doubling of the personality. Consequently, this allowed Lacan to defend a theory of the division of the subject. He states: "This is very exactly the sense that I would give to my method with respect to what Freud taught. (…) this point which I have for a long time underlined in his writing, as the *Spaltung* of the ego, and which returns fully charged with the sense accumulated in the course of a long exploration, that of his whole career, towards an original point with a completely transformed sense, an original point from which he started, almost, from the completely different notion of the doubling of personality. Let us say that he was able to transform completely this current notion (…) in the form of the division of the subject, he gave his definitive seal." (Lacan 1965-6, 243).

perspective of object-relation[132]. In the 1940s and 1950s, various psychoanalyst scholars elaborated on the psychoanalytic line of thought of object relations, which was based on Freud's psychoanalytic theorization. This line of investigation focusses on the child's development of the ego, from the perspective of the child's relationship with other people in its environment (Greenberg and Stephen 1983, 12); this investigation also looks at how the child assimilates images—in particular those of the mother. This process subsequently determines the formation of the child's own body image and personality. Lacan's undertaking here adds to my problematization of following the reasons that lead psychoanalytic theorization of fetishism to frame human sexuality as dependent on a sexual object. In his theory of fetishism, Lacan specifically engages in a discussion about the ideas of object-relation with psychoanalytic authors who in the early 1950s theorized about the role of artificial objects in the development of the child's body image. These scholars saw fetishism and the fetish object as a pathological phenomenon during this development. This serves the problematization of this chapter through my argument that Lacan finds in these authors' discussions similar ideas to those he had already been formulating about fetishism. Before elaborating on this, I will discuss how Lacan applies his doubling model in this context.

In discussing the object-relation, Lacan (1956-7, 12-3, 17, 62) takes up his earlier assumptions about fetishism as a narcissistic problem in the subject's adaptation to reality in the specular relation with the image of others. As Lacan finds in the work of object-relation scholars (Greenacre 1955, 192) the assumption that fetishism stems from the "mutual mirroring identification" between the child and the mother, he claims that object-relation implies the dual and conflictual relation experienced as identification with the image of the mother. Lacan then introduces into this debate the problem formulated in previous years about fetishism being linked to a lack in this objectification of images. According to Lacan (53, 56-7), his theory of the lack of object explains problems in object-relation theory: it allows one to understand how the child complements the phallic image of the mother since there is damage in the image related to the mother who is deprived of the phallus. Thus, Lacan (84-5) positions fetishism as a type of imaginary access to a lacking object. Lacan (70) then concludes that the relationship between mother and child is

[132] When presenting his theory of fetishism in this context, Lacan (1956-7, 14) recognizes that the object relation theory is a psychoanalytic topic which is not found in Freud's works. Lacan adds that object relation theory is a deviation from psychoanalytic theory and a historical evolution of psychoanalysis.

doubled[133]. Thus, he applies his previous model of doubling to fetishism. According to Lacan (1956-7, 414-5), fetishism is structured as the child identifies with the mother, more precisely, in an idealized fashion with the mother's imaginary phallus. Lacan (1956-7, 371, 383, 417) describes this as an atypical process in which the child performs a doubling of the mother figure. From the object-relation perspective, fetishism then stems from a doubling of the image of the mother. Lacan (1956-7, 71, 83-4) claims that this relationship, in which the child constructs a phallic image of the mother, is narcissistic, and he (84) argues that this outcome describes the fetishist perversion. According to Lacan (1956-7, 21-4, 84, 176), fetishism is a perverse mode of complementing and fulfilling this deficiency. To better understand Lacan's reasoning, I will next discuss Lacan's reading of other thinkers' ideas in this context.

5.2.1 Fetishism as an Object-relation Phenomenon

Following the structure with which I problematize Lacan's thinking on fetishism, it is important to note that even as late as 1956, Lacan was still unable to position the role of the fetish object in a presupposed fetishist personality phenomenon—or in fetishist patterns of interactions with other individuals. In this section I discuss 1) the ideas formulated from the object-relation perspective on fetishism that enables Lacan to finally present a theory of fetishism that he had not presented in the previous decades; and 2) the ideas about fetishism that Lacan introduces in the debate with the object-relation theorists, namely, ideas about fetishism as a privileged phenomenon to theorize about perversion in terms of perverse and fetishist structure.

When theorizing about fetishism more elaborately, Lacan referred to the ideas about the infantile origin of the fetish object posed by psychoanalyst authors who address the topic as part of the object-relation approach[134]. This supports my argument

[133] In this context, Lacan finds in the works of object-relation psychoanalysts (Greenacre 1953, 82-5) the assumption that due to disturbances of the mother-child relationship, fetishists have a double view in regard to feminine castration. Such an idea is similar to Lacan's initial claim about the phallic mother as the primordial image of the double in fetishism.

[134] Attentive to the debate that took place within the psychoanalytic tradition of the object relation to fetishism up to the year of his 1956 seminar, Lacan also discussed the works of British psychoanalysts Sylvia Payne (Lacan 1956-7, 160-1), Dugmore Hunter (Lacan 1956-7, 160) and William Gillespie (Lacan 1956-7,160; 1958-9, 543). For my argument, I will focus on the ideas of two authors that Lacan highlights as relevant in his discussion, namely, the ideas of Donald Woods Winnicott and Phyllis Greenacre. Secondary literature acknowledges that Lacan's theoretical developments on fetishism are contemporaneous with those of authors such as Winnicott and Greenacre on the topic (Assoun 1994, 174, 201, 262; Rey-Flaud 1994, 112-3; 116-7). However, little is said about what Lacan finds in these ideas and how they are connected to his initial thinking on fetishism.

in this chapter that Lacan's interaction with these ideas—and his explanations—allow him to: 1) understand fetishism as a phenomenon related to personality and interpersonal relationships in terms of a lack in the objectification of images; 2) characterize fetishism in line with assumptions similar to that of the psychiatric conceptualization of perversity; and 3) conceptualize fetishism as a paradigm of perversion (perverse structure). Below, I begin the discussion of how, in this context, Lacan introduces his idea of the lack of object into his theorization of fetishism.

In his theorization of fetishism as an object-relation phenomenon, Lacan (1956-7, 25, 34-5, 127) highlights the relevance of the influential object-relation concept of the transitional object, formulated by British psychoanalyst Donald Woods Winnicott. Exploring the development of personal (personality) and interpersonal relationships patterns, Winnicott (1953, 89-90) coined the concept of the transitional object to designate material objects (e.g., a piece of cloth or a plush toy) to which a child assigns a special value during the early months and years of life (Winnicott 1953, 93). He assumed that transitional objects enable the child to advance in the process of shifting from the earliest oral relationship with the mother's breasts to a step of differentiating itself (ego) from its mother. But how does this idea of the object-relationship apply to Lacan's theory of fetishism? Before Lacan proposed his theory of lack of object in fetishism, Winnicott had already stated that fetishism occurs because of a "gap" in infantile development when the child becomes aware of reality in the relationship with the mother. He had also postulated fetishism as a mode of complementing and filling this gap, unlike the normal outcome of psychic development. Winnicott (1953, 96-7) had further conceptualized fetishism as leading the individual to continue the infantile experience of the transitional object persisting in adult sexual life in the form of a fetish.

Bearing in mind that the fetish is a delusional image of a maternal phallus, Winnicott thus claims that fetishism is the urge to bridge a developmental gap that maintains the individual's experience with respect to a transitional object in adult life. This is crucial to understanding Lacan's debate with the ideas of other thinkers in this context. It is my view that, when aiming to contribute to Winnicott's theory of fetishism as filling a gap, Lacan defended (1956-7, 53-7, 84-5, 108) the idea that the fetish has a function in the frustration that the child encounters in its relationship with the mother: to complement the relation between the subject and the lack of the object (the mother deprived of the phallus). In his subsequent conceptualization of fetishism, so I argue, Lacan also relies on Winnicott's discussion on the types of personal and interpersonal relationship patterns that characterize fetishism.

Winnicott further details the fetishist's urge to fill the developmental gap in the transitional field as employing falsehoods and lying (Pseudology), in addition to thieving (Winnicott 1953, 97). Lacan, in turn, states that while identifying with the object that lacks the mother (the phallus), fetishists create a deceptive object (*objet trompeur*) in their relationship with the mother: a false representation of themselves to the mother in order to try to deceive (*tromper*) her desire (Lacan 1956-7, 194). Lacan situated the fetishist in what he called the imaginary "luring" (*leurrante*) relation with the mother. The fetishist, therefore, maintains a position in relation to the mother to "delude" (*leurrer*) her desire. He concluded that this position is structured in fetishism because it is the only position from which the relation of the fetishist to his object is articulated (Lacan 1956-7, 224-5). Having discussed this characterization, I now turn to a discussion of Lacan's conceptualization of the perverse structure and the fetishist structure.

In this context, Lacan's reading of Freud's late works on fetishism focused on isolating perversions as a clinical category and selecting fetishism as a privileged subject to develop the notion of the perverse structure and the fetishist structure (Lacan 1956-7, 145 and 157). Whereas Freud, in his later works, avoided placing fetishism within the main nosological categories and, in his 1927 essay, made no mention of perversion at all, Lacan took the opposite stance[135]. Lacan addressed Freud's works on fetishism to develop a psychopathological framework for understanding perverse structure as a subjective position (Lacan 1956-7, 224-5). For Lacan, fetishism is no longer a pathological variation as in Freud's theory, but rather a general structure. As discussed in the previous chapters, Freud's early assumptions on fetishism make it theoretically impossible to see perversion as a distinct subjective position (Freud 1905a, 16-17). Contrary to Lacan, Freud's interest in fetishism became part of a strategy to turn perversion into a universal human sexual condition. After all, Freud developed his ideas on the topic by following Binet's insight that the admiration for parts of the body of the beloved person is a feature of normal love. Even when Freud later reasoned that fetishism is a disorder in psychosexual development (Freud 1909, 1914, 1919, 1927, 1940a, 1940b), he did not imply that it is a unique subjective position compared to other perversions. Rather than categorizing fetishism within any nosology class, Freud considered it to be an acceptable eccentricity. This supports my problematization in this chapter that when Lacan conceptualizes and characterizes perverse structure and fetishist

[135] Lacan referred to the nosographic hesitations around the classification of fetishism, emphasizing that, despite the clinical similarities with neurosis, fetishism is, in fact, a perversion. However, according to Lacan, it is necessary to examine and confirm fetishism as a perversion from the perspective of its subjective structure (Lacan 1956-7, 155).

structure, he does so based on ideas not from Freud's works but from the works of psychoanalytic thinkers who adhere to the object-relations tradition. One of these thinkers is the American psychoanalyst Phyllis Greenacre, whose influence on Lacan I will now discuss.

5.2.2 Fetishism as a Paradigm of Perversion in Lacan's Theory

Considering Lacan's interest (1956-7, 86, 160) in Greenacre's ideas, a closer look at her conceptualization of fetishism will show a great similarity to Lacan's previous ideas on the topic. Before Lacan, Greenacre (1953, 85; 1955, 189) saw in fetishism a paradigm for characterizing perversions in general. According to her, fetishism allows an understanding of the interrelation between different types of perversion[136]. She (85, 93-4) argues that in fetishism and other perversions there is a strong visual identification with a phallic mother that creates instability of the body image and subsequent feminine identification. Consequently, the fetishist in adult life can only stabilize his (sexual) identity through the use of the fetish (Greenacre 1955, 188, 191). Having fetishism as a paradigm for characterizing perversions, Greenacre (1953, 83) claims that the same is true in transvestitism[137]. Considering this, I will now discuss how Lacan (1956-7, 157-8) finds his way into conceptualizing what he calls the "perverse structure" and the "fetishist structure".

Along with Greenacre (1953, 93; 1955, 188, 190-1) and others, Lacan (1956-7, 126, 161) agrees that, in perversion, the valorization of the image and the imaginary dimension is prevalent. Lacan contributes to the debate by arguing with his theory of lack of object. Likewise, aiming to apply this theory to fetishism, Lacan (154) comments on Freud's late works on fetishism; this is a strategy for interpreting Freud's ideas on the fetish as representing the phallus as absent from the mother (symbolic phallus). Lacan states that due to the child's frustration with the object, the subject remains in a state of imaginary relationship to the mother. Thus, in fetishism, the subject assumes a permanence of that which is unseen and beyond the object (*au-delà de l'objet*), that is, the imaginary phallus of the mother. (Lacan 1956-7, 119, 154). In this sense, Lacan claims that the fetishist identifies with the phallus that the mother

[136] Furthermore, before Lacan saw Winnicott's theory as suitable for discussing fetishism, Greenacre had already drawn on Winnicott's ideas. Greenacre (1955, 191) claims that a disturbance in the (fetishist) child occurs in the period of the transitional object when the integration of the visual libidinal component with an oral aggressive component of the sexual drive does not occur adequately. Thus, fetishism is categorized (Greenacre 1953, 79, 85-6) as a 'weakness of the ego structure'. This is due to disturbances in the mother-child relationship that leaves an imprint on the child's early primary visual identifications (Greenacre 1953, 89).

[137] Given the same strong visual identification with the mother, Greenacre (1953, 83-9) argues for a relationship between fetishism and transvestitism—as the transvestite represents the phallic woman himself and therefore stabilises his (sexual) identity.

lacks (1956-7, 86). Hewing to Greenacre's line of thought, Lacan (1956-7, 161, 166) conceptualizes what he calls the "fetishist structure" (*structure fétichiste*) as a type of pathological object-relation in which the subject identifies itself with the mother (or, more generally, with a female character). Simultaneously, Lacan claims that the subject veils the lack of the mother: the fetishist, through his fetish object, effectively overcomes the lack of the mother in the image of the other female. This process of overcoming characterizes perversion and the fetishist structure. According to Lacan (1956-7, 165), this further characterizes fetishism as an "exemplary perversion" (184). Unlike Freud, but in a similar way to Greenacre, Lacan claims that the fetishist structure constitutes a general nosological class. He states that "Fetishism is in effect a class that nosologically includes all sorts of phenomena whose affinity or kinship with fetishism is indicated to us in some way by our intuition" (Lacan 1956-7, 161)[138]. In the arguments I have presented thus far, we have seen that Lacan conceptualizes fetishism differently from Freud: Lacan's ideas are more in line with object-relation theory. From this point of view, Lacan conceptualizes fetishism as a major model to develop a general theory of perversion. Therefore, such an approach is contrary to Freud's theoretical developments on the topic. To further problematize this, I will demonstrate below that Lacan finds in Greenacre's ideas other assumptions that enable Lacan to specify fetishist patterns of relating to other individuals. This supports my argument that such a characterization represents a continuation of Lacan's previous psychiatric understanding of fetishism as perversity.

As Lacan's predecessors in forensic psychiatry, Greenacre (1953, 86) also assumed that fetishism is associated with manifestations of perversity and instability of character. She (1955, 189) claims that this leads fetishists to aggression as well as to acting out[139] . When commenting on Greenacre's stance and the work of other authors who are part of the object-relation tradition, Lacan (1956-7, 160) finds support for discussing the mode of the fetishist relations as an identification with women implying aggressiveness, destruction, and murder. He states:

[138] Similar to Greenacre's ideas, Lacan (162-3, 166) argues that insofar as in the fetishist structure, the subject takes a complementary position, in which he attempts to unite himself to the object (the mother). Thus, one can affirm the correlation between fetishism and transvestitism and also between exhibitionism and fetishism.

[139] As in forensic psychiatry and Winnicott's work, Greenacre (1953, 86; 1955, 188) describes fetishist acting out primarily as kleptomania. As a model for characterizing perversions in general, Greenacre (1955, 190) claims that investigating fetishism enables understanding the development of perverse organizations of the aggressive components of the libido (sexual drive) and why fetishists develop fantasies of punishment and killing. I will discuss further the relationship between acting out, kleptomania, and fetishism. In the next section I will follow this argument by discussing Lacan's return to Greenacre's ideas about acting out when he discusses the link between fetish and human desire.

In short, we find an alternation of identifications in the amorous relations with the object which organize this cycle in the fetishist. Identification with the woman (…) the imaginary phallus of the primordial experiences of the oral-anal stage, centered on the aggressivity of the sadistic theory of coitus -- and, in fact, many of the experiences which analysis brings to light show an observation of the primitive scene perceived as cruel, aggressive, violent, indeed, murderous. (…) The child is delivered up to the bipolar oscillation of the relation between two irreconcilable objects, which in any case ends in an outcome that is destructive, indeed murderous. (Lacan 1956-7, 160).

Lacan (1956-7, 153) adds to the psychoanalytic debate on fetishism an additional characterization via his ideas of "symbolic relation" and "symbolic lack". Whereas Freud evolved Binet's aetiological ideas about fetishism in terms of the trauma of sexual difference, Lacan (153) sees the differentiation between the sexes as a relation that is symbolically ordered and that disciplines inter-human relations through interdicts—such as the law of incest. In this sense, Lacan interprets Freud's idea of castration as an interdict of prohibitive laws. According to Lacan (119), perversion is characterized by a symbolic reduction that results in a de-subjectified intersubjective relation. Thus, Lacan (155) confirms fetishism as a perverse structure: in the fetishist object-relation, the object takes the place of the lack, and Lacan (152) considers that the fetish object is devoid of any subjective, intersubjective, and trans-subjective properties. But how does Lacan characterize this de-subjectified fetishist relation? Lacan (162) claims that the fetishist identification with the mother/woman demonstrates a de-subjectified symbolization. It is here that, aiming at characterizing this de-subjectified symbolization, Lacan argues for the "paroxysms of perversions".

According to Lacan (1956-7, 85), given that perversion shows a mode of relation that goes beyond the image of the other, perversions become manifest at their greatest degree of intensity, that is, during the "paroxysms of perversions". Lacan states that the paroxysms of perversions are not symbolically ordered; rather, they are considered to be *passage à l'acte* (passage to the act). Thus, according to Lacan (1956-7, 85), it is during these occurrences of *passage à l'acte* that perversion provides access to the other by going beyond the image of the other. Lacan then immediately connects *passage à l'acte* to fetishism. Although Lacan does not provide examples of either *passage à l'acte* or paroxysm in fetishism, he (1956-7, 163) does affirm that delinquent acts (*actes délinquants*) are equivalents of fetishism. Here, we see that Lacan finally explains the paroxysms of fetishism in accordance with the doctrines of perversity in the tradition of forensic psychiatry. To follow Lacan's development further, I will next discuss how he came to frame his theorization of fetishism as a paradigm of perversion. I will also

examine how Lacan came to apply the fetish object as a model for the discussion on human desire.

5.3 The Fetish as a Model of the Object of Human Desire in Lacan's Thinking

In line with my problematization in this chapter, I will now turn to the last stage of my argument for how Lacan came to see fetishism as a theoretical model of human desire. This section supports the overall problematization of this dissertation: that, for his part, Lacan attempts to explore fetishism as separate from the particulars of the fetish object. As previously discussed, the 1950s saw Lacan theorizing that fetishism involved the objectification of images of people. In this section, I focus on the 1960s, when, in exploring fetishism as a theoretical model of human desire, Lacan examines the objectification of the action that causes the subject's desire for the object. Given that Freud did not address this subject, Lacan's examination of this objectification supports the differences between Lacan and Freud in their theoretical approaches to fetishism. In this vein, my exploration of Lacan's theory of the fetish as an object that causes human desire further advances my argument in this chapter: unlike Freud, Lacan sees the phenomenon of fetishism less as a sexual practice and more as a product of theories of perversity that aim to explain immoral as well as criminal acts. I will present my case below.

Various scholars (Assoun 1994, 118–20) have pointed out that Lacan's interest in the fetish object heralded the re-emergence of the question of the object in psychoanalysis. However, given that Lacan starts discussing the fetish from theoretical references that are no longer psychoanalytic, in this section I pursue my argument that Lacan's undertaking of such a theorization can again be read as 1) further developing ideas present in the contemporary psychiatric landscape; and 2) evolving ideas of the same psychoanalytic thinkers that Lacan had previously debated when discussing fetishism. As I have shown, such thinkers did not rely strictly on Freud's works. More specifically, it is my view that Lacan, in continuing to discuss the fetish as a model of human desire, is extending his previous theory of paroxysm and "passage to the act" to fetishism and perversion.

As stated, Lacan (1956-7, 194) stressed that the way in which the fetishist relates to his object makes fetishism the "perversion of perversions". However, while Lacan categorizes fetishism as a paradigm of perversion, he also develops insights on the relationship between the fetish object and human desire. Framed as a topic of object relations in the mid-1950s, according to Lacan (1965-7, 158) fetishism addresses the illusory relation with the object of human desire. Here, Lacan reveals, "…I took a step towards the elucidation of fetishism, which is a particularly fundamental example of

the dynamics of desire" (1956–7, 165). But what, exactly, does Lacan mean by this? Taking his theory on lack of an object as a starting point, Lacan (1956–7, 37) uses fetishism to claim that the object of human desire is related to the symbolization of "lack". In this sense, Lacan (1956–7, 154–5) follows Freud's late elaborations on the fetish's function of symbolizing the feminine phallus, identifying the fetish as a model of an object that symbolizes the lack. According to Lacan (1956–7, 36), the object represents something that is lacking but indispensable to the relationship between subject, world, and desire. In order for desire to be activated, the subject needs to construct a replacement which surpasses the object itself (Lacan 1956–7, 23). Thus, the object has the function of complementing the relationship between subject and desire. This leads Lacan (1956–7, 165) to suggest fetishism as a fundamental example of the dynamics of desire: according to Lacan (1956–7, 158), fetishism exemplifies an illusory relationship that is an essential component of the relationship between the subject and object of desire.

What is at issue in Lacan's theory of the fetishist structure? Starting in the late 1950s, as he continued to develop this theory, Lacan progressively changed his view of fetishism from a radical perversion of human desires (Lacan 1957–8, 76) to a more generalized approach (1958–9, 370). As a model of the object of desire, the fetish in the perverse structure demonstrates the functioning of the object in terms of the absolute condition of desire (Lacan 1958, 682; 1962–3, 122). Lacan (1958–9, 370) claims that the object of desire has a function in the association of subject and fantasy. Further, the object takes the place of that which the subject is symbolically deprived of: the phallus. Given that the fetish symbolizes the phallus, the object of human desire has a fetishistic character. Thus, Lacan claims that the fetishization of human objects (*fétichisation des objets humains*) is at the root of human relations, that is, the fetish is a fundamental dimension of the human world (Lacan 1958–9, 371 and 563–4)[140]. In the years that followed, Lacan deepened the link between the fetish and "lack" in the objectification of human desire; Lacan's goal was to devise a theory that addressed the limitations of the subjective symbolization of human desire. Below, I will elaborate on how this topic relates to the argument in this chapter—and in this dissertation in general.

We have seen that, in his theorization of a fetishist structure, Lacan equated delinquent acts and *passage à l'acte* with acts of fetishism. However, from the early 1960s onwards, Lacan failed to provide examples of these acts. This fact supports the thesis of this

[140] Regarding my argument that Lacan's discussion on the relation between the fetish and human desire implies theoretical references that are no longer psychoanalytic, in this reference Lacan includes Karl Marx's theory of the fetish in his discussion. This supports the problematization of the differences between Freud and Lacan's theory of fetishism.

dissertation. I argue that for Lacan, as for Freud, fetishism was a phenomenon linked to an object (frequently a piece of clothing or part of the body). As such, there remains a question: How are the actions of the fetishist structure—delinquent acts and *passage à l'acte*—explained, considering the presence of the fetish object? It is my view that Lacan's strategy for answering this question was to explore a direction opposite to Freud's. As we have seen in previous chapters, the riddle of fetishism in Freud's theorizing cropped up *after* he began to view this phenomenon as distinct from its object. To solve this problem, Freud turned to Binet's initial ideas on fetishism, seeking an aetiological theory that explains the origin of the fetish object. By way of introducing the fetish object, Freud gradually applied concepts arising from his theory of neurosis, such as fantasy, idealization, and overvaluation, as well as symbolization and memory—all concerning the object. Lacan, in contrast, does not explain the actions of the fetishist structure by focusing on how the fetish comes to be fantasized, overvalued, idealized, symbolized, or remembered. On the contrary, Lacan does not opt for an aetiological theory of how the fetish object originated, formed, or came to be chosen in the fetishist structure at all. Instead, he maintains the view that fetishism is a singular topic with which to theorize about processes that precede the formation or choice of the fetish. I elaborate on this point below.

The more Lacan elaborates on his theorization of fetishism, the more his thinking diverges from Freud's. I will show that in Lacan's theory of the cause of desire, he identifies fetishism as a vehicle for understanding actions that concern pre-subjective processes. In the 1960s, Lacan begins to see the fetish as a prerequisite for the subject to perform de-subjectivized actions towards the object. My line of argument in this chapter acknowledges the influence of Lacan's previous psychiatric training, as well as his reasons for turning to theories other than Freud's psychoanalytic ideas; this will lead to understanding why Lacan directs his attention to fetishism, and, in particular, to pre-subjective issues (which Lacan in the 1960s termed the "cause of desire"). More specifically, by providing evidence of the influence of Lacan's training in forensic psychiatry on his approach, I will in the next section argue that an exploration of fetishism from the perspective of non-subjectivized actions towards the object had already been undertaken within the psychiatric landscape before Lacan approached fetishism in a similar way. Like Lacan, his predecessors in forensic psychiatry did not follow Freud in his longstanding efforts to formulate a psychoanalytic aetiology of fetishism that introduced the fetish object. Rather, Lacan and his predecessors positioned fetishism as a way to explain criminal and immoral acts, to be understood from the perspective of pathological, involuntary, uncontrollable, and non-subjectivized processes that lead to actions towards objects. Below, I will discuss how Lacan in the 1960s developed this theory—by introducing the concept of "object *a*".

5.3.1 The Fetish in Lacan's Conceptualization of "Object a"

Some scholars (Assoun 1994, 118–20) claim that Lacan's interest in the fetish foreshadows his development of "object *a*" as the lacking object that causes desire in the human subject. By introducing his concept of "object *a*", Lacan's theory of the causality of human desire addresses limitations in the domain of human subjectivity (1962–3, 119, 120–7, 140; Vanheule 2011, 125). I argue that Lacan approaches the fetish object as a means of addressing the limitations of human subjectivity, that is, by perceiving the cause of desire (object a) in terms of processes that are independent of the formation or choice of the fetish. As Lacan introduces his concept of "object *a*"—and begins to discuss his idea of cause of desire (*cause du désir*)—he (1962-3, 122) takes the fetish as a model of an object prior to any subjective internalization, claiming that the fetish as such unveils the nature of the object as the cause of desire. He states:

> *The notion of cause belongs to this outside, the locus of the object, prior to any internalization. (…) To give an image of it, it is not by chance that I am going to use the fetish as such, because this is where the veil is drawn back on the dimension of the object as cause of desire. (Lacan 1962–3, 122)*

But what does Lacan mean by this? This quotation demonstrates that even if Lacan recognizes the fetish as an external object, when he views the fetish as the object that causes desire, he theorizes it as prior to subjective interiorization. Consistent with the argument of this chapter, which problematizes Lacan's theory of fetishism by uncovering his affiliations to theoretical traditions other than Freud's psychoanalytic work, I argue that Lacan's ideas about the (fetishist) dimension of the object of desire also differs from Freud's ideas on fetish and perversion; in this case, Lacan's conceptualization hews to the French psychiatric tradition to which he belonged. We have seen that in the development of his theory of subjectivity, Lacan discusses fetishism from his native psychiatric perspective, as an evolution of the conceptualization of doubling of personality. This culminates in Lacan's elaboration of the notions of fetishist and perverse structures. In the section below, I argue that in the background of Lacan's discussion of the fetish as the cause of desire, he postulates another (psychiatric) conceptualization of doubling that is *not* associated with the images that influence the subject's personality. Rather, this conceptualization of doubling reflects the subject's uncontrollable impulses toward his or her desire.

After presenting in the 1930s his psychogenic aetiology of doubling of personality in debate with Dupré's views of constitutional perversity (which included explaining

fetishism), Lacan (1946, 168) introduced his theorization of (psychic) causality by turning to the psychogenic ideas of another of his predecessors at the Special Infirmary of the Paris Police Headquarters, the French psychiatrist Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault. Lacan established a link between his notion of structure and de Clérambault's idea of mental automatism: the interference of involuntary, uncontrollable, and "alien" motor and sensory-affective processes. These processes included psychomotor phenomena, and verbal impulses. Such mental automatisms underlie the origin and development of various mental disorders (de Clérambault 1920, 458–64; Daumezon and Lantéri-Laura 2017, 12–3; Vanheule 2018, 208–9). Lacan cites the relevance of de Clérambault's idea of mental automatism to Lacan's psychoanalytic thinking: this reinforces my argument that Lacan's conceptualization of doubling diverges from Freud's debate with Binet's conceptualization on the topic[141]. Arguably, de Clérambault's definition of mental automatism itself represents an evolution of the conceptualization of doubling; after studying the theory of doubling of personality at the Salpêtrière hospital (Gumpper and Haustgen 2012a, 225–6) and discussing the subject with Binet and Simon (de Clérambault, 1910), de Clérambault defined mental automatism as "scissions" of the ego and personality (*scissions du moi, scission de la personnalité)* (de Clérambault 1920, 457–8, 464) —as well as framing the phenomenon as doubling (*dédoublement, double*) (de Clérambault 1920, 458; 1924a, 493).

Lacan's thinking diverges further from Freud's when Lacan, after conceptualizing the perverse and fetishist structures, subsequently argues for the fetish as a model for

[141] In the 1950's, Lacan acknowledged Binet's *Fetishism in Love* as a milestone in the origin of the fetish object. In the context of Lacan's further development on fetishism, when starting his theory on the unawareness of the subject's own desire, he did not draw on Binet's ideas on fetishism, but rather on Binet's ideas about children's acquisition of language. It is arguable that Lacan turns to Binet's ideas on this topic in the late 1950s in order to discuss pre-subjective issues. This is because Lacan (1958-9, 92-3) found support in Binet's early experiments with children as pointing to the existence of a "primitive position" of the human subject when learning to speak. Lacan's reference to Binet here corresponds to works of the same period when Binet theorized about personality in terms of doubling. Then, Binet (1890b, 596) studied problems and issues related the development of children's feeling of self (*sentiment du moi*) and their perception about such feeling. Binet considered the acquisition of language to be a faithful reflection of the successive stages in which personality is developed and argued that children only acquire a clear consciousness of themselves when they take hold of the words I (je) and me (*moi*) (1890b, 596, 598). According to Lacan (1958-9, 92), Binet was able to demonstrate the difficulties of the human subject in his or her initial stages of ego formation. Lacan stated that Binet's tests evidenced children's difficulties in distinguishing between the use of "I" and "me" or "myself" when formulating spoken sentences as subject of the enunciation or as subject of the statement (enunciating). Therefore, Lacan (1958-9, 102) claims that Binet was able to recognize through his assumptions on language and personality the existence of a primitive position of human subjectivity in terms of a subject divided into two egos.

the cause of desire (Lacan's object *a*); some scholars claim that Lacan was increasingly relating his theory—including his concept of "object *a*"—with de Clérambault's ideas on mental automatism[142] (Vanheule 2018, 218; Gumpper and Haustgen 2012b, 361). Studies devoted to the influence of de Clérambault's concept of mental automatism in Lacan's thinking focus primarily on Lacan's theory of psychosis (Vanheule 2011, 2018; Gumpper and Haustgen 2012b). Given that my problematization of Lacan's view on fetishism follows the influence of his forensic thinking and training—which links fetishism to the notion of perversity as an explanation for immoral and criminal acts—I assert the relevance of de Clérambault's influence on the connection between fetishism and Lacan's theory of the cause of desire (object *a*). Given the definition of mental automatism as defined by involuntary, uncontrollable, and "alien" psychomotor impulses, it is possible that Lacan sees fetishism as a phenomenon that clarifies the cause of desire by expanding his previously characterization of fetishism as paroxysms, *passage à l'acte* and delinquent acts. In the following paragraphs I detail how, by evolving this characterization, Lacan theorizes about the objectification of the cause of desire by exploring the concept of *acting out*.

Arguably, characterizations of fetishism in terms of mental automatisms did *not* underlie Freud's interest in exploring this phenomenon. In the context of this dissertation, Freud's lack of interest in mental automatisms contributes to the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism. It is also noteworthy that Lacan's discussion of fetishism as linked to the cause of desire omits any references to Freud's works on the topic. Instead, Lacan (1962-3, 121-2) comments on the conceptualization of Freud's theory of sexuality such as "auto-eroticism"[143] (140) in postulating the cause of desire as a pre-subjective elicitation of the subject's desire in which his or her sense of self is absent. As I have argued, here, too, we see that even when commenting on Freud's ideas, Lacan adopts a view opposite to Freud's aetiology of fetishism, which was years in the making. In my view, Lacan does so from his standpoint of the French psychiatric tradition and object relations theory, in which the concept of mental automatism allows for the link between the fetish, cause of desire (object a) and *acting out*. Whereas Freud explored the choice

[142] Studies conducted on de Clérambault's influence on Lacan's ideas point out that rather than a "return to Freud's texts", Lacan's development of his psychopathological theorising conceptualised in terms of structure can be described as a "return to de Clérambault" (Gumpper and Haustgen 2012b, 361).

[143] Other examples can be seen when Lacan (1962-3, 121) states that Freud's conceptualization of drive is sensitive to his structural ideas on the cause of desire. Here, Lacan highlights Freud's theory elements that escape the subject's possibilities to think between the "aim of the drive" and the "object of the drive" in terms of the action of "displacement". The same goes for Lacan's comment on Freud's notion of "object choice" (133) on which Lacan points out the limits of subjectification between constitutional and historical elements in the subject's object choice.

of the fetish as dependent on its link to the sexual drive (e.g., through odour or taste) or as connected to early scenes of sexual impressions, Lacan engages with Freud's ideas with a different intention altogether. Lacan searches in Freud's lexicon for a description of the manifestation of "object *a*", viewing the action implied in the intentionality of the subject's desire. This is how Lacan identifies the fetish as the vehicle for conceptualizing "object *a*", that is, not as having specific sexual features or for aetiological reasons, but rather as capable of demonstrating desire prior to the processes of subjectification. Lacan states:

> *What is desired? It's not the little item of footwear, nor the breast, nor anything else with which you can embody the fetish. The fetish causes desire. Desire goes off to hook on wherever it can. It is not absolutely necessary for her to be wearing the little shoe (…). (Lacan 1962–3, 122)*

The above quote shows Lacan's interest in discussing the fetish as "object *a*". In this sense, the object that causes desire is something that the subject steals away (*que se dérobe*) (1962–3, 121, 127). Here, Lacan discusses the "object *a*" that causes desire as *acting out*, specifically through acts of theft. This characterization is crucial to my argument, as will become evident in the discussion below.

Lacan (1962–3, 149), by asserting that the fetish reveals the dimension of the object as the cause of desire, again turns to Greenacre's ideas on *acting out*; this highlights the relevance of these ideas to his theory. As previously discussed, according to Lacan's conceptual vocabulary of forensic psychiatry, Greenacre (1953, 86) characterized fetishism as a manifestation of perversity and problems of character. Considering fetishism as a model for all perverse characters, Greenacre (1953, 95; 1955, 188–9, 193–4) insisted on labelling *acting out*—mainly described as kleptomania and aggression—as the primary tendency in the character of fetishists. In keeping with the psychiatric landscape that was integral to Lacan's thinking, Greenacre's concept of *acting out* has features akin to those found in de Clérambault's definition of mental automatism: *acting out* is a phenomenon understood as discrepancies between verbalization and motor activity, manifesting as involuntary bodily tensions and impulsivity connected with motility or activity[144] (Greenacre 1950, 457). De Clérambault's definition of mental automatisms was achieved by investigating psychotic symptoms and by studying women who had been arrested for criminal acts. Thus, de Clérambault related mental automatism to the women's impulses and thoughts on theft and acts of stealing (de Clérambault 1924b, 499–502).

[144] *Acting out*, Greenacre claimed (1950, 457-9, 461-2), is derived from pre-verbal exhibitionism and early child scopophilia culminating in a weak and narcissistic ego.

Lacan, in turn, undertakes an analogous discussion to demonstrate how the fetishist's desire for the fetish demonstrates the pre-subjective dimension of the cause of desire. After referring to Greenacre, Lacan (1962–3, 168, 170–1, 372, 385) links the unknown automatism that causes the desire to *acting out* by discussing the cases of kleptomania in female subjects. Next, I will address Lacan's argument for the ways in which pre-subjective elements enable the fetish to cause desire.

Earlier, Lacan had aligned his psychoanalytic theorisation of psychic causality and structure with de Clérambault's psychogenic ideas. However, by the time he embarked on the discussions of fetishism, Lacan (1955-6, 15) maintained this alignment by presenting alternative ideas to that of psychogenesis (and organogenesis), consequently turning to a structural theory of psychoanalysis. This culminated in the conceptualization of fetishist and perverse structures, for example. Consequently, in this context of Lacan's focus on fetishism in terms of a paradigmatic "Freudian structure" of perversion, the idea of the genesis of fetishism becomes less important. Accordingly, the entire problem of aetiology recedes into the background as Lacan discusses fetishism as an extension of object relations. From this perspective, Lacan's disengagement with the idea of psychogenesis (and organogenesis)—and his interest in non-subjectivized processes as the cause of desire—support the problematization in this chapter, that is, Lacan's opposing view in theory of fetishism when compared to Freud's. As already stated, Freud turned repeatedly to Binet's ideas on fetishism; this highlights Freud's continuing need for an explanation of the genesis of the fetish object. In search of this explanation, Freud elaborated on an organic theory of the components of the sexual drive; Freud also posited psychological mechanisms and concepts such as fantasy, symbolization, memory, overvaluation, idealization, and defence. Lacan, in contrast, abjures aetiological theory and separates his theorization of the fetish as the cause of desire from any explanation of the genesis of the fetish object. Having recognized the difference between Freud's and Lacan's approaches to fetishism so far, it becomes relevant to question how Lacan elaborates on a psychoanalytic theory of the fetish as an object cause of desire. Various scholars claim (Lanteri-Laura 1994, 39-40) that by opposing Freud and criticizing the idea of psychogenesis, Lacan in fact advances his debate through the use of psychiatric ideas[145]. In light of this assertion, Lacan focuses on the pre-subjective dimension of desire and introduces, in his structural psychoanalytic theory, the conceptualization of three subjective registers. Lacan calls these subjective registers the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real (Lacan

[145] In fact, scholars (Lanteri-Laura 1994, 40-1) interpret Lacan's exclusion of psychogenesis as the expression of a trend in contemporary psychiatry and indicative of a diminishing interest in aetiological theories.

and Granoff 1956). Lacan scholars (Casanova 1987; Dimitriadis 2014) also assert that Lacan's theory of "object *a*" is the culmination of his alternative to the idea of psychogenesis. Of primary importance for the problematization that I develop in this dissertation is the contention that fetishism plays a crucial role in Lacan's argumentation. I elaborate on this below.

According to selected Lacan scholars (Fink 1995, 148, 17; Vanheule 2011, 126), his conceptualization of "object *a*" implies a lack of different subjective registers—or denotes that the object of human desire is irreducible to subjective registers. Beginning in the 1950s, Lacan had already given the phenomenon of fetishism a place of privilege, in the "line of demarcation" between the different registers of human reality (Lacan and Granoff 1956, 272). He writes, "(…) fetishism is extremely enlightening. It articulates, in a particularly striking manner, those three realms of human reality which we have called the symbolic, the imaginary and the real" (Lacan and Granoff 1956, 275). These points lead naturally to my argument concerning Lacan's view of the fetish in the 1960s[146]. During this period, Lacan viewed the fetish as a pre-subjective model of the cause of desire (object *a*) linked to an ongoing influence of de Clérambault's psychiatric ideas. Moreover, in keeping with the argumentation of this dissertation, Lacan's undertaking of linking the fetish and his concept of "object a" supports its general problematization. This corroborates my assertions in the previous chapters that, after Binet's *Fetishism in Love*, Kraft-Ebing and Freud encountered obstacles when attempting to isolate the phenomenon from the fetish object. In line with this general problematization, my discussion of Lacan's theory of fetishism denotes a complementary effort in terms of investigating fetishism by focusing not on the particulars of the fetish object, but on the uncontrollable and impulsive actions of the fetishist towards the fetish. I continue this discussion below.

As discussed in the preceding sections, in the 1950s, Lacan turned fetishism into a key model of perverse non-subjectified structure. In the 1960s, seeing the fetish as a means of introducing his concept of "object *a*", Lacan theorizes that the object of human desire is irreducible to subjective registers. Decades earlier, in his

[146] Decades later, in his forthcoming theoretical developments on the three subjective registers, Lacan (1975-76, 72-3) located the object cause of desire (object *a*) exactly where he had initially located the fetish object in the 1950s, that is, between the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. Lacan (1975-76, 55-6) did so precisely in order to explore a concept that I will discuss in the following section, that is, the concept of jouissance. When placing the object cause of desire (object a) precisely where he previously had positioned the fetish in the 1950s, Lacan discussed the concept of jouissance exactly in line with topics linked to fetishism in the 1950s, that is, jouissance connected to the double, the specular image, and the body as imaginary.

initial definition of automatisms as intense and spontaneous reflex movements independent of the subject, de Clérambault (1908, 685, 698–9, 702–3, 713–4) linked them to the experience of subjects with a sexual object, devoid of any link to image, fantasy, memory, adoration, or attachment when exploring fetishism. He did so when investigating female amorality, delinquency, and kleptomaniacal impulses in his forensic psychiatric studies (de Clérambault 1908, 683–8, 692–5, 700–9). To discuss automatisms and particular features of this type of sexual object, de Clérambault specified a type of sexual perversion that, according to him, belongs to the framework of fetishism; de Clérambault called these sexual perversions "erotic passion for fabrics" (*passion érotique des étoffes*)[147]. De Clérambault (706) defined the automatism in question as a sensory pathology linked to impulsive contact with fabrics (*perversion du toucher*) that culminates in an automatic erotic "repercussion" (700) devoid of subjective content. As for Lacan, by focusing on fetishism to better understand actions that concern pre-subjective processes, his acknowledgment of mental automatism in his structural theory supports my argument in this section: that Lacan and Freud took their theorizations of fetishism in opposite directions.

Further, we see that before Lacan turned to Freud's notion of autoerotism when seeking a pre-subjective conceptualization of the subject's desire, de Clérambault, in exploring fetishism, had already discussed automatisms that evidenced an "autoerotic" (Shera 2009, 158) type of sexual preference for pieces of fabric, displaying an instinctive disregard in relation to the object. In this regard, I argue below that Lacan's ideas—first encountered in his forensic-psychiatry training—connected fetishism to non-subjectivized acts, rather than to sexual pleasure, as Freud had done. These views enabled Lacan to interpret fetishism as a vehicle for achieving a kind of gratification that was different from sexual pleasure. Below I address this topic via the discussion of Lacan's conceptualization of *jouissance*.

We have seen that in the 1950s, insofar as Lacan did *not* conceptualize fetishism as a phenomenon concerning a sexual practice, he equates fetishism and delinquent acts in order to defend his argument that the paroxysms of perversions are not symbolically ordered. In the 1960s, as Lacan (1962-3, 122) views the fetish as a model for eliciting the subject's desire in the form of *acting out*, he adds that this interrupts "the symbolic functioning of law", producing what Lacan conceptualized as *jouissance* (Lacan 1962–3, 126; Fink 1995, XIII–XIV, 83, 173), a type of satisfaction or drive gratification beyond pleasure (Vanheule 2011, 125–7). Therefore, *jouissance*

[147] Aiming to delimit the existence of intermediate perversions between typical fetishism and erotic passion for fabrics, de Clérambault made a systematic comparison with several cases from Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* (de Clérambault 1908, 709).

refers to how the "object *a*" overwhelms human subjectivity, exciting and agitating the subject in such an uncontrolled way that it disrupts the subject's imaginary sense of unity and the symbolic articulation of subjectivity (Vanheule 2011, 128–31).

Given the contrast between Lacan's and Freud's ideas about the nature of the fetish, we would be well served to further investigate Lacan's conceptualization of the phenomenon. Below I show how a closer look at de Clérambault's discussion on erotic passion for fabrics as a specification of fetishism supports my discussion of this point.

As we saw, automatisms manifested as kleptomaniacal impulses characterize both fetishism and erotic passion for fabrics. In this regard, de Clérambault argues that, while fetishism is suitable to masculine psychosexual features, the erotic manifestations shown in the passion for fabrics are particularly feminine (de Clérambault 1908, 698, 703–4, 712). Indeed, after interrogating women detained for stealing fabrics at the Special Infirmary of the Paris Police Headquarters, de Clérambault (1908, 685, 694, 704, 716–7) acknowledged that by masturbating with fabrics, the women experienced an especially intense sexual *jouissance* (*jouissance sexuelle*). De Clérambault's (685, 702) explanation of a sexual object that can dismiss the subjective involvement is connected with this female sexual *jouissance*, which is in turn described as much more intense than the sexual pleasure derived from sexual intercourse with partners. When experiencing sexual *jouissance*, de Clérambault (1908, 691, 698–9) explains, women have no desire for penile intromission, and they experience no desire for fantasizing about the opposite sex. Diverging from psychoanalytic thinking about fetishism, de Clérambault (698) claimed that in this case of female sexual *jouissance*, the sexual object is not taken as a substitute for the male body.

Going forward, I will present how de Clérambault's way of differentiating this perversion from fetishism—and the influence of this thinking on Lacan's theory of the cause of desire (and *jouissance*)—dovetails with the problematization that I develop in this chapter.

In fact, de Clérambault's conceptualization of a sexual object derived from fetishism that does *not* function as a substitute for the male body is relevant to the argument of this entire dissertation. I have discussed that, in his *Three Essays*, Freud initially conceptualized fetishism by considering the genital zone as one of several erogenous zones, demonstrating that the sexual drive attaches itself to various objects. We saw that after writing *Three Essays*, the concept of fetishism led Freud

to modify his theory and discuss sexuality from the perspective of the trauma of sexual difference, finally giving central role to the idea of the genital zone. Freud did so by progressively ascribing a specific meaning to Binet's aetiology of fetishism and theorizing the defence against castration in fetishism. Unlike Freud's theory, Lacan's theory on fetishism, when viewed as a return to de Clérambault's ideas and concepts, leads to a conceptualization of *jouissance* as an experience that is *not* framed as sexual pleasure. Indeed, after crediting de Clérambault's notion of mental automatism as grounding his structural theory of psychopathology (Lacan 1966, 65), Lacan ultimately specifies—as de Clérambault before him, via the erotic passion for fabrics—a type of female *jouissance* that transcends sexual difference by negating the relevance of the phallus (Lacan 1972–3, 69). Here, Lacan (1972–3, 75) describes female *jouissance* as a doubling of *jouissance* (Aflalo 2012, 7–8; Pesenti-Irrmann 2006, 65, 68; Pickmann 2004, 201).

Considering Lacan's interaction with Freud's theory of fetishism in the overall problematization of this dissertation, we can now evaluate the differences between the two thinkers. It can be argued that Lacan's theorization of fetishism, even when referencing Freud's later works on the topic, does *not* align with Freud's thinking at the time. These differences arise for three main reasons: 1) Lacan views fetishism from the perspective of forensic psychiatry, based on theories of perversity; 2) Lacan's theory of fetishism was developed in the context of the psychoanalytic tradition of object-relations; and 3) Lacan discusses the fetish object in service to his theory on subjectivity and his theory on the object of human desire—topics that were not discussed by Freud. In the next chapter, I will conclude the argument carried out thus far in this dissertation.

Conclusion

In this section, I will summarize the most important points discussed in this dissertation, and I will present my conclusions. I will set out with the more fundamental and philosophical reflections of the argumentative structure that I have developed. These reflections are linked to the overarching research questions of this dissertation, questions formulated around how Freud's theory of fetishism challenges the status of perversions as pathological, and how Freud's thoughts on fetishism and perversions can explain human sexuality as independent of a sexual object. I will highlight the line of argumentation that I have developed in this dissertation, and I will discuss how this adds to the knowledge about Freud's psychoanalytic theory of fetishism and perversion as well as his overall theory of psychopathology. Next, I will state my conclusions about the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism, which I have examined in detail. Finally, I will suggest several relevant topics for future research.

In my investigation and discussion of Freud's works on fetishism—in chronological order of their publication—I have argued that the influence of Binet's ideas on Freud's psychoanalytic thinking offers the most convincing evidence for answering the research questions of this dissertation. Specifically, I conclude that Binet's influence on Freud's ongoing re-examination of fetishism provides the context for psychoanalytic thinking in the attempt to evolve conceptualizations and solve problems inherited from nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century neuropathology. I will elaborate on this by linking my conclusive arguments to the research questions formulated in this dissertation.

Considering that fetishism in 1905 did not align with the pathological status of perversions in Freud's psychoanalytic exploration of sexual drive, I posit that when he called for the de-pathologization of perversion through his arguing about fetishism, Freud's critique of the criteria for distinguishing between normal and pathological sexualities—previously established by authors of the literature on sexology and psychiatry in the late-nineteenth century—was actually a continuation of Binet's (and, to a lesser extent, Krafft-Ebing's) previous assumptions on fetishism and the link to normal sexuality. This allows me to conclude that Freud, in hewing to Binet's ideas on fetishism, did *not* undertake a radical critique of his predecessors' theory of sexuality. Rather, Freud in 1905 rendered perversion an empty concept by placing it in the domain of normal sexuality; over the following decades, Freud favoured Binet's ideas on fetishism. In his final works, Freud considered fetishism to be an acceptable sexual eccentricity, if not a welcome sexual abnormality. Although Freud

applied the framework of neurosis to fetishism in service to outlining his theorization in aetiological terms, his final work qualifies fetishism clinically as signifying only a minor pathological condition. Thus, based on the line of argument concerning Binet's influence, my conclusion counters the prerogatives of twenty-first-century authors who claim that Freud's thinking on fetishism provides arguments for new forms of sexual practice and the diversification of sexual desire. Regardless of whether Freud's psychoanalytic categorization of fetishism is framed as either a welcome sexual abnormality, an acceptable sexual eccentricity, or a minor pathological condition, his thinking on this topic constitutes an evolution of—rather than a departure from—the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scientific and conceptual frameworks of (French) neuropathology, represented by Binet's influence. In this same sense, the progressive neuroticization and Oedipalization of Freud's theory of fetishism demonstrated in this dissertation is intrinsically linked to an evolution of Binet's ideas.

By investigating Binet's influence on Freud's thinking, I have been able to answer one of this dissertation's key research questions: How does Freud's psychoanalytic theory of fetishism and perversions explain whether human sexuality is to be understood independently of a sexual object? After his initial exploration of fetishism as the aim of the sexual drive, Freud over subsequent decades wrestled with the question of the fetish object. In doing so, Freud attempted repeatedly to evolve Binet's ideas on the subject, pursuing a psychoanalytic aetiological theory of the fetish object. Thus, I have argued, Binet's influence on Freud's conceptualisation of fetishism over the years culminated in Freud's understanding of human sexuality as being dependent on an object. After actively engaging with Binet's ideas in his works, Freud used the fetish object as his primary vehicle for evolving the concept of trauma, as well as for reviving his concept of defence and splitting.

At this juncture, I wish to identify a relevant topic for future research: a deeper exploration of Freud's theorization of sexual function as a matter of defence and splitting. While Freud indeed concluded that the fetish cannot be an exclusively dominating object choice—and that the fetish can give way to normal sexual behaviour—it is crucial to acknowledge that this formulation depended on Freud's argument of a psychological mechanism—namely, splitting. This mechanism already featured in Binet's ideas on fetishism; as such, Freud's positing of splitting represents a return to his early repurposing of Binet's ideas on doubling. My conclusion that Freud's thinking on sexuality via the lens of fetishism relies on an object is also based on the history of how the fetish object became a central argument in Freud's thinking on psychopathology. Having engaged for more than thirty years in a debate with Binet's theories, as part of Freud's ongoing effort to understand the

conditions that give rise to fetishism, Freud returned to Binet's ideas on doubling, ultimately formulating a psychoanalytic view of splitting based on his overall theory of psychopathology.

My conclusion on the influence of Binet's ideas on doubling in the evolution of Freud's psychoanalytic ideas also holds true for Lacan's ideas. In the previous chapter, I illustrated the ways in which Binet's influence on Lacan's early psychoanalytic theorization—and Lacan's theory of fetishism—resemble Binet's influence on Freud's thinking. I conclude that Lacan's psychoanalytic thinking included an attempt to evolve Binet's conceptualization of doubling already present in French forensic psychiatry, a field in which Lacan was trained. Specifically, when Lacan engaged with the ideas of fetishism, Binet's concept of doubling, and psychoanalytic theory, Lacan was indeed attempting to solve problems that stemmed from French forensic psychiatry. I would suggest that future research could build on this dissertation's conclusion regarding Binet's influence on psychoanalytic theory; an even more extensive, more detailed investigation of the relationship between Freud and Binet—as well as that between Lacan and Binet—will provide further insights into the thinking on fetishism and perversion.

Seen from a more general perspective, the discussions carried out in this dissertation demonstrate that both Freud and Lacan use fetishism to develop fundamental insights into general aspects and *structures* of human psychosexual life. However, another set of research questions formulated in this dissertation concern the differences between Freud's and Lacan's psychoanalytic theories of fetishism. Whereas Freud explored fetishism in part by critiquing the criteria for distinguishing between normal and pathological sexualities, Lacan associated perversion and fetishism with perversity and immorality. Given that this association had already been established in the literature on psychiatry and sexology written by Freud's predecessors, I conclude that Lacan disregards Freud's critique of the criteria for distinguishing between normal and pathological sexualities—a key Freudian exploration into the concepts of perversion and fetishism.

Now, I turn to the research question posed in this dissertation on the link between fetishism, perversions, and the understanding of human sexuality as connected to a sexual object in Lacan's theory. I have concluded that Lacan overlooks Freud's move to de-pathologize fetishism and perversion. In addition, having explored the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism, I conclude that Lacan draws on Freud's theory of sexuality and fetishism in a way that is consistent with the developments of the psychoanalytic tradition of the object relation. In this

sense, Lacan applies the notion of fetishism as well as Freud's theory of sexuality as arguments concerning not the fetish object as such, but the objectification of the subject's body image—and the images of other people in the subject's environment. At this juncture, I conclude that traditional psychoanalytic ideas relating to the object relation and fetishism—represented by the works of Winnicott and Greenacre— resemble the characterization of fetishism intrinsic to the forensic-psychiatry tradition in which Lacan was trained. Having established this similarity in this dissertation, I a propose that a deeper exploration of the relationship between the psychoanalytic tradition of the object relation and topics such as perversity, immorality, and forensic concerns is a relevant subject for future research. To support this assertion, I will now elaborate on the relationship between issues of forensic psychiatry and Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of fetishism and perversion.

Regarding the differences between Freud's and Lacan's theories of fetishism, the topic of objectification features in Lacan's theory for reasons that are absent from Freud's exploration. Whereas Freud views fetishism as an acceptable sexual eccentricity with minor pathological significance, Lacan sees fetishism as a paradigmatic perversion, characterized by a symbolic reduction in intersubjective relations that interrupts the "symbolic functioning of law". Lacan does not theorize fetishism from the perspective of the fetish object; rather, Lacan strives to explain issues of forensic psychiatric thinking that link fetishism to delinquent acts qualified as cruel, aggressive, violent, and murderous. While Freud over the years developed his understanding of fetishism by defining it as a defensive phenomenon, Lacan in contrast addressed fetishism as an offensive phenomenon, by focusing on the processes of "passage to the act" and "acting out". As Lacan evolves his theorization of fetishism, he gets closer and closer to the conceptualization of this topic put forward by his predecessors in forensic psychiatry. Lacan views fetishism and Freud's theory of sexuality as arguments concerning the objectification of the action that causes the subject's desire for the object. In doing so, Lacan casts fetishism less as a sexual practice—as Freud did—and more as a practice that signifies immoral and criminal acts. Freud saw fetishism as a defence; his goal was to uncover the psychological motivation for the object choice. Lacan, on his part, interpreted fetishism as an offensive action that he tried to understand regardless of the object choice. These considerations lead me to conclude that Lacan distances himself from Freud's theoretical undertaking in formulating an aetiological theory of fetishism and seeks instead to incorporate the phenomenon into a more structural theory.

The findings in this dissertation shed light on the challenges Freud and other scholars of psychoanalytic theory encountered in theorizing about fetishism. These challenges are embedded in a broader problematic in which the phenomenon of fetishism resists a conceptual unity within the modern rational discourse of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and sexology. The challenges fetishism posed to psychoanalytic theory led Freud to continually rearticulate his approach to fetishism, adopting different theoretical models. Freud's and Lacan's efforts to apply these theoretical models to fetishism reflect psychoanalytic theory's reliance on ideas and conceptualizations originating in fields beyond psychoanalytic thought per se, most often, as I have concluded, related to the ideas initiated by Binet in French neuropathology. These conclusions provide considerations for future research, especially in view of twenty-first-century authors' claims that Freud's—and Lacan's—thinking on fetishism provides arguments for new forms of sexual practice and the diversification of sexual desire.

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Resumo

Esta dissertação investiga a teoria do fetichismo de Sigmund Freud discutindo duas problemáticas filosóficas maiores. Tais problemáticas são discutidas em termos de 1) como a teoria do fetichismo de Freud desafia o status das perversões como patológicas, e 2) como o pensamento de Freud sobre o fetichismo pode explicar se a sexualidade humana é dependente de um objeto sexual. O principal argumento que estrutura esta dissertação é sobre a influência das idéias do psicólogo francês Alfred Binet sobre o pensamento psicanalítico de Freud sobre o fetichismo. Argumenta-se que em seu trabalho, Freud desenvolve as idéias e conceptualizações de Binet com o objetivo de resolver os problemas causados pelo fetichismo na teoria psicanalítica de Freud sobre o tema. Esta dissertação também afirma que a influência das idéias de Binet sobre o fetichismo no pensamento psicanalítico de Freud também pode ser vista na teoria da perversão de Freud e em sua teoria psicopatológica geral. Finalmente, esta dissertação discute as idéias do psicanalista francês, Jacques Lacan, sobre o fetichismo. Discute-se como as idéias de Lacan sobre o tema estão ligadas a uma teorização sobre a subjetividade e sobre o objeto do desejo humano. Aqui, esta dissertação discute a diferença entre a teoria de Freud e Lacan sobre o fetichismo, bem como o fato de que o pensamento psicanalítico de Lacan sobre o fetichismo e outros tópicos também está engajado na evolução das idéias de Binet.

Curriculum vitae

Ednei Soares de Oliveira Junior is a Brazilian qualified docent, researcher and psychologist with 18 years of experience in South America and Europe. He is passionate about his work, always ambitious and motivated to challenge myself integrating practice, research and teaching. In 2006 he graduated in Psychology at FUMEC University, Belo Horizonte, Brazil and he obtained his master's degree in Psychology at Pontifical Catholic University, Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

Ednei currently works as a docent in the Psychology course at the Behavioural Science Institute at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. From 2012 to 2017, Ednei worked as a docent at in the Psychology course at the University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNA), Brazil and at Pitágoras Faculty in Ipatinga, Brazil. As a docent in 2014 he was awarded the prize Best Anima – Innovative pedagogical practices in by ANIMA Educação, São Paulo, Brazil and the Prize Professor Padre Magela - Best innovative Pedagogical Practices developed by a single docent. He has already worked as a researcher for Foundation for Research Support of Minas Gerais in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

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