Beautiful Spark of Democracy: The Conditions for Democratic Defence Against Incumbent-led Democratic Recession

When democracies are challenged by democratically elected leaders – would-be autocrats – it is up to democratic defenders to sustain democracy. This defence of democracy is, however, neither automatic nor guaranteed, as incumbent-led democratic recession is covert, incremental, and often justified by the would-be autocrat. 

In this thesis, I investigate under what circumstances the defence of democracy occurs: when do elite actors within the typical democratic institutions stand up against the would-be autocrat, and when are they able to persuade citizens to join the defence of democracy? 

Employing computational methods, case studies, elite interviews, and survey experiments, I show that the defence of democracy hinges on elites’ self-interest in preventing the autocratic action, repression by the would-be autocrat, the ambiguity surrounding the autocratic action, and elites’ credibility in the eyes of citizens.

Even when the defence of democracy appears to be an uphill battle, and even though there are many challenges that democratic defenders face, the defence of democracy against incumbent-led democratic recession is both necessary and possible. When aiming to sustain democracies, this thesis shows we need to look beyond institutions and formal rules towards the people within and outside those institutions – elites and citizens alike – and what they do to make democracies resilient.